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Abstract
We analyze equilibrium problems arising from interacting markets and market partic-
ipants, first competing markets with feedback and asymmetric information and then
strategically interacting traders; moreover we develop and analyze a new notion of a
pathwise directional derivative in the context of pathwise Malliavin calculus.
The first chapter analyzes a principal-agent game in which a monopolistic dealer (the
principal) competes with a crossing network for trading with privately informed agents.
The agents choose the best contract, i.e. quantity-price-combination, given their type
and given the utility they could get from trading in the crossing network. The princi-
pal aims at designing pricing schedules that will maximize his profit. We analyze the
structure of the principal’s offer for different outside options ranging from getting noth-
ing for not trading to outside options the principal will not be able to compete with.
We formulate sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the
dealer’s problem and show that in our setting the introduction of the crossing network
is beneficial for the agents. Additionally, we show that an equilibrium price for the
feedback between dealer and crossing network exists and discuss its uniqueness.
In the second chapter we analyze the impact of performance concerns on a problem of
equilibrium pricing. A derivative designed to make a non-financial risk hedgeable shall
be priced such that supply equals the demand from a finite set of agents. The risk mea-
sure of each agent is specified by a Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE).
The argument of the risk measure is the weighted sum of a risky position and the dif-
ference of the agent’s trading gains and the average trading gains of all agents, pun-
ishing below average trading success and thereby requiring a strategic behavior of the
agents. In spite of this strategic interaction, we are able to apply a representative agent
approach (via weighted-dilated infimal convolution of the BSDEs’ drivers) to obtain
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium market price of external risk. In the spe-
cial case of entropic risk measures, we perform a parameter analysis, first analytically
and then numerically, stating the influence of the different model parameters on the
outcome. The equilibrium market price of risk is characterized by the solution to a
quadratic BSDE.
The third chapter provides a link between classical and pathwise Malliavin calculus. On
the one hand, there is the characterization of the Malliavin derivative via directional
derivatives when the path varies with Cameron-Martin functions. On the other hand,
there is the vertical derivative of Dupire, used by Cont and Fournié to establish a path-
wise stochastic calculus of variations, where the variation is a certain step function. We
propose a unifying approach by considering a wide range of variations for which we
define directional derivatives: starting with Cameron-Martin functions we proceed with
Hölder-continuous functions, continuous functions and discontinuous functions (regu-
lated or of bounded variation). For the latter we rely on generalized Riemann-Stieltjes
integrals – a novel approach within this field of research. Finally, we also introduce a
notion of perturbation with a measure.
Zusammenfassung
Wir befassen uns mit Gleichgewichtsproblemen, die bei dem Zusammentreffen von
Märkten und Marktteilnehmern entstehen, zuerst in einem Modell mit konkurrieren-
den Märkten mit Feedback und asymmetrischer Information und dann mit strategisch
interagierenden Händlern. Zudem entwickeln und analysieren wir einen neuen Begriff
der pfadweisen Richtungsableitung im Kontext des pfadweisen Malliavinkalküls.
Im ersten Kapitel analysieren wir ein Prinzipal-Agenten-Problem mit einem monopoli-
stischen Dealer (dem profit-maximierenden Prinzipal), der mit einem Crossing-System
um den Handel mit Agenten mit privater Information konkurriert. Die Agenten wäh-
len entsprechend ihrem Typ und in Anbetracht ihrer Outside-Optionen die für sie be-
ste Preis–Mengen–Kombination aus. Wir untersuchen die Angebote des Prinzipals in
Hinblick auf ihre Struktur für unterschiedliche Outside-Optionen — von der einzigen
Alternative des Nichthandelns und dafür nichts bekommen bis hin zu einer für den
Prinzipal nicht zu überbietenden Outside-Option. Wir formulieren hinreichende Bedin-
gungen für die Existenz und Eindeutigkeit einer Lösung des Maximierungsproblems
des Dealers und zeigen, dass in unserem Modell die Einführung des Crossing-Systems
für die Agenten vorteilhaft ist. Zudem zeigen wir, dass ein Gleichgewichtspreis für das
Feedback-Problem existiert, und diskutieren die Frage nach dessen Eindeutigkeit.
Im zweiten Kapitel analysieren wir den Einfluss von vergleichender Leistungsbewer-
tung von Händlern auf die Preisfindung im Marktgleichgewicht. Ein Derivat auf ein
nicht-finanzielles Risiko soll den Preis bekommen, der am Markt der beteiligten Händler
ein Gleichgewicht von Angebot und Nachfrage erzeugt. Das Risikomaß der Händler ist
durch stochastische Rückwärtsgleichungen (BSDE) gegeben. Das Risiko eines Händlers
setzt sich zusammen aus dem eigenen Risikoprofil, dem Erfolg des Handelns und dem
durchschnittlichen Handelserfolg aller anderen Händler, so dass unterdurchschnittlicher
Handelserfolg bestraft wird. Trotz des so entstehenden strategischen Handelns können
wir einen repräsentativen Agenten bestimmen (mit Hilfe von gewichteter Konvoluti-
on der Treiber der BSDE) und mit dessen Hilfe die Existenz und Eindeutigkeit eines
Gleichgewichtspreises für das nicht-finanzielle Risiko zeigen. Weiterhin können wir den
Gleichgewichtspreis charakterisieren und im Spezialfall von entropischen Risikomaßen
konkret berechnen. In diesem Spezialfall führen wir auch eine Parameteranalyse durch,
um den Einfluss der verschiedenen Modellparameter auf das Marktgleichgewicht (Preis
und Handelsmengen) zu bestimmen.
Das dritte Kapitel verknüpft klassischen und pfadweisen Malliavinkalkül. Malliavin-
Ableitungen lassen sich einerseits mit Hilfe von Richtungsableitungen charakterisieren,
wobei man den Pfad mit Cameron-Martin-Funktionen variieren lässt. Andererseits hat
Dupire den Begriff der vertikalen Ableitung eingeführt, mit dessen Hilfe Cont und Four-
nié den pfadweisen stochastischen Kalkül entwickelten. Dieser Begriff erfordert, dass
Pfade mit Treppenfunktionen variiert werden. Wir untersuchen verschiedene Klassen
von Variationen, um beide Begriffe in einem Rahmen zu verbinden. Zuerst variieren wir
Pfade mit Cameron-Martin-Funktionen, anschließend mit Hölder-stetigen Funktionen,
mit stetigen Funktionen, mit unstetigen Funktionen beschränkter Variation und mit Re-
gelfunktionen. Für die letzten beiden Fälle wenden wir, abweichend von der üblichen
Vorgehensweise, das verallgemeinerte Riemann-Stieltjes-Integral an. Schließlich führen
wir für unser Setting noch den Begriff der Variation mit einem Maß ein.
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0 | Introduction
In the last decades, financial mathematics has motivated mathematical research in areas
ranging from abstract probability theory to applied optimization and from game theory
to the theory of market microstructure. This thesis contributes to different aspects of
equilibrium theory with market imperfections and to pathwise stochastic analysis.
A central question at the intersection of market microstructure, mechanism design and
pricing is how newly emerging alternative tradings systems and new financial products
interact with existing markets and how prices and trade volumes are affected. The first
two out of three chapters of this thesis are motivated by this question.
The first chapter originates from a project with U. Horst and S. Moreno-Bromberg,
which resulted in the joint paper [BHMB16]. We analyze the competition between a
monopolistic Dealer Market (DM) and a Crossing Network (CN), where the latter offers
trades at a price derived from the former. The agents’ types are private information,
hence the dealer solves a screening problem to find the best offer, assuming a fixed
price at the CN. In a second step, we analyze the feedback between DM and CN, lead-
ing to a (not necessarily unique) equilibrium price. We apply our theory to a setting
with a Dark Pool (DP). The methods we use are mainly from mechanism design and
variational analysis.
The second chapter originates from a project with G. dos Reis and A. Lionnet, which
resulted in the joint paper [BLDR17]. Agents can trade in a financial product and a
derivative written on a non-financial risk. Competition is not primarily between those
products, but between the agents, which leads to strategic interaction of the agents and
requires a game-theoretic approach. The goal is to set a price for the derivative such
that the constant supply is met by the demand for the derivative. The combination of a
Walrasian equilibrium problem with strategic interaction is solved by the representative
agent method; mathematically we rely in particular on martingale representation under
measure changes and Malliavin differentiation of BSDEs.
The third chapter, which is based on an ongoing cooperation with P. Imkeller, inves-
tigates pathwise directional (or variational) derivatives with the goal of providing a
common setting for the vertical derivative from [Dup09] and the directional derivative
for Cameron-Martin directions that is closely linked to the Malliavin derivative. While
Malliavin calculus provides the motivation, the methods applied in this chapter are
mostly from integration theory, including the less well-known gauge integral.
In what follows we will introduce the research problems of each chapter, describe our
approach at solving these problems, present our main results and also review the related
literature.
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Introduction to Chapter 1
In traditional financial markets, liquidation of large positions (relative to the available
liquidity) leads to an unfavorable price impact. In response to this problem, alternative
trading venues such as Crossing Networks (CNs) have been established. Their most
prominent features are that trading occurs at a price taken from a reference market (a
stock market or Dealer Market (DM)), and execution of orders is uncertain. This leads
to the question of how the prices and traded volumes in the DM are affected by the
emergence of the CNs.
We model the price-setting market as a monopolistic DM run by a profit-maximizing
principal (or dealer). The agents are traders who can choose between the incentive-
compatible offer made by the dealer and their outside option, which is either not trading
or trading in the CN, depending on which offers the highest (expected) utility. The price
in the CN depends in a prespecified manner on the price schedule offered by the dealer,
and simultaneously it determines the agents’ outside option, thereby influencing the
dealer’s optimal strategy. This feedback loop leads to a fixed point problem, which we
solve step by step.
First, we formulate the optimization problems of the dealer and the traders. The latter
are parametrized by their types, which might represent e.g. inventory positions. The
dealer does not know each agent’s type, but only the distribution of types; hence, he
faces a screening problem. We assume that whenever an agent is indifferent between
DM and CN, the agent will accept the dealer’s offer. For a given execution price in the
CN, the dealer’s objective is to maximize the profit from trading with the agents. We
show that this constrained variational problem has a solution which is unique on the set
of agents participating in the DM.
Second, we analyze the qualitative influence of the CN on the existing market. We prove
that the set of reserved types, i.e. those who trade nothing in exchange for nothing,
shrinks after the introduction of the CN; furthermore, for uniformly distributed types
the spread narrows and the indirect utility, i.e. the highest attainable utility an agent
can obtain from trading with the dealer, increases.
For the purpose of this comparison we first analyze the problem without a CN in the
spirit of [BMR00]. Adding a non-trivial outside option complicates computations sig-
nificantly, rendering an analysis by means of a maximum principle too cumbersome
due to the discontinuities of the model. We overcome this difficulty by using an "ac-
counting trick": Instead of excluding agents with whom trading is too costly we modify
the dealer’s cost function in such a manner that the costs equal the gains from trading
with the previously excluded types of agents. Thus, these types can be regarded as
non-excluded types giving zero revenue to the dealer.
We illustrate the results by means of several examples with and without CN. The struc-
ture of the sets of reserved types of agents, agents who are indifferent between DM
and CN and agents being fully serviced by the dealer can become quite complex, as is
demonstrated in particular in Example 1.4.9.
Having understood the dealer’s problem, we show that for uniformly distributed types
of agents there exists an equilibrium price, i.e., if sell and buy orders in the CN are ex-
ecuted at a specific price, the dealer will find it optimal to offer quantity-price bundles
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such that the best bid and best ask equal those from the CN. The proof is based on
Tarski’s fixed point theorem and the two results that there is a positive bid–ask spread
(Lemma 1.5.1) and that types adjacent to reserved types are fully serviced (Lemma
1.4.7). We show in an example how the equilibrium price can be calculated numeri-
cally by recursively solving the dealer’s problem, calculating the spread and solving the
dealer’s problem again for the new spread.
As an application of our model we consider agents aiming at liquidating their portfolios.
They can choose to do so in a DM or in a Dark Pool (DP) and the agents’ (uniformly
distributed) types correspond to sizes of their portfolios. A DP allows investors to reduce
their market impact by submitting liquidity that is shielded from the public view. The
downside is that trade execution is uncertain: trades take place only when the matching
liquidity is or becomes available, which is not known prior to the placing of orders. In
case of a match, trades are typically settled at prices prevailing in an associated primary
venue, such as the midpoint of the bid–ask spread. We obtain the existence of an
equilibrium price and discuss the lack of the uniqueness thereof.
Related literature
The literature on the impact of market fragmentation and, more specifically, the impact
of alternative trading venues on existing markets, has grown significantly in the last
two decades, see for instance [GST+13], [DVAW05] and [Ori12] for references to both
theoretical and empirical papers.
Topics addressed in the market microstructure literature range from equilibrium models
for competing markets (see e.g. [Glo94] and [PS03]) to the role of impatience and
information and trading costs in the choice of markets (see e.g. [DDH13], [Ye16] and
[DVAW09]) to the impact of emerging alternative trading venues on different aspects
of market quality (see e.g. [Zhu14] and [BRW16]).
A common approach in the theoretical literature is to assume that the market partici-
pants trade only a single unit of the stock. For instance, in their seminal work, [HM00]
derive conditions for the viability of the alternative trading institutions in a modeling
framework where a random number of informed and liquidity traders, each buying or
selling a single unit, chooses between a DM and a CN. In their model, dealers receive
multiple single–unit orders and cannot distinguish between the informed and the liq-
uidity orders.
In our model we have private information, but, contrary to [HM00], [BMR00], [Zhu14]
and others, no public value. Therefore, there is no adverse selection and the monopo-
listic dealer cannot lose against informed traders.
The models considered by [Pag92], [Jul00] and [PSS+08] feature this kind of screen-
ing problem. The former analyzes, in quite a general setting where the set of con-
sumer types is a Polish space and the contract space an arbitrary compact metric space,
the problem of a monopolist who faces both a screening problem (as in the work at
hand) as well as a moral-hazard one relative to contract performance. [Jul00], on the
other hand, only studies the screening problem in a finite-dimensional setting. This al-
lows him to find a quasi-explicit representation of the optimal contract using Lagrange-
multiplier techniques. He identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating,
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to be non-stochastic and to induce full participation. Furthermore, he also discusses the
nature of the solution when bunching occurs. Neither of the two papers mentioned
analyzes the case where the dealer’s choices may have an impact on the structure of
the reservation–utility function, which in turn would influence his decisions. Our study
of such a feedback loop is novel and it is a crucial component in our analysis of the
interactions between DMs and CNs, which is typically not unidirectional.
[Fag96] and [PSS+08] study models of dealers competing for agents with private infor-
mation about their types. The former analyzes a model with two equal dealers and an
agent who may have one out of two possible types. The latter allows more than two
agents and an unspecified type space, but still all dealers are identical. Contracts and
the resulting competitive equilibria are called efficient if, among other requirements, the
dealers obtain zero profit. Our setting differs significantly from both papers by having
only one profit-maximizing dealer who competes with a CN whose price-schedule solely
depends on the dealer’s price, without any further maximization. While they have true
Nash Equilibria, we have only a one-sided optimization. Without the symmetry from
having identical dealers, it is not clear a priori that an equilibrium must exist in our
setting.
As an application we think of DPs as a specific type of alternative trading venue. Si-
multaneous trading at a DM and a DP is modelled for instance in [HN14] and [KS15].
However, neither allows for an impact of off–exchange trading on the dynamics of the
associated DM, which is precisely the feedback effect that we focus on.
Besides the cited theoretical works there exists a growing number of papers presenting
empirical results on the effects of market fragmentation in general and dark trading
venues in particular. For instance, [Bat97] empirically observes a positive effect of new
OTC1 trading (and hence increased market fragmentation) on NYSE-listed securities
and a tightening spread. [Gre06] finds that risk-sharing benefits from CNs dominate
fragmentation costs and cream-skimming2; if dealers are allowed to trade in the CN,
then they can offer better prices. [NØ06] analyze different costs associated to trading
in CNs such as direct trading costs (e.g. originating from the spread), adverse selection
costs and opportunity costs from delayed trading. They find that implicit costs are larger
than explicit trading costs. [NR14] present, besides a good literature review, evidence
of informed traders in CNs, suggesting that information and price discovery happen in
CNs due to concurrent trading. [DdJK15] empirically supports the theory of cream-
skimming and finds a negative impact of dark trading on the related lit market. [AV15]
finds empirical evidence for negative spillover effects of dark trading. [FP16] show
that two-sided dark pools (i.e., dark limit order books (LOBs)) are beneficial, whereas
the impact of one-sided dark pools (where crossing occurs e.g. at the midpoint of the
bid–ask spread) is not clear and has an adverse-selection effect. We can sum up the
empirical results with a statement from [GST+13, Section 7.3]: "It is also possible that
all types of dark pool trading activity may not have a uniform impact on the markets,
given the different types of market structure that are clubbed in its definition."
1OTC (over-the-counter) – trading that occurs away from traditional exchange markets
2Cream-skimming refers to the effect that informed dealers tend to prefer the DM, whereas unin-
formed traders move to the DP, leading to a higher (adverse selection) risk for the dealer who faces the
better-informed traders.
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Introduction to Chapter 2
In this chapter we study the effects of social interaction between economic agents on a
market equilibrium, on the efficiency of a securitization mechanism and on the overall
risk. We consider a finite set A of N agents having access to an incomplete market
consisting of an exogenously priced liquidly traded financial asset. The incompleteness
stems from a non-tradable external risk factor, such as the amount of rain or the tem-
perature, to which those agents are exposed. In an attempt to reduce the individual and
overall market risks, a social planner introduces to the market a derivative written on
the external risk source, allowing the agents in A to reduce their exposures by trading
on it, and, under suitable conditions, completing the market.
Agents are price takers in a market with a stock and a derivative, they calculate how
much they would like to buy or sell for a given price (θ) and while the stock market
is exogenous, the market for the derivative clears due to what could be interpreted as
a Walrasian clearinghouse3. This institution or person uses the knowledge about the
agents’ preferences in order to determine a price such that the market for the derivative
clears. Then the actual trading will happen at this price. Completeness of the market is
first assumed and then verified a posteriori in equilibrium. If demand for the derivative
equals the supply and all shares of the derivative are held by agents in A, then we say
that we have zero net supply.
We add to this Walrasian equilibrium model some strategic behavior of the agents:
Instead of just maximizing their profit from trading (or minimizing their risk), they
also assess their trading gains relative to the average trading gains of all other agents.
Each agent a ∈ A has an endowment Ha over the time period [0, T ] depending on both
risk factors. Her investment strategy pia in stock and the newly introduced derivative
induces a gains process (V at (pi
a))t∈[0,T ]. For a given performance concern rate λa ∈ [0, 1]
the agent seeks to minimize the risk
ρa0
(
Ha +
(
1− λa)V aT (pia) + λa(V aT (pia)− 1N − 1 ∑
b∈A\{a}
V bT (pi
b)
))
, (0.0.1)
where ρat (t ∈ [0, T ]) is a dynamic risk measure, which is derived from a BSDE with
driver ga and terminal condition given by minus the argument of ρa0. The first two terms
inside ρa0 correspond to the classical situation of an isolated agent a trading optimally in
the market to profit from market movements and to hedge the financial risks inherent to
Ha. The last term is the relative performance concern and corresponds to the difference
between her own trading gains and the average trading gains achieved by her peers.
Intuitively, as λa ∈ [0, 1] increases, the agent is less concerned with the risks associated
to her endowment Ha and more concerned with how she fares against the average
performance of the other agents in A. Thus, individual optimization is replaced by
finding a Nash Equilibrium (NE).
Building upon the methods of equilibrium pricing from [HM07], [HPDR10] solve the
model without strategic interaction by the representative agent approach4, which is
3See for instance [Ath13, Chapter 1] for a conceptional exposition of the model of Arrow, Debreu and
McKenzie and [Ath13, Section 2.2] on the Walrasian clearinghouse.
4For the origin of the representative agent approach see [Neg60], where aggregation of the agents into
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known to be successful in providing Walrasian prices in this setting. With the addition
of strategic interaction, and thus a combination of Nash and Walras equilibrium con-
cepts, the success of the representative agent approach is not clear a priori. We do not
only find the appropriate manner of aggregation such that the representative agent has
preferences described in the same way as individual agents. We also verify that the rep-
resentative agent approach provides a correct equilibrium price vector such that, given
all agents adopt the (unique) NE strategy, the market for the derivative clears. An equi-
librium in our setting is thus a collection of investment strategies and a market price of
external risk.
We proceed as follows: At first, the performance concerns appear in the BSDE’s terminal
condition and not in the driver. For the purpose of finding the strategies that minimize
the agents’ risk functionals, it turns out to be more convenient to move the performance
terms from the terminal condition into the driver and obtain a new BSDE. That BSDE
can be minimized by minimizing the driver (cf. [HPDR10]). Suitable assumptions on the
said driver (convexity, existence of unique minimizer) allow us to replace the expression
depending on the other agents by an expressing that solely depends on the single agent’s
driver. As the terminal payoff is linear in the other agents’ average performance, the NE
for a given market price of risk can be computed by solving a linear system Api = J
(cf. [ET15, Section 3.2]). The matrix A contains the performance concern parameters
λ·, while the right hand side vector J contains the solutions of N (independent) BSDEs
and depends on θ.
The equilibrium market price of risk (θ∗) for zero net supply is characterized by the
equation
0 =
∑
a∈A
Z˜a,2t (θ
∗)−Za,2(t,−θ∗t )
(1 + λ˜a)
, (0.0.2)
where λ˜a = λ
a
N−1 , Za(t, ϑ) is characterized by∇zga(t,Z) = ϑ and the pair (Y˜ a, Z˜a) solves
the BSDE with terminal condition Y˜ aT = −Ha and driver G˜a(t, za) = ga(t,Za(t,−θt)) +
〈Za(t,−θt), θt〉 − 〈za, θt〉.
For the special case of entropic risk, i.e. ga(z) = |z|
2
2γa
(corresponding to expected expo-
nential utility), Equation (0.0.2) can be rearranged and solved for θ∗. For more general
drivers we show that, assuming that the market is complete, the representative agent
approach gives θ∗. The representative agent’s risk is given by a BSDE whose driver is
a weighted infimal convolution of all agents’ drivers. (0.0.2) suggests that the weights
should be 1
1+λ˜a
modulo some scaling. For the special case of entropic risk we verify
that, under suitable assumptions, the market with the derivative is complete, we prove
regularity results and we perform a parameter analysis. First, we calculate analytically
the signs of the partial derivatives of aggregated risk with respect to the parameters λa
(a ∈ A), total and individual risk tolerance and number of units of the derivative (n),
as well as the signs of the ∂nθR· and ∂nB
θ
· . Following the analytic parameter analysis we
numerically perform a parameter analysis for the special case A = {a, b} on how initial
trading activity pia0 , the derivative’s price B
θ
0 and total and individual risk Y
w
0 and Y
a
0
(a ∈ A) change as performance concerns and risk tolerance change.
a single economy and optimal Pareto risk sharing are equivalent to simultaneous individual optimization.
Compare this with competitive equilibrium pricing, e.g. in [CHKP16].
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Our main contribution is twofold: First, we demonstrate that the representative agent
approach can be successfully applied to our model where Walrasian and Nash Equi-
librium are combined. In particular, an a priori difficult system of BSDEs with inter-
dependencies (cf. [ET15, Section 4.1]) is transformed into a single (solvable) BSDE,
which can be interpreted as giving the representative agent’s risk. Second, we obtain
qualitative results concerning the effects of performance concerns when a derivative is
introduced in a market in order to reduce exposure to previously non-hedgeable risks.
Related Literature
The theory of monetary, possibly convex, possibly coherent, risk measures was initiated
by [ADEH99] and later extended by [FS02] and [FRG02]. One special class of risk
measures, the so-called g-conditional risk measures, which are closely related to the
so-called g-conditional expectations (see [Gia06]), are those defined through Backward
Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs), see [Pen97], [ER09] and [BE09]. Our use of
BSDEs is motivated by two general aspects. The first is that it generically allows to solve
stochastic control problems away from the usual Markovian setup where one uses the
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman approach in combination with theory of partial differential
equations (PDEs), see e.g. [Tou13]. The second is that optimization can be carried out
in closed sets of constraints without the assumption of convexity for which one usually
uses duality theory, see [HIM05].
The question of the completeness of the resulting market has been addressed in some
generality in the literature, and we refer for instance to [Sch17]. For questions about
pricing and benefits of securities written on non-tradable assets, we refer in particular
to [HM07] and [HPDR10], where the new derivative is priced such that supply equals
demand, and more generally to [AR08]. For a good overview of equilibrium issues
stemming the frommarket incompleteness as well as some solutions we point the reader
to [KXŽ15] and references therein.
Our market model is based on that in [HM07] and [HPDR10]5. While the former consid-
ers a problem of maximizing the expected terminal (exponential) utility from trading,
the latter minimizes the risk corresponding to the solution of a BSDE with exponential
utility only as special case. In both papers, an equilibrium price is such that the demand
for the derivative (on the non-financial risk), given that all agents trade optimally, equals
the constant supply. The representative agent approach is used in [HPDR10] whereas
it is only briefly mentioned in [HM07, Remark 3.1]. In contrast to both papers, we do
not start with the question of how to price the derivative in the given setting, but we
take this method of pricing as given and analyze how the introduction of a strategic
component (i.e., performance concerns) affects this method of pricing. This requires
that we find a NE, prove its uniqueness before calculating the equilibrium price, and
perform a parameter analysis with respect to (w.r.t.) the new parameters.
The importance of relative concerns in human behavior has been emphasized both in
economic and sociological studies. In his pioneering monograph [Due49], Duesenberry
does not only present arguments supporting “interdependence of preference systems”,
but he also explains data on saving which, without such interdependence, would be
5For more details on the differences between this work and [HPDR10] see Remark 2.6.7.
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inconsistent with the theory. The utility functions representing such interdependencies,
mostly developed and used only decades after Duesenberry’s work, are said to exhibit a
“keeping up with the Joneses” behavior. Contributions to this theory have been made,
among others, by [Abe90], [Abe99], [Gal94], [CK02], [Góm07] and [XZ10]. A slightly
different concern criterion uses the past consumption of the agent as a benchmark for
the current consumption; [RH73] introduced this “habit formation” approach.
An application beyond private households and firms is presented for instance in [Ped15]
and [HRAY10]: The social interaction component appears in the form of peer-based
under-performance penalties known as “Minimum Return Guarantees”; the compari-
son is usually done via tracking a relevant market index, something quite standard in
pension fund management.
Our performance functional compares total trading gains from a given time period with
the average gains made by all other agents; it originates from [Esp10] and the papers
referring to it, [ET15] and [FdR11].
[ET15] have a model of agents aiming to trade optimally in a market with given prices.
Hence there is no Arrow-Debreu model of equating supply with demand and conse-
quently there is no need for a representative agent. Furthermore, most of the work is
done for exponential utility and not a general utility function. Only very briefly and
solely for exponential utility do they consider a general equilibrium. They solve this
problem without a representative agent in a manner similar to our Section 2.5.1. Their
focus is not on trading strategies and pricing, but rather on the market index, i.e. the
average wealth of all agents, and the impact of trading constraints.
On the other hand, [FdR11] focus on the role of investment constraints on the existence
of equilibria. Again, there is no Arrow-Debreu type model, hence no representative
agent. We solve unconstrained optimization problems and verify the admissibility a
posteriori, where the admissibility criterion is deliberately chosen weak enough to not
prevent existence of equilibria.
Introduction to Chapter 3
The motivation for this chapter comes from pathwise Malliavin calculus. Our study
objects are functionals on the path space of a specific structure for which we want to
obtain directional derivatives for different classes of directions (i.e., variations).
Stochastic calculus of variations, also known as Malliavin calculus, provides a link be-
tween stochastic and classical analysis. Since Malliavin’s seminal papers in the 1970s,
the topic has been developed and expanded in different directions and with different
applications in mind, see e.g. [Bel06] for a brief historic overview, an exposition of
different approaches and applications of Malliavin calculus.
A recent area of research develops pathwise notions of differentiation and integra-
tion in the context of the study of the regularity of Wiener functionals. A first ap-
proach to extend integration to paths of low regularity is Lyons’ rough path theory
(e.g. [LQ02], [FV10]), which introduced iterated integrals of rough paths. A further
approach uses Fourier expansions and concepts of control between integrand and in-
tegrator, see e.g. [Gub04], [GIP15] and [GIP16]. A third approach addresses the rep-
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resentation theorem by Clark, Ocone and Haussmann: With the methodology from
pathwise Malliavin calculus, the integrand can be explicitly given ([Nua06, Proposition
1.3.14] with conditional expectation or [CF13, Theorem 5.9] for a version with vertical
derivative).
The notions of vertical and horizontal derivative in [Dup09] and [CF13] go beyond
the directional derivatives from variation with Cameron-Martin functions, which are
intimately connected with the ordinary Malliavin derivative. That connection, which
is nicely presented e.g. in [Øk97], raises the question of whether or how to define
directional derivatives beyond variations in the Cameron-Martin space in a manner that
allows to maintain the link to the Malliavin derivative and obtain the vertical derivative6
as special case.
We restrict our analysis to functionals that have a specific representation. This is not
as strict an assumption as it might seem; the reason is that functionals on the path
space can be factorized as functionals on the sequence space, see e.g. the first chapter
of [Imk08] for details.
If a functional on Ω = C(I;R) for I = [0, 1] has the specific structure of a cylinder
function, i.e., for a fixed orthonormal basis (ONB) of L2(I), (hk)k∈N, one has F (ω) =
f(θh1 (ω), . . . , θ
h
n(ω)) for θ
h
k(ω) =
∫
I
hk(t)dω(t) (k = 1, . . . , n), then the Malliavin deriva-
tive of F with respect to time t evaluated for path ω can be calculated by the chain rule.
On the other hand, if for all Cameron-Martin functions γ ∈ H(I) there exists a function
ψ(t, ω) satisfying
DγF (ω) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
[F (ω + εγ)− F (ω)] =
∫
I
ψ(t, ω)dγ(t),
then one may define DF (t, ω) := ψ(t, ω) for t ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω. As was pointed out in
[Øk97], if the Malliavin derivative DF (t, ω) exists in both definitions, then both yield
the same result.
While the above definition ofDγF (ω) requires only perturbations of ω of the type ω+εγ
with ε > 0 and γ ∈ H(I) (Cameron-Martin space), the literature of pathwise calculus al-
ready features perturbations that go beyond variations with Cameron-Martin functions.
For instance, the vertical perturbation in [Dup09] or [CF13] ωhT (s) := ω(s) + h1{T}(s)
(s ∈ [0, T ]) or the variation with a step function in [SUV07] ω(s)+h1[t,T ](s) (s ∈ [0, T ]).
Our goal is to find conditions on F for different classes of perturbations γ such that for
fixed ω ∈ Ω
• the directional derivative DγF (ω) := limε→0 1ε [F (ω + εγ)− F (ω)] exists,
• the Malliavin derivative at ω,DF (t, ω), is integrable against γ in the Stieltjes sense,
i.e.,
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) is a well-defined Stieltjes integral,
• the equality DγF (ω) =
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) holds.
6The horizontal derivative vanishes for functionals that do not explicitly depend on time.
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We consider either cylinder functions or functions given by their infinite representation
F (ω) = f((θhk(ω))k∈N); such an infinite representation is known to exist on the Wiener
space. If we let βk(ω) := ∂∂xk f((θ
h
k(ω))k∈N), then the Malliavin derivative of F , if it exists,
has (by the chain rule) the form DF (t, ω) =
∑∞
k=1 βk(ω)hk(t). Similarly, the candidate
for the directional derivative is DγF (ω) =
∑∞
k=1 βk(ω)
∫
I
hk(t)dγ(t).
With F of the above specific structure, the three aspects of our goal give us four mathe-
matical problems, namely finding conditions such that
• the Stieltjes integral ∫
I
hk(t)dγ(t) exists in a given sense,
• the series defining DγF (ω) converges,
• DF (·, ω) is integrable w.r.t. γ (in the same sense),
• integration and infinite summation (i.e., taking the limit to get the series) can be
interchanged.
The classes of perturbations that we consider are Cameron-Martin functions, α-Hölder-
continuous functions (vanishing at 0, for α ∈ (0, 1)), continuous functions (vanishing
at 0), functions of bounded variation, regulated functions (i.e., functions which are
uniform limits of step functions) and finite measures. Perturbing a path with a measure
makes sense in our setting because all perturbations are, ultimately, integrators of Haar
functions or of functions given by their orthogonal development w.r.t the Haar basis.
In the first part, we present the setting, introduce the notation and present the bench-
mark case of functions from the Cameron-Martin space. The first extension, by which
we depart from the literature, is the case of Hölder-continuous functions, which calls for
the application of the Young-Stieltjes (YS) integral. From this point onwards we use the
Haar functions as ONB of L2(I) – this particular choice allows us to apply Ciesielski’s iso-
morphism, which we also briefly recall. The next extension – from Hölder-continuous to
merely continuous functions – goes slightly beyond Ciesielski’s isomorphism and, more
importantly, does not fall into the setting for Young’s integration theory. While we do im-
pose the rather strict requirement that DF (·, ω) must have finite variation, we make no
assumption on the p-variation of γ for any p. Instead, we notice that with a continuous
integrator and a bounded integrand we are well in the setting of Riemann-Stieltjes (RS)
integration.
The extension beyond continuous variation requires additional changes in the definition
of our functional F : If we want to evaluate it for ω + εγ, that expression must fall
into the domain of F . Consequently, we extend the domain of F and also space of
functions that are allowed as perturbations of ω first to the set of functions of bounded
variations and then to the set of regulated functions. The integrals go beyond both RS-
and YS theory. Instead, we work with Lebesgue-Stieltjes (LS) integrals and the even
broader class of generalized RS integrals (analogous to gauge integrals). Even though
this is a true extension of the variations with continuous functions, the condition on
the coefficients β·(ω) associated to F (or, more precisely, to f), remain the same. This
condition (roughly speaking, it is (2p/2βpm(ω))p∈N0,m∈{1,...,2p} ∈ ℓ1) is closely linked to the
Haar functions, which increase with the factor 2p/2. We illustrate this link in Example
3.4.20 and Remark 3.4.21.
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The last class of perturbations are measures. We present two possibilities of defining
the corresponding directional derivatives. The first relies on the previous results by
assigning to a measure the corresponding distribution function and thus returning to
functions as variations. The second uses the abstract Lebesgue integral with respect to
given measures.
The variations with 1{T}(s) (s ∈ [0, T ]) and 1[t,T ](s) (s ∈ [0, T ]) mentioned at the be-
ginning are covered by our theory and emerge as a natural extension of variations with
Cameron-Martin functions instead of a completely separate object.
Related literature
While Itô’s stochastic calculus provides a stochastic integral that was not available in
a pathwise (LS) sense, new developments in deterministic calculus (in particular in
integration theory) permit in specific situations to return to a pathwise definition.
The pathwise approach to Malliavin and Itô calculus has received increasing attention
in the last decade and a half. One motivation for this development is the need for results
that are robust with respect to model uncertainty, as was the case for instance in [Vol16]
or [PP16]. The former develops a pathwise integral from Föllmer’s ideas (see [Föl81]),
the latter proposes a controlled rough paths integral.
Another application is Monte Carlo Simulation, where pathwise derivatives are used to
estimate derivatives, for instance in calculating Greeks in Mathematical Finance. See
for instance [Gla04, Section 7.2].
A quick overview on functional Itô calculus can be found in [BCC16, Chapter 4]. For
the link to [Föl81] we refer to the beginning of [BCC16, Chapter 5].
The theory of rough paths (see for instance [LCL07] or [FH14]), allows integration
beyond semimartingale integrators (for instance integration w.r.t. fractional brownian
motion, see [Nou12, Chapter 3]) and gives meaning to previously ill-posed stochastic
PDEs.
Besides the applications mentioned above, perturbing paths in a non-smooth (in par-
ticular discontinuous) way is a common tool when working with Lévy processes, see
e.g. [SUV07] where the variation is w.r.t. a step function s ↦→ x · 1[t,∞)(s) (s ∈ I ⊂ R).
So in some applications paths are not assumed to be continuous, but only càdlàg. We
will start with continuous paths, but we will come across discontinuous paths and per-
turbations thereof from Section 3.6 onwards.
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Notation
We introduce here only chapter-independent notation. Due to the differences between
the topics of the chapters, we will introduce further specific notation in each of the
chapters.
R shall denote the real numbers and N = {1, 2, 3, . . .} the (positive) natural numbers.
For closed intervals we use the notation [a, b], whereas the corresponding open intervals
are denoted (a, b). The left and right limits of of function f at x are denoted by f(x−)
and f(x+), respectively. For x ∈ R, |x| denotes the Euclidean norm of x. For definitions
we use the notation ":=". The subdifferential of a function f , evaluated at x, is denoted
by ∂f(x). If A ⊂ Ω, i.e. A is a subset of the space Ω, then Ac = Ω \A is the complement
of A in Ω. If, for vector spaces A and B, we are given a function f : A → B and x ∈ A,
then f ′(x) denotes the derivative of f at x. If time and space variables appear, we use
f˙(t) to denote the derivative w.r.t. the time parameter. We write f ≡ c if the function
f : A → B is given by f(x) = c for some c ∈ B and all x ∈ A. The partial derivative of
a function f w.r.t. variable x is denoted by ∂f
∂x
, ∇xf or fx for short if there is no danger
of confusion with other subindices. The abbreviations P − a.a. and P − a.e. stand for
P-almost all and P-almost everywhere, respectively, where P denotes a measure.
1 | Analysis of Crossing Networks
Interacting with Dealer Markets
via a Principal-Agent Model
1.1 Organization of this chapter
Our model and main results are presented in Section 1.2. Existence of a solution to
the dealer’s optimization problem is established in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 studies the
impact of a CN on the spread. Section 1.5 establishes our result regarding the existence
of equilibrium price schedules. A specific application to a portfolio-liquidation problem
with DP trading is analyzed in Section 1.6; Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model and main results
We consider a quote-driven market for an asset, in which a risk-neutral dealer engages a
group of privately-informed traders1. The Dealer Market (DM) is described by a pricing
schedule T : R → R. In other words, q units of the asset are offered to be traded, on a
take–it–or–leave–it basis, for the amount T (q). For q ∈ R, we refer to the pair (q, T (q))
as a contract. We assume that T (0) = 0 and that T is absolutely continuous. Thus, we
may write
T (q) =
∫ q
0
t(s)ds, q ≥ 0,
and analogously for negative values of q.Here t(s) is the marginal price at which the s-th
unit is traded. As we shall see below, pricing schedules are, in general, not differentiable
at zero. Hence, for a particular schedule T the spread is
S(T ) := |T ′(0+)− T ′(0−)| = |t(0+)− t(0−)|,
where t(0−) and t(0+) are the best–bid and best–ask prices, respectively. We denote by
C : R → R the dealer’s inventory or risk costs associated with a position q, e.g. the
impact costs of unwinding a portfolio of size q in a limit order book. We assume that
the mapping q ↦→ C(q) is strictly convex, coercive2 and that it satisfies C(0) = 0.
1Our dealer is called the principal in the contract-theory jargon and the traders are usually referred to
as the agents.
2A function C : R→ R is called coercive if lim|q|→∞ C(q) = +∞.
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The traders’ idiosyncratic characteristics are represented by the index θ that runs over
a closed interval Θ := [θ, θ], called the set of types. We assume that zero belongs to the
interior of Θ. Saying that a trader’s type is θ means that if he trades q shares for T (q)
dollars his utility is u(θ, q)− T (q), where
u(θ, q) := θψ1(q) + ψ2(q).
We make the following assumption3:
Assumption 1.2.1. ψ1, ψ2 : R → R are smooth functions that satisfy ψ1(0) = ψ2(0) = 0,
ψ1 is strictly increasing and C(q)− ψ2(q) ≥ 0 holds for all q ∈ R.
Thus far, with our choice of preferences the traders enjoy a type–independent reserva-
tion utility of zero, should they decide to abstain from trading in the DM. Such an action
is commonly referred to agents choosing their outside option. As C(0) = 0, providing(
0, T (0)
)
is costless to the dealer and, since
(
0, T (0)
)
yields all agents their reservation
utility, in the absence of any other trading opportunity, we may equate the contract (0, 0)
to the traders’ outside option.
Besides participating in the DM, each trader has the possibility to submit an order to
a Crossing Network (CN) The latter is an alternative trading venue where trades take
place at fixed bid/ask prices pi :=
(
pi−, pi+
)
, but where execution might not be guaran-
teed.4 The possibility of trading in the CN modifies the traders’ outside option to the
extent that now they may choose between abstaining from all trading and earning zero
or participating in the CN if the corresponding expected utility is non-negative. For a
specific pi, the quantity u0(θ; pi) ≥ 0 represents the expected utility of the θ-type investor
who decides to take his (now extended) outside option. In a slight abuse of the lan-
guage we also refer to u0(·; pi) as the agents’ outside option(s). Following [DDH13] and
[HM00] we focus on the case where a trader chooses exclusively between his outside
option and trading in the DM, i.e., we do not allow for simultaneous participation in
the DM and the CN. Initially we take pi as given, but later we analyze the case where it
is endogenously determined through the interaction between the DM and the CN. We
work under the following assumption:
Assumption 1.2.2. There is a fixed cost κ > 0 of accessing the outside option such that, for
all pi ∈ R2, the function u0(·; pi) can be written as u0(·; pi) = max
{
u˜0(·; pi) − κ, 0
}
, where
u˜0(0; pi) = 0.
Trading in the DM is anonymous; the dealer is unable to determine a trader’s type before
he engages the latter. The only ex-ante information the dealer has is the distribution of
the individual types over Θ, which is described by a density f : Θ → R+. In the sequel
we specify the traders’ and the dealer’s optimization problems and analyze the impact
of the CN on the DM, especially on its spread.
3Once an assumption has been made, we consider it to be standing for the remainder of the chapter.
4In other words, the CN presents agents with possibly better prices at the cost of an uncertain exe-
cution. CN trading often benefits agents who intend to unwind large positions, which might result in a
price impact.
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1.2.1 The traders’ problem
Until further notice we consider pi to be fixed. The problem of a trader of type θ is to
determine, for a given pricing schedule T,
qm(θ) := argmax
q
{
u(θ, q)− T (q)
}
and then choose, for qm ∈ qm(θ), between his indirect utility v(θ) := u
(
θ, qm
) − T(qm)
from trading in the DM and his outside option u0(θ; pi). As the supremum of affine
functions, the indirect–utility function is convex.
The choice of a pricing schedule T induces a partition of the type space. We say that a
trader of type θ participates in the DM if v(θ) ≥ u0(θ; pi), assuming that ties are broken in
the dealer’s favor. Conversely, we say that a trader of type θ is excluded from trading in
the DM if v(θ) < u0(θ; pi). For a given schedule T, we denote the set of excluded types by
Θe(T ; pi). Observe that in the absence of a CN there is no loss of generality in assuming
that all traders participate. We say that a trader of type θ is fully serviced if he earns
strictly positive profits from interacting with the dealer.
1.2.2 The dealer’s problem
According to the Revelation Principle (see e.g. [Mye91]) there is no loss of generality
in focusing on direct-revelation mechanisms, i.e., those mechanisms where the set of
types indexes the contracts. Furthermore, from the Taxation Principle (see e.g. [Roc85])
there is also no loss of generality in writing τ(θ) instead of T (q(θ)), where τ : Θ → R
is an absolutely continuous function. From this point on we shall, therefore, study our
principal-agent game through books of the form
{(
q(θ), τ(θ)
)
, θ ∈ Θ} and drop T from
the specification of the indirect–utility functions. We also write Θe(q, τ ; pi) instead of
Θe(T ; pi) for the set of excluded types.
At the onset, a trader of type θ could misrepresent his type by choosing a contract(
q(θ˜), τ(θ˜)
)
, with θ˜ ̸= θ. The dealer strives to avoid this situation, since he wants to
exploit the information contained in the density of types. This requires that he offers
incentive-compatible books, i.e. those that satisfy
max
θ˜∈Θ
{
u
(
θ, q(θ˜)
)− τ(θ˜)} = u(θ, q(θ))− τ(θ).
In the presence of an incentive-compatible book, the contract that yields a trader of type
θ his indirect utility is precisely the one the dealer has designed for him.
Since the dealer is risk neutral, his goal is to maximize his expected income from en-
gaging the traders. Taking into account the impact of the CN on the traders’ optimal
actions, his problem is to devise (q∗, τ ∗) so as to solve the problem
P(pi) :=

sup(q,τ)
∫
Θce(q,τ ;pi)
(
τ(θ)− C(q(θ)))f(θ)dθ
s.t.
(q, τ) is incentive-compatible,
τ is absolutely continuous.
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Due to the Envelope Theorem, if a contract
{
(q(θ), τ(θ)
)
, θ ∈ Θ} is incentive-compatible,
then ψ1(q(θ)) belongs to the subdifferential ∂v(θ). Since for almost all θ ∈ Θ it holds
that ∂v(θ) = v′(θ) and ψ1 is strictly increasing, we have for almost all θ ∈ Θ that
q(θ) = ψ−11
(
v′(θ)
)
. (1.2.1)
Therefore, starting from a convex indirect–utility function we can recover, for almost all
types, the quantities in the incentive-compatible book that generated it. Furthermore,
the indirect–utility function may be written as
v(θ) = θψ1
(
ψ−11
(
v′(θ)
))
+ ψ2
(
ψ−11
(
v′(θ)
))− τ(θ)
= θ v′(θ) + (ψ2 ◦ ψ−11 )(v′(θ))− τ(θ).
(1.2.2)
It follows from Equations (1.2.1) and (1.2.2) that the traders’ indirect–utility function
contains all the information about the quantities and the pricing schedule, which allows
us to write Θce(v; pi) instead of Θ
c
e(q, τ ; pi). In particular, introducing the functions
K˜(q) := C
(
ψ−11 (q)
)− ψ2(ψ−11 (q)) and i(θ, v, q) := θq − v − K˜(q)
and denoting by C the cone of all real-valued convex functions over Θ, we can restate
the dealer’s problem as
P(pi) = sup
v∈C
∫
Θce(v;pi)
i
(
θ, v(θ), v′(θ)
)
f(θ)dθ.
We prove in Theorem 1.2.5 below that, under suitable assumptions, Problem P(pi) ad-
mits a solution. The latter is, in fact, quasi-unique in the sense that on the set of
participating types the solution is indeed unique. However, agents are excluded by
offering them any incentive-compatible indirect–utility function that lies below u0. In
other words, there is no uniqueness on the set of excluded types. From the agents’
point of view there is no ambiguity: they either trade with the dealer or they take their
outside option. The non-uniqueness is also no issue for the dealer, since it only appears
in subdomains of the type space that he does not access. With this in mind, in the sequel
we denote by v(·; pi) “the” solution to Problem P(pi).
Assumption 1.2.3. The functions ψ1, ψ2 and C are such that K˜ is strictly convex, coercive,
continuously differentiable and it satisfies K˜ ′(0) = 0.
Determining the set of types who do participate but who get zero utility is essential to
our analysis, since it is precisely at the boundary types where the best–bid and best–
ask prices t(0−) and t(0+) are determined. We prove in Lemma 1.4.7 that, by virtue of
Assumption 1.2.2, these limits are always well defined. For any v ∈ C, we shall refer to
Θ0(v) := {θ ∈ Θ | v(θ) = 0}
as the set of reserved traders. Whenever we refer to the reserved set corresponding to
the solution v(·; pi) to P(pi) we write Θ0(pi). We prove in Proposition 1.3.2 that there
is no loss of generality in assuming that any admissible v ∈ C satisfies v(0) = 0; thus,
Θ0(v) ̸= ∅.
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Remark 1.2.4. A well defined spread requires Θ0(pi) to be a proper interval [θ0(pi), θ0(pi)],
which will follow from Assumption 1.2.2, and that there exists ϵ > 0 such that (θ0(pi) −
ϵ, θ0(pi)) and (θ0(pi), θ0(pi) + ϵ) belong to the set of fully-serviced traders. The existence of
such an ϵ is proved in Lemma 1.4.7. Economically, this conditions means that the CN is
not beneficial for low-type traders. We shall encounter several instances where the proofs
of our results concern conditions on points to the left of θ0(pi) or to the right of θ0(pi) that
are analogous. So as to streamline the said proofs, whenever we find ourselves in one of
these “either–or” situations, we deal only with the positive types.
We are now ready to state the first main result, whose proof is given in Section 1.3
below.
Theorem 1.2.5. Problem P(pi) admits a solution, which is unique on the set of participat-
ing types.
Our second main result concerns the effect of the CN on the spread and the set of
participating traders if, disregarding negative expected unwinding costs, the dealer can
match the CN.
Assumption 1.2.6. There exists an incentive-compatible book
{
(qc(θ), τc(θ)
)
, θ ∈ Θ} such
that for almost all θ ∈ Θ it holds that u(θ, qc(θ))− τc(θ) = u0(θ; pi).
Assumption 1.2.6 implies that u0(·; pi) is also a convex function. The case where u0(·; pi)
is concave is somewhat simpler, since it boils down to exclusion without matching.
The following theorem analyzes the impact of the CN on the DM and the traders’ wel-
fare.
Theorem 1.2.7. For a given price pi = (pi−, pi+) let Sm and So be the spreads with and with-
out the presence of the CN and v(·; pi) and vo the corresponding indirect–utility functions,
respectively. In the presence of the CN
1. less types are reserved, i.e. Θ0(vo) ⊇ Θ0(pi). Furthermore, the inclusion is strict if
there exists θ ∈ Θ such that u0(θ; pi) > vo(θ);
2. if the types are uniformly distributed (f = (θ − θ)−11Θ), the spread narrows, i.e.
So ≥ Sm;
3. the typewise welfare increases, i.e. vo(θ) ≤ v(θ; pi) for all θ ∈ Θ.
In the sequel we use the subindices “m” and “o” to distinguish structures or quantities
with and without a CN, respectively.
1.2.3 Equilibrium
It is natural to assume that pricing in the DM has an impact on the pricing schedule pi.
For example, the CN could be a Dark Pool (DP), where trading takes place at the best
bid and best ask prices of the primary market. We analyze such an example, within a
portfolio-liquidation framework, in Section 1.6. The pecuniary interaction between the
DM and the CN, however, is not unidirectional if the dealer anticipates the effect that
his choice of book structure has on the CN. Our main focus is the impact of the CN
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on the spread in the DM. Specifically, if we denote by t(0; pi) :=
(
t(0−; pi), t(0+; pi)
)
the
best–bid and best–ask price in the DM for a given CN price schedule pi, then we call pi∗
an equilibrium price if pi∗ = t(0; pi∗).
We make the following natural assumption on the impact of pi on the traders’ outside
option.
Assumption 1.2.8. Let pi1 ≤ pi2, where “≤” is the lexicographic order in R2; then for
all θ ∈ Θ it holds that u0(θ; pi1) ≥ u0(θ; pi2). Furthermore, we assume that there exists(
pi−, pi+
) ∈ R2 such that u0(·; pi) ≤ 0 for all (pi−, pi+) such that pi− ≤ pi− and pi+ ≤ pi+.
The following is our main result on the existence of an equilibrium price.
Theorem 1.2.9. If types are uniformly distributed, then the mapping pi ↦→ t(0; pi) has a
fixed point.
Summarizing, we have that the dealer can correctly anticipate the movements in prices
in the CN when he designs the optimal pricing schedule for the DM. Furthermore,
the presence of the CN is beneficial in terms of liquidity, market participation and the
traders’ welfare.
Remark 1.2.10. The uniformity of the distribution of types in Theorems 1.2.7 and 1.2.9
can be relaxed, which is something we postpone to the corresponding proofs, where the
required notation is introduced.
1.3 Existence of a solution to Problem P(pi)
In this section we prove the existence of a solution to the dealer’s problem in the pres-
ence of a CN. Even though, strictly speaking, this result is a particular case of Theorem
4.4 in [Pag92], for the reader’s convenience we present a proof in our simpler setting.
Some of the arguments are somewhat standard, but we include them for completeness.
The first important result that we require is that the dealer’s optimal choices will lead
to him never losing money on types that participate.
Proposition 1.3.1. If (q∗, τ ∗) : Θ→ R2 is an optimal allocation, then for all participating
types it holds that τ ∗(θ)− C(q∗(θ)) ≥ 0.
Proof. Assume the contrary, i.e. that the set
Θ˜ :=
{
θ
∣∣ v(θ; pi) ≥ u0(θ; pi), τ ∗(θ) < C(q∗(θ))} ,
where v(θ; pi) = u
(
θ, q∗(θ)
)− τ ∗(θ), has positive measure. Define a new pricing schedule
via
τ˜(θ) := max
{
τ ∗(θ), C
(
q∗(θ)
)}
.
The incentives for types in Θ˜c do not change, since their prices remain unchanged,
whereas prices for others have increased. Agents who did not participate still don’t
participate after the change. Profits corresponding to trading with types in Θ˜ increase
to zero. As a consequence the dealer’s welfare strictly increases, which violates the
optimality of (q∗, τ ∗).
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A consequence of Proposition 1.3.1 is that, together with Assumption 1.2.3, it allows us
to restrict the admissible set of the dealer’s problem (so far it is C) to a compact one.
We prove this in several steps.
Lemma 1.3.2. If v : Θ → R is a non-negative convex function that solves P(pi), then
v(0) = 0.
Proof. Assume that v ∈ C is non-negative and solves P(pi). This implies that v(0) =
ψ2
(
q(0)
) − τ(0) ≥ 0. Since, from Assumption 1.2.2, a trader of type θ = 0 has no
access to a profitable outside option, he participates. From Proposition 1.3.1 it must
then hold that τ(0) ≥ C(q(0)), which, together with our first observation, implies that
ψ2
(
q(0)
) ≥ C(q(0)). By Assumption 1.2.1, this relation can only hold for q(0) = 0. From
ψ2(0) = C(0) = 0 we infer that both v(0) = −τ(0) ≥ 0 and τ(0) ≥ C(0) = 0 must hold,
implying v(0) = 0.
Lemma 1.3.3. There exists q ≥ 0 such that if v ∈ C solves P(pi), then |∂v| ≤ q.
Proof. From Assumption 1.2.3 and the compactness of Θ we have that the mapping
q ↦→ i(θ, v, q) tends to −∞ as |q| → ∞ uniformly on Θ for v ≥ 0. From Proposition 1.3.1
i
(
θ, v(θ), v′(θ)
)
must be non-negative for all participating types, which concludes the
proof.
As q could depend on pi, we define
A(pi) := {v ∈ C | v ≥ 0, v(0) = 0, |∂v| ≤ q}
as new admissibility set for problem P(pi). The previous results show that if we replace
C by A(pi) in the definition of P(pi), the solution to the problem does not change.
Corollary 1.3.4. The admissible set A(pi) ⊂ C of Problem P(pi) is uniformly bounded and
uniformly equicontinuous.
Proof. From Lemmas 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 we have that the quantity maxθ∈Θ
{
u0(θ; pi)
}
+
q‖Θ‖ is an upper bound for any admissible choice of v. Furthermore, Lemma 1.3.3
guarantees that for any v ∈ A(pi) it holds that |∂v| ≤ q. In other words, A(pi) is com-
posed of convex functions whose subdifferentials are uniformly bounded, hence A(pi) is
uniformly equicontinuous.
Notice that, when it comes to determining quantities and prices for trader types who do
participate, Proposition 1.3.1 results in the dealer having to solve the problem
P˜(pi) :=
{
supv∈A(pi)
∫
Θ
(
i
(
θ, v(θ), v′(θ)
))
+
f(θ)dθ
s.t. v(θ) ≥ u0(θ; pi) for all θ ∈ Θ.
The last auxiliary result that we need is the following proposition, whose proof is a
direct consequence of Fatou’s Lemma, together with Lemmas 1.3.2 and 1.3.3.
Proposition 1.3.5. The mapping v ↦→ ∫
Θ
(
i(θ, v(θ), v′(θ))
)
+
f(θ)dθ is upper semi-continu-
ous in A(pi) with respect to uniform convergence.
We are now ready to prove our first main result:
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Proof of Theorem 1.2.5. Assume that A(pi) ∩ {v ∈ C | v(·) ≥ u0(·; pi)} is non-empty and
consider a maximizing sequence {v˜n}n∈N of Problem P˜(pi). From Corollary 1.3.4 we
have that, passing to a subsequence if necessary, there exists v˜ ∈ A(pi) such that v˜n → v˜
uniformly for n→∞. A direct application of Proposition 1.3.5 yields that v˜ is a solution
to P˜(pi). To finalize the proof we must construct from v˜ a solution to Problem P(pi). To
this end, let us define the sets
Θ− :=
{
θ ∈ Θ ∣∣ i(θ, v˜(θ), v˜′(θ)) < 0} and Θ+ := Θc−.
It is well known that if a sequence of convex functions converges uniformly (to a convex
function), then there is also uniform convergence of the derivatives wherever they exist,
which is almost everywhere. This fact, together with the continuity of the mappings
θ ↦→ v˜(θ) and (θ, v, q) ↦→ i(θ, v, q), implies that Θ− is the union of disjoint open intervals:
Θ− =
∞⋃
j=1
(aj, bj).
Define, for each j ∈ N,
v˜a,j := inf {q | q ∈ ∂v˜(aj)} and v˜b,j := sup {q | q ∈ ∂v˜(bj)}
and consider the support lines to the graph of v˜ at aj and bj given by
lj(θ) = v˜(aj) + v˜a,j(θ − aj) and Lj(θ) = v˜(bj) + v˜b,j(θ − bj),
respectively. Let cj ∈ (aj, bj) be, for each j ∈ N, the unique solution to the equation
lj(θ) = Lj(θ) and define on (aj, bj) =: Θj
v∗j (θ) :=
{
lj(θ), aj < θ ≤ cj;
Lj(θ), cj < θ < bj.
Finally define
v∗(θ) :=
{
v˜(θ), θ ∈ Θ+;
v∗j (θ), θ ∈ Θj, j ∈ N,
then v∗ is a solution to Problem P(pi) and Θe(v∗) = Θ−, which concludes the proof.
Remark 1.3.6. If the dealer can profitably match all agents’ outside options, then the
quasi-uniqueness of a solution to Problem P(pi) is in fact uniqueness. Indeed, in such a
case (
i(θ, v(θ), v′(θ))
)
+
=
(
i(θ, v(θ), v′(θ))
)
and problem P˜(pi) is, by Assumption 1.2.3, one of maximizing a strictly concave, coercive
functional over a convex set that is closed w.r.t. uniform convergence. In the general case,
we construct the quasi-unique solution in Section 1.4.2. Assumption 1.2.3 remains crucial,
since it guarantees that the maximization problems through which we define the optimal
quantities have unique maximizers.
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1.4 The impact of a crossing network
In this section we look at the impact that a CN has on the spread, on participation and
on the traders’ welfare. In order to do so, we provide a characterization of the solution
to Problem P(pi). It should be noted that, given the restriction of candidate solutions to
C, we cannot simply make use of the Euler-Lagrange equations to solve the variational
problem, since the said equations are only satisfied when the constraints do not bind.
1.4.1 A benchmark without a crossing network
We first analyze the benchmark case where the traders do not have access to a CN.
The corresponding dealer’s problem is denoted by Po. Recall that all trader types have
a zero reservation utility, which the dealer is able to match costlessly by offering the
contract (0, 0). The point of making this normalization is to simplify the constraints in
the dealer’s optimization problem. This will not be possible in the presence of a CN
since, even if the dealer were able to match the utility that investors enjoy if they trade
in the CN, this would in general not be costless.
We take a Lagrange-multiplier approach to provide a characterization of the solution to
Problem Po. To this end, let us introduce the following definition:
I[v] :=
∫
Θ
i
(
θ, v(θ), v′(θ)
)
f(θ)dθ.
Let BV+(Θ) be the space of non-negative functions of bounded variation γ : Θ → R+,
which we place in duality with C(Θ,R), the space of real-valued continuous functions
on Θ, via the standard pairing
〈v, γ〉 :=
∫
Θ
v(θ)dγ(θ)
for v ∈ C(Θ,R), where dγ is the distributional derivative of γ. Furthermore, it follows
from Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle and the fact that f is a probability density function
that there is no loss of generality in assuming that γ is absolutely continuous and that
γ(θ) = 1. The Lagrangian for the dealer’s problem is
L(v, γ) := I[v] + 〈v, γ〉, v ∈ C,
with corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
〈v, γ〉 = 0 and dγ(θ) = 0⇒ v(θ) > 0. (1.4.1)
The next result is the formalization of the vox populi saying that “quality does not jump”.
Regularity properties of the solutions to variational problems subject to convexity con-
straints were studied in [CLR01], and their methodology can be directly adapted to
prove the following result.
Proposition 1.4.1. If v ∈ C is a stationary point of L(v, γ), then v ∈ C1(Θ).
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The fact that, at the optimum, the mapping θ ↦→ v′(θ) is continuous, implies that q is
also a continuous function of the types. This will prove to be extremely useful, specially
in the presence of a CN. If we integrate by parts, then L(v, γ) can be transformed into
Σ(q, γ) :=
∫
Θ
((
θ +
F (θ)− γ(θ)
f(θ)
)
ψ1
(
q(θ)
)− C˜(q(θ)))f(θ)dθ,
where q(θ) = ψ−11
(
v′(θ)
)
, as in Equation (1.2.1), and C˜(q) := C(q) − ψ2(q). The idea
now is to maximize the mapping
q ↦→ σ(θ, q,Γ) :=
(
θ +
F (θ)− Γ
f(θ)
)
ψ1(q)− C˜
(
q
)
pointwise, for a given fixed Γ (in the sequel we use Γ whenever we are dealing with
an arbitrary but fixed value of γ). From Assumption 1.2.3 it follows that we can write
down the unique maximizer as
l(θ,Γ) := K−1
(
F (θ) + θ f(θ)− Γ
f(θ)
)
,
where K(q) := C˜ ′(q)/ψ′1(q). For each θ ∈ Θ and Γ ∈ [0, 1], the quantity l(θ,Γ) is a
candidate for the optimal q(θ) and convexity (or incentive compatibility) is verified if
the mapping θ ↦→ l(θ,Γ) is increasing. The crux is to determine the Lagrange multiplier
γ. In the sequel we denote Θo := Θ0(v∗o), where v
∗
o solves Problem Po. In other words, if
θ ∈ Θo, then q(θ) = T (θ) = v(θ) = 0.
From Lemma 1.3.2 we have that, unless v(θ) = 0, the quantity q(θ) < 0 and the
complementary–slackness condition imply that γ(θ) = 0 for θ ∈ [θ, θ˜) for some θ˜ > θ.
The left endpoint θ0 of Θo is then determined by solving the equation
K−1
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
= 0.
Furthermore, since v must be convex, once v(θˆ) > 0, then v(θ) > 0 for all θ > θˆ. This
implies that the right endpoint θ0 of Θo is determined by solving the equation
K−1
(
θ − 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
= 0.
The quantities F (θ)/f(θ) and (1−F (θ))/f(θ) are know as the hazard rates, and sufficient
conditions for the mapping θ ↦→ l(θ,Γ) to be non-decreasing are
d
dθ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
≥ 0 ≥ d
dθ
(
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
,
see e.g. [BMR00] for a discussion on this condition.
Let us assume that we have determinedΘo. What remains is to connect the participation
constraint with the spread. Differentiating Equation (1.2.2) and noting that v′(θ) =
ψ1(q(θ)), we have that
τ ′(θ) = q′(θ)
(
θψ′1(q(θ)) + ψ
′
2(q(θ))
)
.
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Observe that τ ′(θ0) and τ
′(θ0) are in fact T ′(0−) and T ′(0+), since by construction q(θ0) =
q(θ0) = 0. If we define φ1 := ψ′1(0) and φ2 := ψ
′
2(0), then we have that the spread is
given by the expressions
t(0−) = q′(θ0−)
(
θ0φ1 + φ2
)
and t(0+) = q′(θ0+)
(
θ0φ1 + φ2
)
. (1.4.2)
Our objective in Section 1.4.2 is to compare the values above to those obtained in the
presence of a CN.
Before we proceed, we present two examples so as to illustrate the use of the methodol-
ogy described hitherto. The first revisits [MR78]. The second is slightly more advanced.
We shall use it below to illustrate the complex structure of equilibrium pricing schedules
and utilities in the presence of CNs.
Example 1.4.2. Let us assume that Θ = [−r, r] for some r > 0, that types are uniformly
distributed and that
u(θ, q) = θq.
We also set C(q) = 0.5 q2. By direct computation we find that θ0 = − r2 and θ0 = r2 . Since a
trader of type θ ∈ Θo is brought down to reservation utility and hence trades q(θ) = 0, the
expression
q(θ) = θ +
F (θ)− γ(θ)
f(θ)
= 2θ + r − 2rγ(θ)
implies that the Lagrange multiplier is
γ(θ) =

0, θ < θ0,
1
2
+ θ
r
, θ ∈ Θo,
1, θ > θ0.
In particular, q′(θ0−) = q′(θ0+) = 2 and hence t(0−) = −r and t(0+) = r. Thus, the spread
increases linearly in the highest/lowest type.
Example 1.4.3. Let us assume that the distribution of types over Θ = [−1, 1] is given by
f(θ) = (2θ + 3)/4 for θ ∈ [−1, 0) and f(θ) = (3 − 2θ)/4 for θ ∈ [0, 1]; that C(q) = 0.5 q2
and that u(θ, q)− τ = θ · q + 0.25 q2 − τ. It is straightforward to show that the conditions
on the hazard rates are satisfied and that
K−1
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
= 2
[
3θ2 + 6θ + 2
2θ + 3
]
and K−1
(
θ − 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
= 2
[
3θ2 − 6θ + 2
2θ − 3
]
.
Furthermore, Θo ≈
[ − 0.423, 0.423]. For the spread, we have that t(0−) = q′(θ0)θ0 ≈
−1.359 and t(0+) = q′(θ0)θ0 ≈ 1.359. In order to obtain v we integrate q (since ψ1(q) = q)
and take into account that v ≡ 0 over Θo. We plot the graph of vo in Figure 1.1, as well as
the per-type profits of the dealer.
1.4.2 Introducing a crossing network
Let us now analyze the dealer’s problem when the market participants have access to
a CN that yields a trader of type θ the expected utility u0(θ; pi). In this setting it is no
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Figure 1.1: An example without a CN
longer without loss of generality to assume that all traders participate in the DM, given
that enforcing participation (which can be done thanks to Assumption 1.2.6) may result
in losses to the dealer. The latter may, as a consequence, choose to abstain from trading
with a set of types Θe(v) by offering an incentive-compatible book whose corresponding
indirect–utility function lies strictly under u0(θ; pi) for θ ∈ Θe(v). The resulting problem
for the dealer would be
P(pi) = sup
v∈C
∫
Θ
(
θ v′(t)− v(t)− K˜(v′(θ)))1{Θce(v)}(θ)f(θ)dθ.
Dealing with the presence of the zero–one indicator function 1{Θce} is quite cumber-
some (see e.g. [HMB11]), since its domain of definition may change with different
book choices. In contrast to the setting studied in [HMB11], however, here the CN is
passive. This lack of non-cooperative-games component allows for an alternative way
to proceed. To this end, we make use of the following accounting trick, which was in-
troduced in [Jul00]: Let us assume that the dealer had access to a fictitious market
such that the unwinding costs from trading in it, denoted in the sequel by Cc, satisfy
Cc(q(θ)) = τ(θ) for almost all θ ∈ Θ. In this way, we may again assume that the dealer
trades with all market participants, but now his costs of unwinding are given by the
function C : R→ R defined as
C(q) := min {C(q), Cc(q)} , q ∈ R.
In terms of incentives, nothing is distorted by introducing the cost function C, but we
must identify the points where there is switching from using C to using Cc and vice
versa. These switching points will determine the regions of market segmentation.
If we define, for any traded quantity q, the function C˜(q) := C
(
q
)−ψ2(q), then we may
re-use the machinery from Section 1.4.1 with minor modifications;5 namely, denoting
5Observe that Assumptions 1.2.2 and 1.2.6 imply that C˜ satisfies Assumption 1.2.3.
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by I the energy corresponding to the cost function C, we may write the Lagrangian of
the dealer’s problem as
L(v, γ) := I[v] + 〈v − u0(·; pi), γ〉,
with the corresponding complementary–slackness conditions. From here we may pro-
ceed as in Section 1.4.1 to find the quantities that the dealer will choose to offer. Strictly
speaking we should find the pointwise maximizer in q of the expression(
θ +
F (θ)− Γ
f(θ)
)
ψ1(q)−K(q), (1.4.3)
where K(q) := C˜(q) − ψ2(q). This may fortunately be avoided, given that whenever
C(q) = Cc(q), the participation constraint binds and q(θ) = qc(θ). Before proceeding
to the proof of Theorem 1.2.7, we study the mechanism used by the dealer to choose
between excluding types, matching the CN, and fully servicing them by offering strictly
positive rents.
Whenever the participation constraint does not bind, the dealer selects the quantity to
be chosen via the pointwise maximization of the mapping q ↦→ σ(θ, q,Γ). What makes
the current problem trickier than the case without a CN is that now we must pay more
attention to the evolution of the multiplier γ. If we compare l(θ, 0) and l(θ, 1) to qc(θ),
we may pinpoint the set where the participation constraint may bind. Observe that{
l(θ, 1), θ ∈ Θ} and {l(θ, 0), θ ∈ Θ} are the sets of the lowest and highest quantities
the dealer may offer in an individually-rational way. Hence, as long as l(θ, 1) ≤ qc(θ) ≤
l(θ, 0) there is the possibility of profitable matching.
There might be instances where the participation constraint is binding for some type
θ ∈ Θ, i.e. (q(θ), τ(θ)) = (qc(θ), τc(θ)), and τc(θ)−C(qc(θ)) < 0. In such cases C(qc(θ)) =
Cc
(
qc(θ)
)
and θ ∈ Θe(v) for the corresponding indirect–utility function, and we say there
is exclusion.
Remark 1.4.4. It is at this point that the quasi-uniqueness mentioned in Remark 1.3.6
can be addressed. The principal’s problem PC(pi) using the cost function C results in the
condition (
i(θ, v(θ), v′(θ))
)
+
=
(
i(θ, v(θ), v′(θ))
)
being trivially satisfied. As a consequence, problem PC(pi) admits a unique solution. The
latter coincides, by construction, with the solution to P(pi) whenever C(q(θ)) = C(q(θ)).
The caveat is that the solution to problem PC(pi) is blind towards what is offered to excluded
types, since here their outside option is costlessly matched (they are effectively reserved).
Constructing incentive-compatible contracts for the excluded types is, thanks to the con-
vexity of the indirect–utility function, relatively simple. For instance if an interval of types
(θ1, θ2) were excluded (but θ1 and θ2 participated) one could consider any two supporting
lines to the graph of v(·; pi) at (θ1, v(θ1; pi)) and (θ2, v(θ2; pi)). From the resulting indirect–
utility function on (θ1, θ2) one could extract the corresponding quantities and prices. The
resulting global convexity of the indirect–utility function offered by the principal would im-
ply that all incentives would remain unchanged. Whether the principal would suffer losses
from the contracts offered to types on (θ1, θ2) would be irrelevant, since the corresponding
agents do not participate.
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As mentioned above, here it is not necessary to determine γ(θ) in order to determine
q(θ). On the other hand, however, if we interpret γ as the shadow cost of satisfying the
participation constraint, we may wish to identify the multiplier so as to have a measure
of the impact of the CN on the dealer’s profits. The following result, which deals with
points where there is switching between matching and fully servicing, extends Proposi-
tion 1.4.1.
Proposition 1.4.5. For pi ∈ R2 given, let θ˜ ∈ Θ be such that there exists ϵ > 0 such that
v(θ; pi) = u0(θ; pi) on (θ˜ − ϵ, θ˜] and v(θ; pi) > u0(θ; pi) on (θ˜, θ˜ + ϵ]. Furthermore, assume
that ∫ θ˜
θ˜−ϵ
(
τ(θ)− C(q(θ)))f(θ)dθ > 0,
where
{(
q(θ), τ(θ)
)
, θ ∈ Θ} implements v(·; pi). In other words, there is profitable matching
on (θ˜ − ϵ, θ˜] and the dealer fully services types on (θ˜, θ˜ + ϵ]. Then ∂v(θ˜; pi) is a singleton.
The result also holds if the order of the matching and full-servicing intervals is switched.
The rationale behind Proposition 1.4.5 is that, as long as the dealer is able to match the
traders’ outside option without incurring a loss, it is possible to normalize the latter to
zero and directly apply Proposition 1.4.1. This is, naturally, not the case when matching
u0 results in losses. We put Proposition 1.4.5 to work in Example 1.4.9.
Before moving on, we present below a modification to Example 1.4.3 that shows how
even agents without access to a non-trivial outside option benefit from the presence of
the CN and that the optimal Lagrange multiplier need not be continuous.
Example 1.4.6. Let f, Θ, C and u be as in Example 1.4.3 and assume that the CN offers
the traders the following expected profits:
u0(θ; (3.2, 3.2)) =

−0.975θ − 0.52, if θ ≤ − 8
15
;
0.975θ − 0.52, if θ ≥ 8
15
;
0, if θ ∈ (− 8
15
, 8
15
).
Matching this outside option would require the dealer to offer the contracts (±0.975, 0.52).
This is profitable, hence the indirect utility never lies below u0. To illustrate this, we have
plotted the indirect–utility function in Figure 1.2(a). It strictly dominates the one plotted
in Figure 1.1(a) for all types who earn positive profits. The smooth pasting condition
(l(θ, γ(θ)) = qc(θ) where v touches u0, i.e. in ±0.675) determines the optimal Lagrange
multiplier, namely γ(−1) = 0 and γ ≡ 0.030 on (−1,−0.389]. For positive types we
obtain symmetrically γ(1) = 1 and γ ≡ 0.970 on [0.389, 1). The new spread, given by(
t(0−), t(0+)
)
= (−1.282, 1.282), is strictly smaller than in the case without a CN.
The following result will prove to be essential for the results in Section 1.5. It guaran-
tees, by virtue of Assumption 1.2.2, that our notion of the spread is well defined in the
presence of a CN, and could be loosely summarized by saying that the first (in terms of
moving away from θ = 0) types to earn positive utility trade in the DM.
Lemma 1.4.7. For any pi ∈ R2, there exists ϵ = ϵ(pi) > 0 such that the types that belong
to (θ0(pi)− ϵ, θ0(pi)) ∪ (θ0(pi), θ0(pi) + ϵ) are fully serviced.
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Figure 1.2: An example without exclusion
Proof. Let us denote by θˆ the largest positive solution to the equation u0(θ; pi) = 0. If
there exists η > 0 such that types on (θˆ, θˆ+ η) can be matched profitably, then the result
follows either because θ0(pi) < θˆ or because θ0(pi) = θˆ and the types on (θˆ, θˆ + ϵ), for
some 0 < ϵ ≤ η, are fully serviced. Let us now assume that such an η does not exist,
we claim then that θ0(pi) < θˆ must hold. Proceeding by the way of contradiction, let us
assume that θ0(pi) = θˆ (which is equivalent to θ0(pi) ≥ θˆ) and that there exists δ > 0 such
that (θˆ, θˆ+δ) ⊂ Θe(pi). This configuration can be improved upon as follows: let a > 0 be
such that θˆ−a > 0. By construction l(θˆ−a, γ(θˆ−a)) = 0. Let us fix γ(θ) ≡ γ(θˆ−a) =: Γ(a)
for θ ∈ (θˆ − a, θa), where θa is the solution to va(θ) = u0(θ; pi) on (θˆ − a, θ] if it exists or
θa = θ otherwise, given that we denote by va the indirect–utility function corresponding
to Γ(a). In particular, θa > θˆ and l(θ,Γ(a)) > 0 for θ ∈ (θˆ − a, θa).
We now have that types θ ∈ (θˆ − a, θa) are fully serviced. By Assumption 1.2.2, v′a(θˆ −
a) = 0 < u′0(θˆ; pi); therefore, there exists a1 > 0 such that for all a ≤ a1 it holds that
θa < θˆ + δ. If we could show that there exists a ≤ a1 such that the principal could offer
types in (θˆ − a, θa) the quantities qa(θ) = l(θ,Γ(a)) at a profit, we would contradict the
optimality of θ0(pi) and the proof would be complete, since incentives above θa would
not be distorted and the principal’s profits would strictly increase. In order to do so,
observe that the principal’s typewise profit when offering qa(θ) is
P (θ) := θψ1(qa(θ)) + ψ2(qa(θ))− va(θ)− C
(
qa(θ)
)
.
In particular, P (θˆ − a) = 0 and
P ′(θˆ − a)
= ψ1(qa(θˆ − a)) + (θˆ − a)ψ′1(qa(θˆ − a))q′a(θˆ − a) + v′a(θˆ − a)− C˜ ′
(
qa(θˆ − a)
)
q′a(θˆ − a)
= ψ1(0) + (θˆ − a)ψ′1(0)q′a(θˆ − a) + v′a(θˆ − a)− C˜ ′
(
0
)
q′a(θˆ − a)
= (θˆ − a)ψ′1(0)q′a(θˆ − a).
The third equality follows because by construction v′a(θˆ−a) = 0; by assumption ψ1(0) =
0 and, from Assumption 1.2.3, C˜ ′
(
0
)
= 0. Furthermore, since ψ1 is strictly increasing
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and q′a(θˆ − a) > 0, then P ′(θˆ − a) > 0. Therefore, there exists b > 0 such that P (θ) > 0
if θ ∈ (θˆ − a, θˆ − a + b). As a consequence, if a < a1 is small enough, then P (θ) > 0 for
θ ∈ (θˆ − a, θa), as required.
We are now in the position to present the proof of our second main result.
Proof of Theorem 1.2.7. (1) Observe that if pi is such that
(
θ0(pi), θ0(pi)
)
= Θ0(pi) ⊂ Θo,
then the result follows immediately from Lemma 1.4.7. If we revert the inclusion,
two situations are possible, since the addition of the CN-constraint to Problem Po may
or may not bind for some types. The latter case being trivial, let us look at the case
where there is a point θa > θ0 on which it holds that vo(θa) = u0(θa; pi) and such that
vo(θ) > u0(θ; pi) for θ < θa and vice versa for θ > θa. The Lagrange multiplier γm is active
on (θa, θ], which implies that γm(θa) < 1. We know from [Jul00, p. 9] that for all θ such
that l(θ,Γ) > 0, the latter is decreasing in Γ. As a consequence, the root of the equation
K−1
(
θ +
F (θ)− γm(θa)
f(θ)
)
= 0
is strictly smaller than that of l(θ, 1) = 0, which yields the desired result.
(2) Let us denote by to(0−) and to(0+) the best bid and ask prices without the presence
of a CN and by tm(0−) and tm(0+) the corresponding marginal prices with one; thus,
to(0−) = q′o(θ0,o−)
(
θ0,oφ1 + φ2
)
and to(0+) = q′o(θ0,o+)
(
θ0,oφ1 + φ2
)
and
tm(0−) = q′m(θ0,m−)
(
θ0,mφ1 + φ2
)
and tm(0+) = q′m(θ0,m+)
(
θ0,mφ1 + φ2
)
.
From Part (1) we know that θ0,o ≤ θ0,m (both negative) and θ0,m ≤ θ0,o (both positive)
and, since φ1 and φ2 do not depend on the presence of the CN, all we have left to do is
show that
q′m(θ0,m−) ≤ q′o(θ0,o−) and q′m(θ0,m+) ≤ q′o(θ0,o+).
Using the well-known relation (f−1)′(a) = 1/f ′(f−1(a)) for the derivative of a function’s
inverse we have that
q′m(θ0,m−) =
1
K ′
(
K−1
(
θ0,m − γ(θ0,m−)−F (θ0,m)f(θ0,m)
)) d
dθ
(
θ − γ(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
) ∣∣∣
θ=θ0,m−
=
1
K ′
(
qm(θ0,m)
) d
dθ
(
θ − γ(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
) ∣∣∣
θ=θ0,m−
=
1
K ′(0)
(
1− d
dθ
(
γ(θ0,m−)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)) ∣∣∣
θ=θ0,m
,
where we have used the fact that γ is constant on (θ0,m − δ, θ0,m) for some δ > 0. We
may proceed analogously for the other three quantities. We have to show that
1
K ′(0)
d
dθ
(
γ(θ0,m−)− F (θ)
f(θ)
) ∣∣∣
θ=θ0,m
≥ 1
K ′(0)
d
dθ
(−F (θ)
f(θ)
) ∣∣∣
θ=θ0,o
and
1
K ′(0)
d
dθ
(
γ(θ0,m+)− F (θ)
f(θ)
) ∣∣∣
θ=θ0,m
≥ 1
K ′(0)
d
dθ
(
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
) ∣∣∣
θ=θ0,o
,
(1.4.4)
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which hold with equality under the assumption that f = (θ − θ)−11Θ.
(3) It follows from Part (1) that, if θ participates in the presence of the CN, then qo(θ) ≤
qm(θ). Assume now that the inequality vo(θ) > v(θ; pi) holds for all θ in a non-empty
interval (θ1, θ2) and vo(θ1) = v(θ1; pi) and vo(θ2) = v(θ2; pi). By the convexity of vo and
v(·; pi), this would imply the existence of θ3 ∈ (θ1, θ2) such that v′o(θ) > v′(θ; pi) holds
almost surely in (θ1, θ3). However v′o(θ) = ψ1(qo(θ)), v
′(θ; pi) = ψ1(qm(θ)) and ψ1 is
strictly increasing; hence, this would imply that qo(θ) > qm(θ) for almost all θ ∈ (θ1, θ3),
which is a contradiction.
We finalize this section with two examples that showcase the results obtained thus far.
Example 1.4.8 shows that, in the simple case where the outside option is such that
the dealer will (only) exclude all high-enough (in absolute value) types, the results of
Theorem 1.2.7 follow trivially.
Example 1.4.8. Let us revisit Example 1.4.2 with an extremely steep outside option that
will warrant exclusion, namely, for r0 < r let
u0(θ) =
{
∞, if θ ∈ [−r,−r0) ∪ (r0, r];
0, otherwise.
Recall that, for a given value Γ of the Lagrange multiplier, the corresponding quantity is
q(θ; Γ) := 2θ + r − 2rΓ.
In Example 1.4.2 the participation constraint does not bind for high types. In particular,
γ ≡ 0 on [−r, θ0) and to find the left endpoint of the reserved set we set Γ = 0 and solve
2θ + r = 0. In the current setting, the participation constraint must bind for θ < −r0 and
the multiplier will be constant on (−r0, θ0(Γ)), where
θ0(Γ) := −
r
2
[
1− 2Γ].
By construction, the choice of Γ will bear no weight on the trader types that will be serviced
to the left of θ = −r0, but only on how many additional low types benefit from the presence
of the outside option. By integrating q(θ; Γ) and noting that the corresponding indirect–
utility function v(·; Γ) must satisfy v(θ0(Γ); Γ) = 0, we have
v(θ; Γ) = θ2 + θr
[
1− 2Γ]+ r2
4
[
1− 2Γ]2
for θ ∈ [−r0, θ0(Γ)]. Since the indirect–utility function also satisfies v(θ; Γ) = θq(θ; Γ) −
τ(θ; Γ), we have that the dealer market on [−r0, θ0(Γ)] is described by the quantity–price
pairs
(
q(θ; Γ), θ2 − r2
4
[
1− 2Γ]2). As a consequence, the per-type profit is
Π(θ; Γ) := −θ2 − 3
4
r2
[
1− 2Γ]2 − 2θr[1− 2Γ],
where the third term on the right-hand side is positive and dominates the first two. Finally,
we have that each choice of Γ will result in the dealer obtaining the aggregate profits from
negative types
P (Γ) :=
1
2r
∫ θ0(Γ)
−r0
Π(θ; Γ)dθ.
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The mapping Γ ↦→ P (Γ) is strictly concave and the first–order conditions yield that it is
maximized at Γ = (r − r0)/(2r). As a result θ0(Γ) = −r0/2 and v(θ; Γ) = θ2 + r0θ + r20/4,
which correspond to the boundary of the reserved set and the indirect–utility function for
negative trader types in the problem without a CN on [−r0, r0].
Example 1.4.9. We stay with the basic setup of Examples 1.4.3 and 1.4.6, but now assume
that u0(θ; pi) =
(
1−pi+
3
θ6/5 − 0.001
)
+
for θ ≥ 0 and u0(θ; pi) ≡ 0 otherwise. For any type θ
such that u0(θ) > 0 it holds that(
qc(θ), τc(θ)
)
=
(2
5
(1−pi+)θ1/5, 2
5
(1−pi+)θ6/5+ 1
25
(1−pi+)2θ2/5−
(1
3
(1−pi+)θ6/5−0.001
)
+
)
.
We assume pi = (0, 1/2). The first thing to notice is that the dealer’s per-type profit for
offering (qc(θ), τc(θ)), i.e. τc(θ) − C(qc(θ)) = θ6/5/30 − θ2/5/100 + 0.001, is negative for
types θ ∈ (0.0035, 0.1667). On the other hand, the inequality u0(θ; 1/2) ≥ 0 only holds
for θ ≥ 0.014. Combining both arguments we see that Θe(pi) ⊂ (0.014, 0.1667). Next we
observe that the inequality
l(θ, 1) = K−1
(
θ − 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
≥
5
√
θ
5
holds for all θ ∈ [0.4761, 1].
Hence profitable matching may occur on the interval (0.1667, 0.4761), over which q(θ) =
qc(θ) and C
(
q(θ)
)
= C
(
q(θ)
)
. Furthermore, Proposition 1.4.5 implies that the correspond-
ing indirect–utility function will be differentiable at θ = 0.4761. In order to obtain v(θ; pi)
for θ ∈ [0.4761, 1], we integrate l(·, 1) and determine the corresponding integration con-
stant c by equating
2
∫ 0.4761
0
(
3θ2 − 6θ + 2
2θ − 3
)
dθ + c =
1
6
(0.4761)6/5 − 0.001.
We know from the example without a CN that γ(t) = 0 for θ ∈ [−1,−0.423). On [−0.423, 0)
the multiplier must satisfy
K−1
(
θ − γ(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
= 0,
which results in γ(θ) = (3θ2+6θ+2)/4 on the said interval. What remains to be determined
is θ0 and γ(θ0). To this end, we define the family of functions v(·; Γ) such that v′(θ; Γ) =
l(θ,Γ) whenever this quantity is positive and v(θ; Γ) = 0 for θ ∈ [0, θ(Γ)], where θ(Γ) is
the solution to the equation l(θ,Γ) = 0. Since γ(0) = 0.5, we have that Γ > 0.5.6 In fact,
Γ = γ(θ0) = 0.5105, θ0 = 0.007 and the intersection of v(·; Γ) and u0(·; 1/2) occurs at
θ = 0.0159.
Summarizing, the types on [−1,−0.423) ∪ (0.007, 0.0159] ∪ (0.1667, 1] are fully serviced,
those on [−0.423, 0.007] are reserved and the ones that lie on (0.0159, 0.1667) are excluded.
The left-hand side of the spread is the same as in the example without a CN, whereas the
right-hand side is t(0+) = 0.0281. This is significantly smaller than in Example 1.4.3.
6Pasting when passing from servicing to excluding need not be smooth.
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Determining γ(θ) on (0, 0.007] is relatively simple, as we again must solve l(θ, γ(θ)) = 0,
which results in γ(θ) = (−3θ2 + 6θ + 2)/4. Finally, in order to determine γ on Θe(pi) we
must rewrite the virtual surplus using C(q(θ)) = τc(θ), which results in C(q) = (55/6)q6 −
(1/4)q2 + 0.001. The pointwise maximization of the resulting virtual surplus must equal
qc(θ) =
5
√
θ/5. After some lengthy arithmetic that we choose to spare the reader from, we
obtain
γ(θ) = F (θ)− f(θ)
[
55qc(θ)
5 − θ
]
= F (θ) for θ ∈ Θe(pi).
Finally, in the profitable–matching region we solve l(θ, γ(θ)) = 5
√
θ/5 so as to find the
multiplier, which yields
γ(θ) = F (θ)− f(θ)
[
1
10
θ1/5 − θ
]
for θ ∈ [0.1667, 0.4761),
i.e.,
γ(θ) =
1
10
θ1/5 · 2θ − 3
4
− 3θ
2 − 6θ − 2
4
for θ ∈ [0.1667, 0.4761).
Observe that, in contrast to Example 1.4.6, here γ(θ) = 1 for types that are strictly smaller
than one. This means that the rightmost types do not profit from the introduction of the CN
via changes in the quantities they are offered, but rather from changes in the corresponding
prices. Intuitively speaking this has to do with how steep the outside option is for large types
and, as a consequence, whether or not it will be matched over a non-trivial interval.
We present in Figure 1.3(a) the indirect utilities for positive types (the ones for nega-
tive types being the same as in Figure 1.1(a)). The values of γ have been plotted in
Figure 1.3(b). In Figure 1.4 we provide a magnification around small values of θ so as
to highlight the switching between reservation, full servicing and exclusion. Observe the
jump of the Lagrange multiplier at the boundary between fully-serviced and excluded types
(Figure 1.4(b)) and between excluded and matched ones (Figure 1.3(b)).
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Figure 1.3: An example with exclusion
We shall revisit this example in the upcoming section, where we look into the existence
of equilibrium prices in the CN.
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Figure 1.4: An example with exclusion (magnified)
1.5 An equilibrium price in the crossing network
In this section we prove the existence of an equilibrium price pi∗. We first observe that,
from Assumption 1.2.8, there is no loss of generality in assuming that pi∗ belongs to
some closed and bounded subset of R2, which we denote by Π. As a consequence we
have that t(0; ·) : Π → Π. The restriction of possible equilibrium prices to Π, together
with Assumptions 1.2.2 and 1.2.8, yields the next result.
Lemma 1.5.1. There exists a non-empty interval [ϵ1, ϵ2] ⊂ Θ such that
1. 0 ∈ (ϵ1, ϵ2);
2. u0(θ; pi) = 0 for all θ ∈ [ϵ1, ϵ2] and all pi ∈ Π.
In the sequel we make use of the results obtained in Section 1.4.2 to show that the
mapping pi ↦→ t(0; pi) has the required monotonicity properties so as to use the following
result:
Theorem 1.5.2. (Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem, [Tar55, Theorem 1]) Let (X,≤) be a
complete lattice. If f : X → X is order preserving, then the set of fixed points of f is also a
(non-empty) complete lattice7.
We are now ready to give the proof of our third main result.
Proof of Theorem 1.2.9. Lemmas 1.4.7 and 1.5.1 guarantee that we have a well-defined
spread; thus, we may decompose the analysis of the mapping pi ↦→ t(0; pi) into that of
the mappings pi− ↦→ t(0−; pi−) and pi+ ↦→ t(0+; pi+). In other words, for a given price pi,
the dealer’s optimal response to u0(·; pi) is, modulo a normalization of γ, equivalent to
the combination of his actions towards negative and positive types separately. We shall
concentrate on the existence of a fixed point of the mapping pi+ ↦→ t(0+; pi+).
From Assumption 1.2.8 we have that if pi1+ < pi2+, then u0(θ; pi1+) > u0(θ; pi2+) for all
θ > 0. If for i = 1, 2 it holds that u0(θ; pii+) < vo(θ) for all θ > 0, then v(θ; pi1+) = v(θ; pi2+)
7Every complete lattice is, by definition, non-empty.
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on the same domain and t(0+; pi1+) = t(0+; pi2+). Next assume that u0(θ; pii+) ≥ vo(θ) on
a subset Θi of (0, θ], for i = 1, 2. Given that u0(θ; pi1+) > u0(θ; pi2+) for all θ > 0, then
θ(pi1) < θ(pi2) and the first point θ˜1 such that v(θ; pi1+) = u0(θ; pi1+) holds satisfies θ˜1 < θ˜2,
where the latter is the analogous to θ˜1 in the presence of u0(θ; pi2+). The existence of θ˜1
and θ˜2 is guaranteed by the fact that in both cases the indirect–utility functions intersect
the corresponding outside options. Arguing as in the proof of Theorem 1.2.7, Part (2),
this also implies that θ0(pi1) < θ0(pi2); hence t(0+; pi1+) < t(0+; pi2+). In other words, the
mapping pi+ ↦→ t(0+; pi+) is order-preserving and, using Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem,
we may conclude it has a fixed point.
Remark 1.5.3. The requirement of uniformly distributed types can be relaxed to the extent
that if f and K are such that Conditions (1.4.4) are satisfied, then the required mono-
tonicity properties still apply. Unfortunately, these conditions cannot be verified ex-ante,
since they include the end points of the set of reserved traders.
Example 1.5.4. Let us go back to our example with exclusion, but introduce the feed-
back loop between the DM and the CN through the iteration pii+1 = t(0; pii). We initialize
the recursion by setting pi0 = (0, 1/2) and κ = 0.001, which are the parameters in the
aforementioned example.
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Figure 1.5: The indirect–utility functions corresponding to the iteration pii+1 = t(0; pii).
We observe a very swift convergence. Indeed, it takes only four iterations to reach ‖v(·; pii)−
v(·; pii+1)‖∞ ≤ 10−5 and the indirect–utility functions in the third and fourth iteration are
almost indistinguishable. The equilibrium price is pi∗ = (0, 0.015). We present in Figure 1.5
the plots of the first four iterates. It is evident that each iteration results in a smaller set
of reserved traders and in a higher indirect utility for all types. The spreads, the right
endpoints of the reserved regions, the Lagrange multipliers at the right endpoint of the
reserved regions and the exclusion regions are provided in Table 1.1. It is interesting to
observe that, as the spread decreases to its equilibrium level, the number of trader types
that are reserved decreases and the sets of excluded types grow (in terms of inclusions).
This last fact obeys the fact that, when the traders have a more attractive outside option, it
is harder for the dealer to match it profitably.
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Table 1.1: The numbers of the feedback loop
pi+ Θo Γ Θe(pi+)
1/2 [-0.423,0.0070] 0.5105 [0.0159, 0.1667]
0.0281 [-0.423,0.0040] 0.5061 [0.0083, 0.4872]
0.0161 [-0.423,0.0040] 0.5060 [0.0082, 0.4954]
0.0158 [-0.423,0.0040] 0.5060 [0.0082, 0.4955]
1.6 Portfolio liquidation and DP trading
In this section we present an application of our methodology to portfolio liquidation.
We assume that the market participants’ aim is to liquidate their current holdings on
some traded asset. The sizes of the traders’ portfolios are heterogeneous and saying
that a trader’s type is θ means that he holds θ shares of the asset prior to trading. We
set Θ = [−1, 1] and f = 1
2
1Θ. If a trader of type θ trades q shares for τ dollars, his utility
is
uˆ(θ, q)− τ := −α(θ − q)2 − τ,
where α > 0 denotes the traders’ (homogeneous) sensitivity towards inventory hold-
ings. Notice that −αθ2 is the type-dependent reservation utility of a trader of type θ. If
we “normalize" the said utility to zero, we may write
u(θ, q)− τ = 2αθq − αq2 − τ.
In this example the CN takes the form of a Dark Pool (DP). Choosing to trade in the
latter entails two kinds of costs for the traders: On the one hand, there is a direct fixed
cost κ > 0 of engaging in DP trading. On the other hand, execution in the DP is not
guaranteed. We denote by p ∈ [0, 1] the probability that an order is executed where we
assume for simplicity that the probability of order execution is independent of the order
size. Pricing in the DP is linear. Namely, for a given execution price pi, the utility that a
trader of type θ extracts from submitting an order of q shares to be traded in the DP is
p
[
(2θα− pi)q − αq2]− κ,
where again we have normalized reservation utilities to zero. The problem of optimal
submission to the DP for a θ-type trader is
max
q
{
p
[
(2θα− pi)q − αq2]},
which yields the optimal submission level
qd(θ) := θ − pi
2α
.
We obtain that opting for the DP results in a trader of type θ enjoying the expected
utility
u0(θ; pi) = αp
(
θ − pi
2α
)2
− κ.
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We assume that ppi2 < 4ακ so as to keep the DP unattractive for small types.
We assume that the dealer’s costs/profits of unwinding a portfolio of size q are C(q) =
ϵ q+ βq2 where β > 0 and ϵ is non-negative. Observe that, since u0(·; pi) does not satisfy
Assumption 1.2.2, some restrictions must be imposed on the problem’s parameters so
as to still have Lemma 1.5.1. Namely, it must hold that
pi < 2
√
ακ
p
. (1.6.1)
Condition (1.6.1) imposes a hard upper bound on possible equilibrium DP prices. It
should be noted that Assumption 1.2.8 is not satisfied by u0(·; pi), which, together with
the way in which we shall define the pricing feedback loop from the DM to the DP,
implies that our equilibrium result does not apply “as is” to the current setting.
1.6.1 The dealer market without a dark pool
In the absence of a DP, the dealer’s optimal choices of quantities are
l(θ, 0) =
α
α + β
(
2θ + 1
)− ϵ
2(α + β)
for negative types and
l(θ, 1) =
α
α + β
(
2θ − 1)− ϵ
2(α + β)
for positive types, where the boundary of Θ0 is given by
θ0 =
1
2
( ϵ
2α
− 1
)
and θ0 =
1
2
( ϵ
2α
+ 1
)
.
In order to guarantee that Θ0 ⊂ [−1, 1] the condition ϵ < 2α must be imposed on
the corresponding parameters. From the relation v′(θ) = ψ1
(
q(θ)
)
we have that the
indirect–utility function is
v(θ) =
{
2α2
α+β
θ2 + α
α+β
(
2α− ϵ)θ + c1, θ ≤ θ0;
2α2
α+β
θ2 − α
α+β
(
2α + ϵ
)
θ + c2, θ ≥ θ0,
where
c1 =
2α2
4(α + β)
( ϵ
2α
+ 1
)2
+
α(2α + ϵ)
2(α + β)
( ϵ
2α
+ 1
)
and
c2 =
2α2
4(α + β)
( ϵ
2α
− 1
)2
− α(2α + ϵ)
2(α + β)
( ϵ
2α
− 1
)
.
When it comes to the spread, observe that q′ ≡ 2α
α+β
, ψ1 ≡ 2α and ψ2 ≡ 0, which yields
[t(0−), t(0+)] =
4α2
α + β
[θ0, θ0].
Below we analyze how the spread changes with the introduction of the DP.
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1.6.2 The impact of a dark pool
We first take an exogenous execution price pi and determine, for each θ ∈ Θ, what is
the quantity–price pair
(
qc(θ; pi), τc(θ; pi)
)
that the dealer must offer so as to match a DP
with execution price pi. Using the relation qc(θ; pi) = u′0(θ; pi) we obtain
qc(θ; pi) = 2αp
(
θ − pi
2α
)
and
τc(θ; pi) = κ+ 4α
2p(θ − αp)
(
θ − pi
2α
)
− αp
(
θ − pi
2α
)2
.
(1.6.2)
From the Envelope Theorem and the structure of u(θ, q) we have that the traders’
indirect–utility function satisfies
v′(θ)
2α
= l
(
θ, γ(θ)
)
. (1.6.3)
In order to determine the spread in the presence of the DP we must determine θ0,m and
θ0,m together with γ
(
θ0,m
)
and γ
(
θ0,m
)
. For an arbitrary Γ ∈ [0, 1] we have
l(θ,Γ) =
α
α + β
[
2θ + 1− 2Γ]− ϵ
2(α + β)
.
Indexed by Γ, the candidates for θ0,m are then given by
θ0,m(Γ) =
1
2
( ϵ
2α
+ 2Γ− 1
)
.
Since it must hold that θ0,m(Γ) ≤ 0, then Γ ≤ 0.5(1 − ϵ/2α). Integrating Expres-
sion (1.6.3) we have that, on the interval [θ˜m(Γ), θ0,m(Γ)], the traders’ indirect utility
is given by
v(θ; Γ) =
2α2
α + β
θ2 + 2α
[ α
α + β
(1− 2Γ)− ϵ
2(α + β)
]
θ + c1,m, (1.6.4)
where θ˜m(Γ) is the first intersection to the left of θ0,m(Γ) of v(·; Γ) and u0(·; pi) and c1,m
is determined by the equation
v
(
θ0,m(Γ); Γ
)
= 0.
Unless the inequality Γ ≤ 0.5(1− ϵ/2α) is tight, in which case the types below θ˜m(Γ) are
excluded, Proposition 1.4.5 implies that Γ must be chosen so as to satisfy the smooth–
pasting condition u′0
(
θ˜m(Γ); pi
)
= v′
(
θ˜m(Γ); pi
)
, which is equivalent to
θ˜m(Γ) =
[ 2α
α + β
− p
]−1[ ϵ
2(α + β)
− α
α + β
(1− 2Γ)− ppi
2α
]
.
Observe that, besides the requirement Γ ≥ 0.5(1− ϵ/2α), the strategy to determine θ0,m
is exactly the same as for θ0,m. Summarizing, from Eq. (1.6.4) we observe that, if Γ− and
Γ+ correspond to the optimal choices for the negative and positive endpoints of Θ0(pi),
then
q′
(
θ0,m(Γ−)
)
=
1
2α
v′′
(
θ0,m(Γ−); Γ−
)
=
1
2α
v′′
(
θ0,m(Γ+); Γ+
)
= q′
(
θ0,m(Γ+)
)
=
2α
α + β
.
The spread is then
[tm(0−), tm(0+)] =
4α2
α + β
[θ0,m(Γ−), θ0,m(Γ+)] ⊂
4α2
α + β
[θ0, θ0],
i.e. the presence of a DP strictly narrows the spread in the DM.
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1.6.3 An equilibrium price
A standard (but not unique) way in which DP prices are generated is by computing
the average of some publicly available best bid and best ask prices. In the case of the
US, this is usually the mid-quote of the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO). Borrowing
from this idea we define the price iteration in the DP as follows:
pii+1 =
1
2
(
ti(0+)− ti(0−)
)
, i ∈ N,
where {ti(0−), ti(0+)} are the best bid and ask prices in the DM in the presence of
a DP with execution price pii. We know from the previous section that the sequence
{pii, i ∈ N} ⊂ ((4α2)/(α + β))[θ0, θ0]; hence, by the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem it has
at least one convergent subsequence. The limit of each of the said subsequences will be
an equilibrium price. The (possible) non-uniqueness of these prices is due to the fact
that by virtue of its definition, the sequence of DP prices need not be monotonic. The
problem of non-uniqueness of equilibria in models of competing DMs and CNs has been
observed before. We refer to [DDH13] for a detailed discussion.
1.7 Conclusions
We have presented a screening model to study the structure of the LOB of a dealer who
provides liquidity to traders of unknown preferences. Furthermore, we have established
a link between the traders’ indirect–utility function and the bid–ask spread in the DM.
Making use of the aforementioned link, we have studied how the presence of a type-
dependent outside option impacts the spread of the DM, as well as the set of trader
types who participate in the DM and their welfare. In particular, we have shown, in
a portfolio-liquidation setting, that the presence of a dark pool results in a shrinkage
of the spread in the DM. Finally, we have established that, under certain conditions,
the feedback loop introduced by the impact that the spread has on the structure of the
outside option leads to an equilibrium price.
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2 | Equilibrium Pricing Under Relative
Performance Concerns
2.1 Organization of this chapter
In Section 2.3, we define the general market, agents, optimization problem and equi-
librium that we consider. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 are devoted to solving the general opti-
mization problem for a set of agents having arbitrary risk measures. In the former we
solve the optimization problem for each agent, given the strategies of all others, i.e., we
solve the best response problem, and we find a unique NE. In the latter we characterize
the equilibrium price by means of a suitable weighted aggregation of individual risk
measures and identification of the representative agent. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 analyze
the particular case where the agents use entropic risk measures. In this more tractable
setting, Section 2.6 explores theoretically the influence of various parameters on the
global risk while Section 2.7 focuses on a model with two agents with opposite risk
profiles, and numerically explores the influence of the concern rates, in particular, on
the individual behaviors, risks, and the consequences for the whole system. Section 2.8
concludes the chapter.
2.2 Spaces and Notation
We define the following spaces for p > 1, q ≥ 1, n,m, d, k ∈ N: C0,n([0, T ] × Rd;Rk) is
the space of continuous functions endowed with the ‖·‖∞-norm that are n-times con-
tinuously differentiable in the spatial variable; C0,nb contains all bounded functions of
C0,n; the first superscript 0 is dropped for functions independent of time; Lp(Ft,Rd),
t ∈ [0, T ], is the space of d-dimensional Ft-measurable random variables X with norm
‖X‖Lp = E[ |X|p]1/p < ∞; L∞ refers to the subset of essentially bounded random vari-
ables; Sp([0, T ] × Rd) is the space of d-dimensional measurable F -adapted processes Y
satisfying ‖Y ‖Sp = E[supt∈[0,T ] |Yt|p]1/p < ∞; S∞ refers to the subset of Sp(Rd) of es-
sentially bounded processes; Hp([0, T ] × Rd) is the space of d-dimensional measurable
F -adapted processes Z satisfying ‖Z‖Hp = E[
( ∫ T
0
|Zs|2ds
)p/2
]1/p <∞; For a probability
measure Q, we denote HBMO(Q) as the space of processes Z ∈ Hp(Q) for any p ≥ 2 such
that for some constant KBMO > 0
sup
τ∈T[0,T ]
EQ
[∫ T
τ
|Zs|2ds
∣∣∣Fτ] ≤ KBMO <∞,
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where T[0,T ] is the set of all stopping times τ ∈ [0, T ]. For the reference measure P we
write directlyHBMO instead ofHBMO(P). For more properties ofHBMO, see Appendix A.1.
2.3 The model
We consider a finite set A of N agents, without loss of generality A = {1, 2, . . . , N}, with
random endowments Ha, a ∈ A, to be received at a terminal time T < ∞. They trade
continuously in the financial market which comprises a stock and a newly introduced
structured security (called derivative), aiming to minimize their risk. For simplicity we
assume that money can be lent or borrowed at the risk-free rate zero. Stock prices
follow an exogenous diffusion process and are not affected by the agents’ demand. By
contrast, the derivative is traded only by the agents from A and priced endogenously
such that demand matches supply.
The market model follows [HPDR10], whereas the preferences are extended by a per-
formance functional as in [ET15] and [FdR11].
2.3.1 The market
Sources of risk and underlyings
Throughout this chapter we work on a continuous time scale t ∈ [0, T ]. In our model,
there are two independent sources of randomness, represented by a 2-dimensional
standard Brownian motion W = (W S,WR) on a standard filtered probability space
(Ω,F , (Ft)Tt=0,P), where (Ft) is the filtration generated by W and augmented by the P-
null sets and F = FT . The Brownian motion WR drives the external and non-tradable
risk process (Rt), which is thought of as a temperature process or a precipitation index.
For analytical convenience we assume that (Rt) follows a Brownian motion with drift
being a stochastic process µR and constant volatility b > 0, i.e.,
dRt = µ
R
t dt+ bdW
R
t , with R0 = r0 ∈ R. (2.3.1)
The Brownian motion W S drives the stock price process (St) according to
dSt = µ
S
t St dt+ σ
S
t St dW
S
t , (2.3.2)
= µSt St dt+ 〈σt, dWt〉 with σt := (σSt St, 0) ∈ R2, and S0 = s0 > 0.
We assume that the stochastic processes µR, µS, σS : Ω × [0, T ] → R are (Ft)-adapted,
with σS > 0.
Market price of risk: financial and external
We recall (see e.g. [HM07]) that any linear pricing scheme on the set L2(P) of square-
integrable random variables with respect to P can be identified with a 2-dimensional
predictable process θ = (θS, θR) such that the exponential process (Eθt ) defined by
Eθt := E
(
−
∫ ·
0
〈θs, dWs〉
)
t
= exp
{
−
∫ t
0
〈θs, dWs〉 − 1
2
∫ t
0
|θs|2ds
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.3.3)
49
is a uniformly integrable martingale. This ensures that the measure Pθ defined by having
density EθT against P is indeed a probability measure (the pricing measure), and the
present price of a random terminal payment X is given by Eθ[X], where Eθ denotes the
expectation with respect to Pθ. For any such θ, we introduce the Pθ-Brownian motion
W θt = Wt +
∫ t
0
θs ds, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.3.4)
The first component θS of the vector θ is the market price of financial risk. Under the
assumption that there is no arbitrage, S must be a martingale under Pθ and, from the
exogenously given dynamics of S, θS is necessarily given by θSt = µ
S
t /σ
S
t , t ∈ [0, T ]. The
process θR on the other hand is unknown. It is the market price of external risk and
will be derived endogenously by the market clearing condition (or constant net supply
condition, see below).
The agents’ endowments and the derivative’s payoffs
The agents a ∈ A receive at time T the income Ha which depends on the financial
and external risk factors. While the agents are able to trade in the financial market to
hedge away some of their financial risk, a basis risk remains, originating in the agents’
exposure to the non-tradable risk process R. A derivative with payoff HD at maturity
time T is introduced such that, by trading in the derivative HD, the agents have now a
way to reduce their basis risk.
We make the following assumptions on the endowments, derivative payoff and coeffi-
cients appearing in the dynamics of S and R.
Assumption 2.3.1 (Standing assumption on the data). The processes µR, µS, σS and
θS := µS/σS are bounded (belong to S∞). The random variables HD and Ha, a ∈ A, are
bounded (belong to L∞(FT )).
Price of the derivative, trading in the market and the agent’s strategies
Assuming no arbitrage opportunities, the price process (Bθt )t∈[0,T ] of H
D is given by its
expected payoff under Pθ; in other words Bθ· = Eθ
[
HD|F·
]
. Since HD is bounded,
writing the Pθ-martingale as a stochastic integral against the Pθ-Brownian motion W θ
(with the martingale representation theorem) yields a 2-dimensional square-integrable
adapted process κθ := (κS, κR) such that for t ∈ [0, T ]
Bθt = Eθ[HD] +
∫ t
0
〈κθs, dW θs 〉 = Eθ[HD] +
∫ t
0
〈κθs, dWs〉+
∫ t
0
〈
κθs, θs
〉
ds. (2.3.5)
Note that we have (B, κ) ∈ S∞ × HBMO(Pθ). It will turn out to be useful to rewrite
(2.3.5) as a BSDE:
Bθt = H
D −
∫ T
t
〈κθs, θs〉ds−
∫ T
t
〈κθs, dWs〉. (2.3.6)
We denote by pia,1t and pi
a,2
t the number of units agent a ∈ A holds in the stock and the
derivative at time t ∈ [0, T ], respectively. Using a self-financing strategy pia := (pia,1, pia,2)
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with values in R2, her gains from trading up to time t ∈ [0, T ], under the pricing measure
Pθ inducing the prices (Bθt ) for the derivative, are given by
V at = Vt(pi
a) =
∫ t
0
pia,1s dSs +
∫ t
0
pia,2s dB
θ
s
=
∫ t
0
〈
pia,1s σs + pi
a,2
s κ
θ
s, θs
〉
ds+
∫ t
0
〈pia,1s σs + pia,2s κθs, dWs〉.
(2.3.7)
We require that the trading strategies be integrable against the prices, i.e., for all a ∈ A,
pia ∈ L2((S,Bθ),Pθ), so that the gains processes are square-integrable martingales un-
der Pθ (i.e., we require Eθ [〈 V·(pia) 〉T ] < ∞). The (R2)(N−1)-valued vector of strategies
of all agents b ∈ A \ {a} will be denoted by pi−a := (pib)b∈A\{a}.
2.3.2 Preferences, risk minimization and equilibrium
The agents’ measure of risk
The agents assess their risk using a dynamic convex time-consistent risk measure ρa·
induced by a BSDE.This means that the risk ρat (ξ
a) which agent a ∈ A associates at time
t ∈ [0, T ] with an FT -measurable random position ξa is given by Y at , where (Y a, Za) is
the solution to the BSDE
−dY at = ga(t, Zat )dt− 〈Zat , dWt〉 with terminal condition Y aT = −ξa.
The driver ga encodes the risk preferences of agent a for a ∈ A. We assume that ga has
the following properties:
Assumption 2.3.2. The map ga : [0, T ] × R2 → R is a deterministic continuous function.
Its restriction to the space variable, z ↦→ ga(·, z), is continuously differentiable, strictly
convex and attains its minimum.
For any fixed (t, ϑ) ∈ [0, T ] × R2, the map z ↦→ ga(t, z) − 〈z, ϑ〉 is also strictly convex
and attains its unique minimum at the point where its gradient vanishes. With this in
mind we can define Za : [0, T ]×R2 → R2, (t, ϑ) ↦→ Za(t, ϑ) where Za(t, ϑ) is the unique
solution, in the unknown Z, to the equation1
∇zga(t,Z) = ϑ. (2.3.8)
Under Assumption 2.3.2, the risk measure given by the above BSDE is strongly time
consistent, convex and translation invariant (or monetary). For more details on the
class of risk measures described by BSDEs we point the interested reader to [BE05],
[Gia06] and [BE09].
For convenience, we recall the relevant properties of dynamic risk measures:
translation invariance: for any m ∈ R and any t ∈ [0, T ] it holds that ρat (ξa + m) =
ρat (ξ
a)−m;
time-consistency: for any t, t+ s ∈ [0, T ] it holds that ρat (ξa) = ρat (ρat+s(ξa));
convexity: for any t ∈ [0, T ] and for ξa, ξˆa FT -measurable and α ∈ [0, 1] we have
ρat
(
αξa + (1− α)ξˆa) ≤ αρat (ξa) + (1− α)ρat (ξˆa).
1We write ∇zga(t,Z) for the vector consisting of the partial derivatives of ga w.r.t. the (two) compo-
nents of the space variable, evaluated at Z.
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The individual optimization problem
Agent a’s position at maturity, ξa, is given by the sum of her terminal income Ha and
the trading gains V aT over the time period [0, T ]. Additionally, the agent compares her
trading gains V aT = VT (pi
a) with the average gains of all other agents. Thus, we define
the perceived total wealth ξa(pia, pi−a) of each of the N agents a ∈ A in the market at
time t = T as
ξa =
(
Ha +
(
1− λa)VT (pia))+ λa(VT (pia)− 1
N − 1
∑
b∈A\{a}
VT (pi
b)
)
= Ha + VT (pi
a)− λ˜a
∑
b∈A\{a}
VT (pi
b), where λ˜a :=
λa
N − 1
and λa ∈ [0, 1] is the concern rate (or jealousy factor) of agent a ∈ A (cf. (0.0.1)).2 We
make the following assumption on the concern rates λ·, whose justification will become
clear later on in Theorem 2.4.5.
Assumption 2.3.3 (Performance concern rates). We have λa ∈ [0, 1] for each agent and∏
a∈A λ
a < 1.
For notational convenience we introduce for t ∈ [0, T ]
V¯ −at := Vt(p¯i
−a) =
∑
b∈A\{a}
Vt(pi
b), with p¯i−a :=
∑
b∈A\{a}
pib, (2.3.9)
where we apply the additivity of pi ↦→ V·(pi), which can be inferred from its definition in
(2.3.7). The risk associated with the self-financing strategy pia evolves according to the
BSDE
−dY at = ga (t, Zat ) dt− 〈Zat , dWt〉, t ∈ [0, T ]
Y aT = −ξa(pia, pi−a) = −
(
Ha + VT (pi
a)− λ˜aVT (p¯i−a)
)
.
(2.3.10)
Now, we introduce a notion of admissibility for our problem.
Definition 2.3.4 (Admissibility). Let a ∈ A, and pi−a = (pib)b∈A\{a} be integrable strategies
for the other agents. The R2-valued strategy process pia is called admissible with respect
to the market price of risk θ if Eθ [〈 V·(pia) 〉T ] < ∞, where 〈V·(pia)〉 denotes the quadratic
variation of
(
Vt(pi
a)
)
t∈[0,T ], and BSDE (2.3.10) has a unique solution. The set of admissible
trading strategies for agent a ∈ A is denoted by Aθ(pi−a).
Each agent a ∈ A wants to minimize her risk given the strategies of the other agents,
pi−a, i.e. agent a solves the best-response problem
min
pia∈Aθ(pi−a)
Y a0 (pi
a, pi−a). (2.3.11)
Notice that, a priori, not only the strategy chosen, but also the risk for agent a depends
on the strategies of all other players, pi−a. For the sake of presentation we leave this
interdependence implicit whenever possible and we write the solution to the BSDE
giving the risk for agent a as (Y a, Za) instead of the lengthy
(
Y a(pia, pi−a), Za(pia, pi−a)
)
.
We will use the latter when the situation requires it.
2Compare with the performance functionals in [ET15] or [FdR11]. If λa = 0 for all a ∈ A, then we
are in the setting of [HPDR10].
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Competitive equilibrium, equilibrium market price of risk and endogenous trading
We denote by n ∈ R the number of units of derivative present in the market. While
each unit of derivative pays HD at time T , the agents are free to buy and underwrite
contracts for any amount of HD. Within the trading period [0, T ], only the agents in our
set A, with trading objectives as described above, are active in the market and the total
number n of derivatives present is constant over time.
We show that one can convert the problem for a general n ∈ R into a problem for
n = 0 by distributing the derivative among all agents before the beginning of the trading
period. In the case n = 0 every derivative held by an agent has been underwritten by
another agent in A, entailing essentially that agents share their risks with each other
(see [BE05], [BE09] or [HM07]).
We assume that each agent seeks to minimize her risk measure independently, without
cooperation with the other agents, so we are interested in Nash equilibria.
Definition 2.3.5 (Equilibrium and Equilibrium MPR (EMPR)). For a given Market Price
of Risk (MPR) θ = (θS, θR), we call pi∗ = (pi∗,a)a∈A an equilibrium if, for all a ∈ A,
pi∗,a ∈ Aθ(pi∗,−a) and
for any admissible strategy pia it holds that Y a0 (pi
∗,a, pi∗,−a) ≤ Y a0 (pia, pi∗,−a),
i.e., individual optimality given the strategies of the other agents. We call θ Equilibrium
Market Price of Risk (EMPR) and θR Equilibrium Market Price of external Risk (EMPeR)
if
1. θ = (θS, θR) makes Pθ a true probability measure (equivalently, Eθ from (2.3.3) is a
uniformly integrable martingale);
2. there exists a unique equilibrium pi∗ for θ;
3. pi∗ satisfies the market clearing condition (or fixed supply condition) for the derivative
HD (where Leb denotes the Lebesgue measure):∑
a∈A
pi∗,a,2t =
∑
a∈A
pi∗,a,20 = n P⊗ Leb− a.e.. (2.3.12)
Our approach to finding the equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
2.4 The single agent’s optimization and unconstrained
equilibrium
Finding an EMPR is essentially an optimization problem under the fixed-supply con-
straint. So, prior to looking whether such an EMPR exists (postponed to Section 2.5),
we start by fixing an arbitrary MPR θ ∈ HBMO and find the NE given that MPR, without
the fixed-supply constraint. To this end, we first analyze the optimal behavior of the
individual agents given that the others have chosen their strategies (the so-called best
response problem), and then solve all best response problems simultaneously, thereby
obtaining the NE, which will turn out to be unique for any given MPR θ.
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agents in A social planner
formulate problem,
assume complete market
MPR θ assumed given
FOC of optimality
best response func-
tion for each agent
Nash equilibrium given θ
build
representative agent
market clearing = no
trading in derivative
FOC of
representative agent
EMPR θ∗
verify market is complete
market equilibrium pi∗
solve system
plug θ∗ into
Figure 2.1: Stepwise Approach
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2.4.1 Optimal response for one agent
In this subsection, in addition to a MPR θ being fixed, we focus on a single agent a ∈ A,
whose preferences are encoded by ga, we take the strategies pi−a = (pib)b∈A\{a} of the
other agents as given, and we study the investment problem of our agent in this setting.
Optimizing the residual risk
To solve the optimization problem (2.3.11) for agent a, we first recall from [HPDR10]
that, at each time t ∈ [0, T ], the strategy chosen must minimize the residual risk: the ad-
ditivity of the risk measure implies (writing VT = (VT −Vt)+Vt and using the translation
invariance) that
Y at = ρ
a
t
(
Ha + V aT − λ˜aV¯ −aT
)
= ρat
(
Ha + (V aT − V at )− λ˜a(V¯ −aT − V¯ −at )
)
− (V at − λ˜aV¯ −at ).
This suggests applying the following change of variables to (2.3.10) (using (2.3.9)),
Y˜ at := Y
a
t +
(
V at − λ˜aV¯ −at
)
,
Z˜at := Z
a
t + ζ
a
t , where ζ
a
t =
(
pia,1t σt + pi
a,2
t κ
θ
t
)− λ˜a(p¯i−a,1t σt + p¯i−a,2t κθt) ∈ R2. (2.4.1)
If the strategies are not clear from the context, we also write ζa = ζa(pi) = ζa(pia, pi−a).
Direct computations yield a BSDE for (Y˜ a, Z˜a) given by
−dY˜ at = g˜a
(
t, piat , pi
−a
t , Z˜
a
t
)
dt− 〈Z˜at , dWt〉, t ∈ [0, T ],
Y˜ aT = −Ha,
(2.4.2)
where the driver g˜a : Ω× [0, T ]× R2 × (R2)N−1 × R2 → R is defined as
g˜a(t, piat , pi
−a
t , z
a) : = ga
(
t, za − ζat
)− 〈ζat , θt〉 (2.4.3)
= ga
(
t, za −
((
pia,1t − λ˜ap¯i−a,1t
)
σt +
(
pia,2t − λ˜ap¯i−a,2t
)
κθt
))
(2.4.4)
−
〈(
pia,1t − λ˜ap¯i−a,1t
)
σt +
(
pia,2t − λ˜ap¯i−a,2t
)
κθt , θt
〉
.
Each individual agent a ∈ A seeks to minimize Y˜ a0 , the solution to (2.4.2), via her choice
of investment strategy pia ∈ Aθ(pi−a), in other words she aims at solving
min
pia∈Aθ(pi−a)
Y˜ a0 (pi
a, pi−a). (2.4.5)
Before we solve the individual optimization problem, we make the assumption that the
derivative HD does indeed complete the market. This must then be verified a posteriori
(once the solution is computed) and case-by-case depending on the specific model.
Assumption 2.4.1. Assume that κRt ̸= 0, for any t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s. .
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The pointwise minimizer for the single agent’s residual risk
In (2.4.2), the strategy pia appears only in the driver g˜a, not in the terminal condition.
The comparison theorem for BSDEs suggests that in order to minimize Y˜ a0 (pi
a) over
admissible strategies pia, one needs only to minimize the driver function g˜a over piat , for
each fixed ω, t, pi−at and za. We define such pointwise minimizer as the random map
Πa : Ω× [0, T ]× (R2)N−1 × R2 → R2, given by
Πa(t, pi−at , z) := arg min
pia∈R2
g˜a(t, pia, pi−at , z).
The pointwise minimization problem has, under Assumption 2.3.2, a unique minimizer,
which is characterized by the first order condition (FOC) for g˜a, i.e.,
∇pia g˜a(t, pia, pi−at , za) = 0.
Recall that σ = (σSS, 0). Using (2.4.4), the FOC is equivalently written as
∂pia,1 g˜
a(t, pia, pi−a, za) = 0 ⇐⇒ 〈(∇zga)(t, za − ζa),−σ〉− 〈σ, θ〉 = 0
⇐⇒ gaz1(t, za − ζa) = −θS, (2.4.6)
∂pia,2 g˜
a(t, pia, pi−a, za) = 0 ⇐⇒ 〈(∇zga)(t, za − ζa),−κθ〉− 〈κθ, θ〉 = 0
⇐⇒ −θS κS + gaz2(t, za − ζa)κR = −κSθS − κRθR
⇐⇒ gaz2(t, za − ζa) = −θR, (2.4.7)
where we used (2.4.6) to obtain (2.4.7) under Assumption 2.4.1.
With Za from (2.3.8), the FOC system (2.4.6)–(2.4.7) is equivalent to
za − ζat = za − ζat (Πa(t, pi−at , za), pi−at ) = Za(t,−θt), (2.4.8)
which has the useful property that while the left-hand side (LHS) depends on za, the
best response strategy of agent a and all other agents’ strategies pi−a, the right-hand
side (RHS) merely depends on the MPR θ and the structure of the driver ga.
The expression for ζa in (2.4.1) and elementary re-arrangements allow to rewrite (2.4.8)
as
Πa,1(t, pi−at , z
a)− λ˜ap¯i−a,1t =
za,1 −Za,1(t,−θt)
σSt St
− z
a,2 −Za,2(t,−θt)
κRt
κSt
σSt St
,
Πa,2(t, pi−at , z
a)− λ˜ap¯i−a,2t =
za,2 −Za,2(t,−θt)
κRt
.
(2.4.9)
Plugging za − ζat = Za(t,−θt) into (2.4.3) yields an expression for the minimized (ran-
dom) driver
g˜a
(
t,Πa(t, pi−at , z
a), pi−at , z
a
)
= ga
(
t,Za(t,−θt)
)
+ 〈Za(t,−θt), θt〉 − 〈za, θt〉
=: G˜a(t, za).
(2.4.10)
We stress two important details. First, G˜a is an affine driver (in za) with stochastic
coefficients. Second, G˜a does not depend at all on pi−a and it can be calculated without
an explicit formula for the best response Πa(·, pi−a· , za) by relying on Za from (2.3.8).
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The second statement implies that, while the best-response strategy of an agent a ∈ A
depends on the strategies of the other agents, her minimal risk does not.3
Both statements hold due to the affine structure of the agent’s terminal position, which
is passed on to ζa and via (2.4.3) to the driver, as well as due to Assumption 2.3.2 and
(2.3.8), which lead to the replacement (2.4.8).
Single-agent optimality
Since G˜a is an affine driver, and since ∇zG˜a = −θ ∈ HBMO, we have a unique solu-
tion to the BSDE with driver G˜a and terminal condition −Ha, provided that the pro-
cess (ω, t) ↦→ G˜a(t, 0) = ga(t,Za(t,−θt)) + 〈Za(t,−θt), θt〉 is sufficiently integrable. Let
(Y˜ a, Z˜a) be the solution to BSDE (2.4.2) with driver (2.4.10) and define the strategy
pi∗,a· := Π
a(·, pi−a· , Z˜a· ). This so-called best response function does not only solve the
individual risk minimization problem, but, as we show next, it is even unique.
Theorem 2.4.2 (Optimality for one agent, uniqueness4). Fix a market price of risk θ =
(θS, θR) ∈ HBMO and let Assumption 2.4.1 hold. Fix an agent a ∈ A and a set of integrable
strategies (pib)b∈A\{a}. Assume further that for G˜a given by (2.4.10), |G˜a(·, 0)|1/2 ∈ HBMO.
Then the BSDE with driver (2.4.10) and terminal condition −Ha has a unique solution
(Y˜ a, Z˜a) ∈ S∞ × HBMO. Moreover, if pi∗,a· = Πa(·, pi−a· , Z˜a· ) is admissible, then Y˜ a0 is the
value of the optimization problem (2.4.5) (i.e. the minimized risk) for agent a and pi∗,a is
the unique optimal strategy.
Proof. Given the structure of G˜a in (2.4.10) and the integrability assumption made, the
existence and uniqueness of the BSDE’s solution (Y˜ a, Z˜a) in S∞ × HBMO is straightfor-
ward5.
We first use the comparison theorem to prove the minimality of Y˜ a, and hence the
optimality of pi∗,a. Let t ∈ [0, T ]. Take any strategy pia ∈ Aθ(pi−a). First, from the
definition of G˜a as a pointwise minimum, we naturally have that
G˜a(t, za) = g˜a
(
t,Πa(t, pi−at , z
a), pi−at , z
a
) ≤ g˜a(t, piat , pi−at , za) for all t ∈ [0, T ] and za ∈ R2,
i.e., G˜a(·, ·) ≤ g˜a(·, pia· , pi−a· , ·). Second, G˜a is affine and thus Lipschitz continuous, with
Lipschitz coefficient process −θ ∈ HBMO. By the comparison theorem, we therefore
have, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and in particular for t = 0, that Y˜ at = Y˜ at (pi∗,a, pi−a) ≤ Y˜ at (pia, pi−a).
As this holds for any pia ∈ Aθ(pi−a), this proves the minimality of Y˜ a0 = ρa0
(
ξa(pi∗,a, pi−a)
)
and thus the optimality of pi∗,a.
We now argue the uniqueness of the optimizer pi∗,a. Let pia be an admissible strategy
and let (Y˜ a(pia), Z˜a(pia)) be the corresponding risk, i.e. solution to the BSDE (2.4.2)
3In [HPDR10] the driver did not depend on the other players’ strategies in the first place. There is an
equivalent assumption to Assumption 2.3.2 in [HPDR10, Proposition 3.6 (i)], but the observation of the
linearity was not made.
4cf. [HPDR10, Proposition 3.6], which we extend by proving existence and uniqueness of the solution
of the BSDE instead of assuming it. Uniqueness is important to us in order to obtain a unique NE for a
given MPR θ.
5cf. [IDR10, Theorem 2.6], which states that Y ∈ S∞ and Z ∗W ∈ BMO, which implies Z ∈ HBMO.
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with strategy pia. We compute the difference Y˜ at (pi
a)− Y˜ at (pi∗,a):
Y˜ at (pi
a)− Y˜ at (pi∗,a)
=
∫ T
t
[
g˜a
(
s, pias , pi
−a
s , Z˜
a
s (pi
a)
)
− G˜a
(
s, Z˜as (pi
∗,a)
)]
ds−
∫ T
t
[Z˜as (pi
a)− Z˜as (pi∗,a)]dWs
=
∫ T
t
[
g˜a
(
s, pias , pi
−a
s , Z˜
a
s (pi
a)
)
− g˜a
(
s,Πa
(
s, pi−as , Z˜
a
s (pi
a)
)
, pi−as , Z˜
a
s (pi
a)
) ]
ds (2.4.11)
−
∫ T
t
[Z˜as (pi
a)− Z˜as (pi∗,a)]dW θs ,
where we added G˜a(t, Z˜at (pi
a)), subtracted g˜a
(
t,Πa
(
t, pi−at , Z˜
a
t (pi
a)
)
, pi−at , Z˜
a
t (pi
a)
)
(equal
to the added term) and used the affine structure6 of G˜a combined with (2.3.4).
By construction of Πa as a minimizer, the difference in (2.4.11) is always positive. In
particular, taking Pθ-expectation w.r.t. Ft implies that Y˜ at (pia) − Y˜ at (pi∗,a) ≥ 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. Assume that pia is an optimal strategy. Then Y˜ a0 (pia) = Y˜ a0 (pi∗,a) and the
LHS vanishes for t = 0. Under Pθ-expectation, the stochastic integral on the RHS also
vanishes and we can conclude that the integrand in (2.4.11) is zero Pθ ⊗ Leb-a.e.. Con-
sequently, we obtain Y˜ a(pia) = Y˜ a(pi∗,a) and hence Z˜a(pia) = Z˜a(pi∗,a). This implies
Πa
(·, pi−a· , Z˜a· (pia)) = Πa(·, pi−a· , Z˜a· (pi∗,a)). Finally, by uniqueness of the minimizer Πa,
we obtain pia· = Π
a
(·, pi−a· , Z˜a· (pia)) = Πa(·, pi−a· , Z˜a· (pi∗,a)) = pi∗,a· .
Remark 2.4.3. While Theorem 2.4.2 is stated as the optimal response of a single agent a in
the system A with the other strategies pi−a being fixed, it is clear that it can more generally
describe the optimal investment of an agent with preferences described by ga (equivalently,
ρa· ) who trades in the assets S and B, which have the given MPR θ (one can think of setting
A = {a} or λa = 0). Following the same methods, the result could be generalized to a
higher number of assets, with price processes given exogenously. This applies similarly to
an agent trading in fewer assets, by setting the respective components to zero – see Theorem
2.5.4.
We now state a characterization of the optimal strategy via the FOC.
Lemma 2.4.4. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2.4.2, let pia be an admissible strategy
and (Ŷ a, Ẑa) be the associated risk process, solution to the BSDE with driver g˜a(t, piat , pi
−a
t , ·)
and terminal condition−Ha. Assume that they satisfy the FOC (2.4.6)–(2.4.7) in the sense
that
∇zga(t, Ẑat − ζ̂at ) = −θt where ζ̂at =
(
pia,1t σt + pi
a,2
t κ
θ
t
)− λ˜a(p¯i−a,1t σt + p¯i−a,2t κθt).
Then (Ŷ a, Ẑa) = (Y˜ a, Z˜a) and pia = pi∗,a.
Proof. By the assumptions on ga,∇zga(t, Ẑat −ζ̂at ) = −θt means that Ẑat −ζ̂at = Za(t,−θt),
or equivalently pit = Πa(t, pi−at , Ẑat ). Therefore, g˜
a(t, piat , pi
−a
t , Ẑ
a
t ) = G˜
a(t, Ẑat ) – recall
(2.4.3). By uniqueness of the solution to the BSDE with driver G˜a(t, ·) and terminal
condition −Ha, we have (Ŷ a, Ẑa) = (Y˜ a, Z˜a). Consequently, by the uniqueness of the
FOC’s solution (Theorem 2.4.2), piat = Π
a(t, pi−at , Ẑ
a
t ) = Π
a(t, pi−at , Z˜
a
t ) = pi
∗,a
t .
6(2.4.10) implies G˜a(t, za)− G˜a(t, ẑa) = 〈ẑa − za, θt〉 for any t ∈ [0, T ] and za, ẑa ∈ R2.
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2.4.2 The unconstrained Nash equilibrium
Having found the unique best response function of each agent, we now look at the
existence and uniqueness of a NE, still for the MPR θ ∈ HBMO fixed at the beginning of
this section, and still with no fixed-supply constraint.
Assume pi∗ = (pi∗,a)a∈A is a NE. Fix an agent a ∈ A. From the uniqueness of the optimal
strategy, given by Theorem 2.4.2, one must have
pi∗,at = Π
a(t, pi∗,−at , Z˜
a
t ), t ∈ [0, T ],
where (Y˜ a, Z˜a) is the solution to the BSDE with terminal condition −Ha and driver G˜a
given in (2.4.10). From the characterization (2.4.9) of Πa, we therefore have, for all
a ∈ A and t ∈ [0, T ],
pi∗,a,1t − λ˜ap¯i∗,−a,1t =
Z˜a,1t −Za,1(t,−θt)
σSt St
− Z˜
a,2
t −Za,2(t,−θt)
κRt
κSt
σSt St
=: Ja,1t ,
pi∗,a,2t − λ˜ap¯i∗,−a,2t =
Z˜a,2t −Za,2(t,−θt)
κRt
=: Ja,2t .
(2.4.12)
Note that, for any a ∈ A, the process (Y˜ a, Z˜a) does not depend on pi∗as neither −Ha nor
G˜a does. Therefore, Jat is also independent of the unknown pi
∗
t , which is only present in
the LHS of the System (2.4.12).
Conversely, assume we can solve for pi∗ in (2.4.12) and that pi∗ is integrable against the
prices. Then, since pi∗,at = Πa(t, pi
∗,−a
t , Z˜
a
t ) by (2.4.9), Theorem 2.4.2 guarantees that pi
∗,a
is the best response to pi∗,−a, and we therefore have a NE.
Summing up, the existence and uniqueness of a NE pi∗ is equivalent to the existence and
uniqueness of a solution to System (2.4.12).
Define the matrix AN ∈ RN×N by7
AN =
 1 −λ˜
1
. . .
−λ˜N 1
 , where λ˜j = λj
(N − 1) , j ∈ A, (2.4.13)
i.e., the j-th line has the entries −λ˜j everywhere but in the j-th column, where it equals
1. System (2.4.12) can be rewritten as8
AN pi
∗,·,i = J ·,i, (2.4.14)
where pi∗,·,i = (pi∗,a,i)a∈A and J ·,i = (Ja,i)a∈A, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Theorem 2.4.5. Assume that the MPR θ = (θS, θR) ∈ HBMO, that Assumption 2.4.1
and Assumption 2.3.3 hold, that, for all a ∈ A, Ja is integrable against the prices and
|G˜a(·, 0)|1/2 ∈ HBMO.
Then there exists a unique NE pi∗ = (pi∗,a)a∈A associated with the MPR θ, which is given by
the unique solution to (2.4.14).
7Recall the notation that for sums and products over certain subsets of A we identify A with the set
{1, 2, . . . , N}, where N ∈ N is the fixed finite number of agents.
8cf. [ET15, Section 3.2].
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Proof. By [ET15, Remark 3.4], AN is invertible if and only if
∏
a∈A λ
a < 1, and under
this condition the inverse is explicitly given. This guarantees that one can solve System
(2.4.12) (or, equivalently, (2.4.14)) for each i ∈ {1, 2} to obtain (pi∗,·,i). The integrability
of pi∗ follows from fact that each component pi∗,a is a linear combination of the integrable
Ja’s. Finally, the Nash-optimality of pi∗ was argued in the identification of Equation
(2.4.12).9
Remark 2.4.6. Without the explicit formula for A−1N one can also prove invertibility by
looking at the determinant. The determinant of the AN is (by Laplace’s formula)
det(AN) = 1−
∑
i<j
λ˜iλ˜j − 2
∑
i<j<k
λ˜iλ˜jλ˜k − 3
∑
i<j<k<l
λ˜iλ˜jλ˜kλ˜l − . . .− (N − 1)
N∏
i=1
λ˜i,
where the sums run over indices i, j, k, l from A = {1, . . . , N}. If λa = 1 for all a ∈ A,
then by Lemma A.4.1 det(AN) = 1−
∑N
k=2
k−1
(N−1)k
(
N
k
)
= 0, so the matrix is not invertible.
The determinant is strictly decreasing in each λ˜a (a ∈ A) and therefore also in λa. Hence,
if λa ∈ [0, 1] for all a ∈ A and the product ∏a∈A λa < 1, then at least one factor must be
strictly smaller than one and the determinant must be strictly positive (i.e., det(AN) > 0);
the invertibility of AN follows.
We can now comment on Assumption 2.3.3. If λb = 0 for all b ∈ A \ {a}, then AN is
invertible independently of λa, in particular for λa = 1. This shows that λa ∈ [0, 1) for
all a ∈ A is not necessary, but merely a sufficient condition. Finally, if we were to allow
for λa > 1, then
∏
a∈A λ
a < 1 is not sufficient for invertibility of AN , e.g. in the case
N = 3 take λa = λb = 2 and λc = 0.
From now on we assume that the agents’ optimization problems have a solution so that
it makes sense to discuss the notion of EMPR.
Remark 2.4.7. Notice that at this point, as θ is given exogenously, we have a system of
uncoupled BSDEs. For each a ∈ A, we obtain (Y˜ a, Z˜a) as the solution to a BSDE with
terminal condition −Ha and driver G˜a from (2.4.10), which only takes Z˜a as argument,
but does not depend on the strategies. These processes are then used to solve for the NE of
strategies, pi∗, given the MPR θ.
2.4.3 An example: the entropic risk measure case
We now illustrate the methodology and result of Theorem 2.4.2 for a particular risk
measure, and prepare the ground for the model we study in Sections 2.6 and 2.7. As
before, a market price of risk θ = (θS, θR) ∈ HBMO is given (exogenously) and agents
need not be concerned about market clearing.
Each agent a ∈ A is assessing her risk10 using the entropic risk measure ρa0 for which the
driver ga : R2 → R is given by
ga(z) :=
1
2γa
|z|2, where γa > 0 is agent a’s risk tolerance, (2.4.15)
9Recall argument: If pi∗ is integrable against prices and solves (2.4.12), then by (2.4.9) we have
pi∗,at = Π
a(t, pi∗,−at , Z˜
a
t ) , hence Theorem 2.4.2 tells us that pi
∗,a is the best response to pi∗,−a, and we
therefore have a NE.
10Our problem is that of minimizing a static risk measure. The corresponding dynamic risk measure is
be given by ρat (ξ) := γa lnE[e−ξ/γa |Ft] for t ∈ [0, T ].
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and 1/γa is agent a’s risk aversion (see [BE09, Proposition 3.12]).
Remark 2.4.8. The negative of the entropic risk measure is a certainty equivalent for
exponential utility (see e.g. [BE09, Section 3.1.1] or [FK11, Page 336]):
ρa0(ξ) = Y
a
0 = γa lnE[e−ξ/γa ] satisfies ua(−ρa0(ξ)) = E[ua(ξ)],
where ua(ξ) = −γae−ξ/γa .
Thus, minimizing an agent’s entropic risk is equivalent to maximizing her expected ex-
ponential utility. Furthermore, exponential utility / entropic risk has the advantageous
structure of base preference functionals (see [CHKP16, Equation (24)]) or γ-tolerant risk
measures (see [BE09, Section 3.2.1]). See also [REK00] for a pricing problem in a model
with (negative) exponential utility.
Remark 2.4.9. In Theorems 2.4.2 and 2.4.5 we made the assumption that |G˜a(t, 0)|1/2 ∈
HBMO, which ensures the well-posedness of the minimized-risk BSDEs. In this example,
for a ∈ A, G˜a(t, 0) = −γa
2
|θt|2, and furthermore θ ∈ HBMO by assumption. Hence
|G˜a(t, 0)|1/2 ∈ HBMO is satisfied.
Since gazi(z) = z
i/γa, it is easily found that Za(t,−θt) = (−γaθSt ,−γaθRt ) = −γaθt for all
a ∈ A and i ∈ {1, 2} (cf. (2.3.8)). Injecting this in (2.4.10) yields the minimized driver
G˜a,
G˜a(t, za) = −γa
2
|θt|2 − 〈za, θt〉 , t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.4.16)
The minimized (individual) risk is then given by Y a0 = Y˜
a
0 where (Y˜
a, Z˜a) is the solution
to the BSDE with terminal condition −Ha and driver G˜a, while the optimal strategies
pi∗ = (pi∗,a)a∈A are given by (cf. (2.4.9))
pi∗,a,1 − λ˜a
∑
b∈A\{a}
pi∗,b,1 =
Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
− Z˜
a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
, (2.4.17)
pi∗,a,2 − λ˜a
∑
b∈A\{a}
pi∗,b,2 =
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
. (2.4.18)
The general invertibility of the systems (2.4.17) and (2.4.18) given θ is guaranteed by
Theorem 2.4.5.
Remark 2.4.10. If one imposes (2.3.12) with n = 0, implying that
∑
b∈A\{a} pi
∗,b,2 =
−pi∗,a,2, then the linear system (2.4.18) for the investment in the derivative simplifies
greatly and its solution is explicitly given by
pi∗,a,2 =
1
1 + λ˜a
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
for all a ∈ A. (2.4.19)
In Section 2.7 we study a model with two agents and computations will be done explicitly
for the investment in the stock, including an explicit inversion of System (2.4.17).
61
The case of multiple agents without relative performance concerns
If one assumes λa = 0 for all a ∈ A, then recovers the optimal strategies from [HPDR10,
Section 4.1.1] as special case, namely
piλ=0,a,1 :=
Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
− Z˜
a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
and piλ=0,a,2 :=
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
. (2.4.20)
and as the driver for the minimized residual risk Y˜ a is affine, we have the explicit
solution
Y˜ a0 = E−θ
[
−Ha − γa
2
∫ T
0
|θu|2du
]
= −E
[
E−θT ·
(
Ha +
γa
2
∫ T
0
|θu|2du
)]
.
Observe that in this case the strategy piλ=0,a followed by a does not depend directly on
the strategies of the other agents. However, when the price dynamics of the derivative
is not fixed but emerges from the equilibrium, later on, the other agents’ strategies will
appear indirectly via θR and κ.
Remark 2.4.11. If one assumes n = 0, then the market clearing condition (2.3.12) reads∑
a∈A pi
λ=0,a,2 = 0. With this, the market price of external risk θR can be computed from
adding (2.4.20) over a ∈ A, giving θR = −∑a∈A Z˜a,2/∑a∈A γa. However, each Z˜ ·,2 origi-
nates from a BSDE involving θR. If one replaces θR in each BSDE by −∑a∈A Z˜a,2/∑a∈A γa,
then one gets a (coupled) system of N BSDEs, each of which depends on all Z˜a,2 for a ∈ A.
This idea will be presented in detail in Section 2.5.1.
The reference case of a single agent that cannot trade in the derivative
It is also instructive, and will be useful later on, to look at the case where this single
agent cannot trade in the derivative, and hence faces an incomplete market. We first en-
force pia,2 = 0 on (2.4.4), then we optimize over pia,1 (see Remark 2.4.3). The minimized
driver following the calculations is
G˜a(t, z) = −γa
2
(θSt )
2 − z1 θSt +
1
2γa
(z2)2, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.4.21)
Notice that G˜a is affine in the variable z1 but retains the quadratic term in z2. The
minimized risk is then given by Y a0 = Y˜
a
0 where (Y˜
a, Z˜a) is the solution to the BSDE
with terminal condition −Ha and the above driver G˜a, while the optimal strategy is
pi∗,a,1 =
Z˜a,1 + γaθ
S
σSS
and pi∗,a,2 = 0. (2.4.22)
2.4.4 Reduction to zero net supply
In this section we give an auxiliary result, which allows to simplify Condition (2.3.12).
We show how the initial holdings pia,20− = pi
a,2
0 ̸= 0 before/at the beginning of the game
can be reduced to the case where pia,20− = pi
a,2
0 = 0. This allows us to apply (2.3.12)
with n = 0, which will prove crucial in later computations. The reduction to n = 0 is
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based on the monotonicity of the risk measures and the following lemma, stated from
the point of view of one agent a ∈ A. The result is based on Lemma 3.9 in [HPDR10].
We omit its proof as it does not require notable changes.
To avoid a notational overload, we omit explicit dependencies on pi−a.
Lemma 2.4.12. For a given MPR θ and admissible strategies pi−a = (pib)b∈A\{a}, consider
the dynamics of the residual risk BSDE
−dY˜ at (pia) = g˜a
(
t, piat , Z˜
a
t (pi
a)
)
dt− 〈Z˜at (pia), dWt〉 (2.4.23)
associated with the preferences of agent a using an admissible strategy pia. Assume fur-
ther that (2.4.23) has a unique solution for any given FT -measurable bounded terminal
condition Y˜T . Let ν ∈ R. Then,
• if pia := (pia,1, pia,2)minimizes the solution Y˜0(pia) to (2.4.23) for a terminal condition
−Ha, then pˇia := (pia,1, pia,2− ν) is optimal for the terminal condition −(Ha+ νHD);
• if pia := (pia,1, pia,2) minimizes the solution Y˜0(pia) for a terminal condition −(Ha +
νHD), then pia := (pia,1, pia,2 + ν) is optimal for the terminal condition −Ha.
This lemma intuitively states that an agent a, owning at time t = 0 a portion νa =
pia,20− = pi
a,2
0 of units of H
D, can be regarded as being in fact endowed with Hˇa = Ha +
νaHD. One then looks only at the relative portfolio pˇia,2 = pia,2 − νa, which counts the
derivatives bought and sold only from time t = 0 onwards: the optimization problem
is equivalent. The argument can be extended to all other agents. We note that this
reduction is only possible because we do not consider any trading constraints, so that
either both strategies pia,2 and pˇia,2 are admissible or neither one is.
Henceforth we assume that each agent receives at t = T a portion11 n/N of the deriva-
tive HD. By doing so, the market clearing condition in Definition 2.3.5 transforms into∑
a∈A
pia,2t = 0 P⊗ Leb− a.e.,
and we refer to it as the zero net supply condition.
For clarity, we recall that agent a ∈ A now assesses her risk by solving the dynamics
provided by BSDE (2.3.10) with terminal condition
Y aT = −
(
Ha +
n
N
HD + V a,θT (pi
a)− λ˜a
∑
b∈A\{a}
V b,θT (pi
b)
)
(2.4.24)
(instead of that in (2.3.10)). Moreover, by applying the change of variables (2.4.1) to
BSDE (2.3.10) with terminal condition (2.4.24), we obtain
−dY˜ at = g˜a(t, piat , pi−at , Z˜at )dt− 〈Z˜at , dWt〉, t ∈ [0, T ],
Y˜ aT = −
(
Ha +
n
N
HD
)
,
(2.4.25)
11Many possibilities for this reduction to zero net supply exist, including endowing one agent with the
total amount n of derivatives HD or endowing each agent with their initial portions of the derivative νa.
We make the judicious choice of n/N for simplicity.
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where g˜a is given by (2.4.4) and (Y˜ a, Z˜a) relates to (Y a, Za) via the change of variables
(2.4.1).
It is straightforward to recompile the results of Section 2.4.3 under the zero net supply
condition. It entails no changes in the strategies or drivers, only the terminal conditions
of the involved BSDEs need to be updated from −Ha to −(Ha + n
N
HD) as in (2.4.25).
2.5 The equilibrium market price of external risk
In the previous section we saw how to compute the NE for a given MPR θ = (θS, θR),
without the global constraint on trading (market clearing condition). In this section we
solve the equilibrium problem, as posed by Definition 2.3.5, by finding the EMPeR θR.
The literature contains many results on equilibria in complete markets that link com-
petitive equilibria to an optimization problem for a representative agent, and this is the
approach we use here. The preferences of the representative agent are usually given
by a weighted average of the individual agents’ preferences with the weights depend-
ing on the competitive equilibrium to be supported by the representative agent, see
[Neg60]. This dependence results in complex fixed point problems, rendering the anal-
ysis and computation of equilibria quite cumbersome. The many results on risk sharing
under translation invariant preferences, in particular [BE05], [JST06] and [FK08], sug-
gest that when the preferences are translation invariant, then all the weights are equal.
This was an effective strategy in [HPDR10] and it would be so here if, for all a ∈ A,
λa = λ ∈ [0, 1).
In a market without performance concerns, [HPDR10] shows that the infimal con-
volution of risk measures gives rise to a suitable risk measure for the representative
agent which, for g-conditional risk measures, corresponds to infimal convolution of the
drivers. Due to the performance concerns, we use a weighted-dilated infimal convolu-
tion, and in Theorem 2.5.4 we show that indeed minimizing the risk of our representa-
tive agent is equivalent to finding a competitive equilibrium in our market.
2.5.1 The benchmark case of entropic risk measures
Before presenting the representative agent approach in full generality, we will consider
the case of entropic risk measures. In Remark 2.4.11 we already mentioned that in this
special case, one can obtain a characterization of the EMPR as a linear combination
of solutions to the individual BSDEs (2.4.2) with the minimized driver G˜a given by
(2.4.16). Applying the ideas from Remark 2.4.11 to Equation (2.4.19), we see that the
market clearing condition requires
0 =
∑
a∈A
pi∗,a,2 =
∑
a∈A
1
1 + λ˜a
Z˜a,2 + γaθ
R
κR
⇐⇒ θR = −
∑
a∈A
Z˜a,2
(1+λ˜a)∑
a∈A
γa
(1+λ˜a)
= −
∑
a∈Aw
aZ˜a,2
γR
,
if we define γR :=
∑
a∈Aw
aγa, with wa = 1/(Λ(1 + λ˜a)) and Λ =
∑
a∈A 1/(1 + λ˜
a).
Notice that here we normalize the family w = (wa)a∈A so that
∑
a∈Aw
a = 1 in order to
be consistent with the aggregation in the following section. Any rescaling Λ′ of w would
give the same θR.
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Replacing the term θR by the above value in the minimized driver given by (2.4.16), we
find that the optimal risk processes for each agent solve the BSDEs with drivers given
by
G˜a(t, Z˜At ) = −
γa
2
(
θSt
)2 − Z˜a,1t θSt + 1γR Z˜a,2t
(∑
b∈A
wbZ˜b,2t
)
− γa
2γ2R
(∑
b∈A
wbZ˜b,2t
)2
(2.5.1)
for t ∈ [0, T ]. The BSDEs with these drivers form a system of N coupled BSDEs with
quadratic growth, which, in general, are difficult to solve12. By taking advantage of
the structure of (2.5.1) one can find a simpler BSDE for the process (Ŷ w, Ẑw) :=∑
a∈Aw
a(Y˜ a, Z˜a). It is easily seen that Ŷ wT = −
∑
a∈Aw
a(Ha + nHD/N) =: −Hw,
cf. (2.5.7). Linearly combining the BSDEs (2.4.2) with drivers expressed as in (2.5.1),
we find
−dŶ wt =
[
− γR
2
(
θSt
)2 − Ẑw,1t θSt + 12γR (Ẑw,2t )2
]
dt− 〈Ẑwt , dWt〉, t ∈ [0, T ],
Ŷ wT = −Hw.
(2.5.2)
Given that Hw and θS are bounded, this BSDE falls in the standard class of quadratic
growth BSDEs and the existence and uniqueness of (Ŷ w, Ẑw) is easily guaranteed. This
allows one to compute θR as −Ẑw,2/γR and in turn one can finally solve the BSDEs
giving the minimized risk processes for each agent, using the driver G˜a as given by
(2.4.16).
For more general drivers than that of entropic risk, the condition on the EMPR θ would
read ∑
a∈A
Z˜a,2t
1 + λ˜a
=
∑
a∈A
Za,2t (t,−θt)
1 + λ˜a
.
Solving for θ is particularly easy for entropic risk, because in that case Za,2(t,−θt) =
−γaθt. If a given driver was less well behaved in this regard, or if one wanted to obtain
a method applicable to all drivers which satisfy our assumptions, then one could still
aim for a single BSDE whose solution will be related to θR as above. The method of infi-
mal convolution with the weights for the dilation, (wa)a∈A, which have been suggested
above, will be shown to give the desired BSDE and thus the EMPR θ.
2.5.2 The representative agent approach
Aggregation of risks and aggregation of drivers
Inspired by the above mentioned results and having in mind [Rüs13] (see Remark 2.5.9
below) we deal with the added inter-dependency arising from the fixed-supply condition
and the additional unknown θR (see Remarks 2.4.11 and 2.4.10) by defining a new risk
12Based on the works of [Esp10] and [ET15], the authors of [FdR11] give several counter examples
to the existence of solutions to system of fully coupled multi-dimensional quadratic BSDEs; nonetheless,
under suitable assumptions positive results do exist, see e.g. [Tev08], [Fre14], [JKL14], [CN15], [KP16],
[HT16] and [XŽ16].
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measure ρw0 . For a set of positive weights w = (w
a)a∈A satisfying
∑
a∈Aw
a = 1, we
define13 for any X ∈ L∞(FT )
ρw0 (X) := inf
{∑
a∈A
waρa0
(
Xa
) ∣∣∣∣ (Xa) ∈ (L∞)N :∑
a∈A
waXa = X
}
. (2.5.3)
In the case of risk measures induced by BSDEs, [BE05] shows that the measure defined
by inf-convolution of risk measures (ρa0)a∈A is again induced by a BSDE, whose driver
is simply the inf-convolution of the BSDE drivers ga for the risk measures (ρa0)a∈A. For
a given set of weights w = (wa)a∈A, we define the driver gw as the weighted-dilated
inf-convolution of the drivers ga, i.e., for (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R2,
gw(t, z) := w
(
(ga)a∈A
)
(t, z)
:= inf
{∑
a∈A
waga(t, za)
∣∣∣∣ (za) ∈ (R2)N s.t. ∑
a∈A
waza = z
}
,
(2.5.4)
where the notation 
(
(ga)a∈A
)
would be that commonly used for standard infimal con-
volution (cf. [BE05, Section 3.2]).
Lemma 2.5.1 (Properties of gw). The map gw : [0, T ]×R2 → R defined by (2.5.4) is a de-
terministic continuous function, strictly convex and continuously differentiable. Moreover,
there exists a unique solution of ∇zgw(t,Z) = −ϑ in Z.
For zA = (za)a∈A such that
∑
a∈Aw
aza = z, one has gw(t, z) =
∑
a∈Aw
aga(t, za) if and
only if there exists ϑ ∈ R2 such that, for all a ∈ A, ∇zga(t, za) = −ϑ. In that case, the FOC
for gw, ∇zgw(t, z) = −ϑ, holds.
Proof. The weighted inf-convolution transfers the properties of the drivers ga (a ∈ A) to
gw, in particular continuity, strict convexity and differentiability. We do not show these
as they follow from a simple adaptation of known arguments, cf. [BE05, Section 3.2],
[BE09, Sections 3.3 and 3.8] and [HPDR10, Assumption 3.10].
Since the function being minimized (zA = (za)a∈A ↦→
∑
a∈Aw
aga(za)) is strictly convex
and the function defining the constraint (zA ↦→ ∑a∈Awaza) is also convex, because
affine, the minimization defining gw is equivalent to finding a critical point for the
associated Lagrangian, L(zA, ϑ) =
∑
a∈Aw
aga(za) + ϑ(
∑
a∈Aw
aza − z). Therefore, zA =
(za)a∈A satisfying
∑
a∈Aw
aza = z is a minimizer if and only if there exists ϑ ∈ R2 such
that, for all a ∈ A, ∇zga(t, za) = −ϑ. Then, ∇zgw(t, z) = −ϑ where ϑ is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with z.
The risk of the random terminal wealth ξw, measured through ρw0 , is given by ρ
w
0 (ξ
w) :=
Y w0 where (Y
w, Zw) is the solution to the BSDE
−dY wt = gw(t, Zwt )dt− 〈Zwt , dWt〉, t ∈ [0, T ],
Y wT = −ξw.
(2.5.5)
Since the weights (wa)a∈A are required to satisfy
∑
a∈Aw
a = 1, the risk measure ρw0
associated to the BSDE with the above driver is a monetary risk measure. Translation
13For our purpose, it suffices to define the static risk measure ρw0 . Once the BSDE is identified, one
obtains of course a corresponding dynamic risk measure (ρwt )t∈[0,T ].
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invariance and monotonicity follow from the fact that the driver gw is independent of
y. Convexity follows from the convexity of gw, which in turns follows from that of the
drivers ga (a ∈ A) by the envelope theorem.
Remark 2.5.2. Notice that (2.5.4) can be rewritten
gw(t, z) = inf
{∑
a∈A
waga
(
t,
za
wa
) ∣∣∣∣ ∑
a∈A
za = z
}
.
In this way, gw is seen as the usual w-weighted infimal convolution of the wa-dilated drivers
ga, in the terminology from [BE09, page 137]. For more on dilated risk measures, see
[BE09, Proposition 3.4].
Example 2.5.3 (Entropic risk measure). For entropic risk, i.e. drivers given by ga(za) =
|za|2
2γa
for a ∈ A, one obtains
gw(z) =
|z|2
2γR
, with γR :=
∑
a∈A
waγa. (2.5.6)
Trading and the risky position of the representative agent
Having defined the aggregated risk measure ρw0 and the associated driver g
w, we now
introduce a strategy piw and associated trading gains V·(piw) =
∫ ·
0
piw,1t dSt +
∫ ·
0
piw,2t dBt
for a representative agent whose preferences are described by gw. Direct computations
from (2.5.3) entail that we assign to the representative agent the terminal position
ξw :=
∑
a∈A
waξa =
∑
a∈A
wa
(
Ha +
n
N
HD + V aT − λ˜aV¯ −aT
)
=
∑
a∈A
wa(Ha +
n
N
HD) +
∑
a∈A
wa
(
(1 + λ˜a)V aT − λ˜a
∑
b∈A
V bT
)
=
∑
a∈A
wa(Ha +
n
N
HD) +
∑
a∈A
V aT
(
wa(1 + λ˜a)−
∑
b∈A
wbλ˜b
)
=: Hw + VT (pi
w),
where for ca := wa(1 + λ˜a)−∑b∈Awbλ˜b,
• piw =∑a∈A capia is the representative agent’s portfolio,
• VT (piw) =
∑
a∈A c
aVT (pi
a) is the representative agent’s wealth process and
• Hw, given by terminal condition
Hw :=
∑
a∈A
wa(Ha +
n
N
HD) =
n
N
HD +
∑
a∈A
waHa, (2.5.7)
is the representative agent’s terminal endowment.
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We now choose the weights (wa)a∈A such that ca = c for any a ∈ A for some c ∈ (0,+∞),
namely,
wa :=
1
Λ(1 + λ˜a)
for all a ∈ A, where Λ :=
∑
a∈A
1
1 + λ˜a
. (2.5.8)
Direct verification yields
∑
aw
a = 1 and, furthermore, for all a ∈ A,
ca = wa(1 + λ˜a)−
∑
b∈A
wbλ˜b =
1
Λ
(
1−
∑
b∈A
λ˜b
1 + λ˜b
)
=: c,
i.e., ca does really not depend on a and hence loses rightfully its superindex.
Notice that piw,2 =
∑
a∈A c
apia,2 = c
∑
a∈A pi
a,2. In other words, the zero net supply con-
dition for the individual agents (i.e.
∑
a∈A pi
a,2 = 0) is equivalent to the representative
agent not investing in HD (i.e. piw,2 = 0). This choice is necessary for successful aggre-
gation of risks and simultaneously keeping the zero net supply condition intact. From
now on, the family of weights w is fixed and is given by (2.5.8).
The pointwise minimizer for the representative agent’s residual risk
We now show that the approach by aggregated risk and representative agent, as mo-
tivated above, allows to identify the equilibrium market price of risk as a by-product
of minimizing the risk of the representative agent. This risk is given by the solution
to BSDE (2.5.5) with terminal condition Y wT = −ξw = −Hw − VT (piw), for admissible
strategies piw of the form piw = (piw,1, 0). The R2-valued strategy process piw is said to
be admissible (piw ∈ Aw) if Eθ [〈 V·(piw) 〉T ] < ∞ and if the BSDE (2.5.5) has a unique
solution. Following Section 2.4 we introduce the residual risk processes
Y˜ wt := Y
w
t + V
w
t and Z˜
w
t := Z
w
t + pi
w,1
t σt, t ∈ [0, T ].
The pair (Y˜ w, Z˜w) satisfies the BSDE with terminal condition Y˜ wT = −Hw and random
driver g˜w, defined for (ω, t, piwt , z) ∈ Ω× [0, T ]× R2 × R2, by
g˜w(t, piwt , z) := g
w
(
t, z − ζwt
)− 〈ζwt , θt〉 ,
where ζw = piw,1σ (compare with (2.4.1)-(2.4.4)). Since Y˜ w0 = Y
w
0 , the representative
agent then equivalently aims at solving (i.e., finding the minimizer to)
min
piw∈Aw
Y˜ w0 (pi
w).
Following the methodology used for the single agent in Section 2.4, we first minimize
the driver g˜w pointwise. We defineΠw,1(t, z) as the optimizer formin
{
g˜w(t, (pi, 0), z) | pi ∈
R
}
, setting Πw,2(t, z) = 0 as to enforce the zero-net supply condition. Since gw is strictly
convex, so is the function g˜w, and the minimum is characterized by the solution to
first-order condition
gwz1
(
t, z − Πw,1(t, z) σt
)
= −θSt , t ∈ [0, T ].
We denote the minimized (random) driver by
G˜w(t, z) = g˜w
(
t,Πw(t, z), z
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.5.9)
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Optimality for the representative agent and the equilibrium market price of exter-
nal risk
We assume that the BSDE with driver G˜w defined in (2.5.9) and terminal condition
−Hw has a unique solution (Y˜ w, Z˜w) in S∞ ×HBMO. Define the strategy pi∗,w by pi∗,wt :=(
Πw,1(ω, t, Z˜wt ), 0
)
for t ∈ [0, T ]. Like for the individual agents in Section 2.4, the fol-
lowing theorem asserts that pi∗,w is the optimal strategy and Y˜ w0 is the minimized risk
for the representative agent. Moreover, the theorem relates the EMPR θ = (θS, θR) (re-
call Definition 2.3.5) to the solution of the representative agent’s optimization problem.
Recall the family of weights w given by (2.5.8).
Theorem 2.5.4. Assume that
• the BSDE with driver G˜w, (2.5.9), and Y˜ wT = −Hw has a unique solution (Y˜ w, Z˜w)
in S∞ ×HBMO,
• the comparison theorem holds for the BSDE with driver G˜w,
• pi∗,w· =
(
Πw,1(·, Z˜w· ), 0
)
is integrable against the prices S and B,
then Y˜ w0 is the minimal risk for the representative agent and pi
∗,w is the unique optimal
strategy that leads to this level of risk.
If, for the process θ∗ = (θS, θR), with θR defined by
gwz2
(
t, Z˜wt − pi∗,w,1t σt
)
= −θRt , t ∈ [0, T ], (2.5.10)
the conditions of Theorem 2.4.5 hold, then θ∗ is the unique EMPR for the agents in A.
Additionally, the minimized aggregated risk Y˜ w is linked to the individual minimized risks
(Y˜ a)a∈A through the identity Y˜ w =
∑
a∈Aw
aY˜ a. Moreover, the NE for the agents in A
satisfies pi∗,w = c
∑
a∈A pi
∗,a.
Remark 2.5.5. The uniqueness of the EMPR θ∗ does also hold with respect to the choice
of the weights (wa)a∈A. We chose the weights s.t.
∑
a∈Aw
a = 1, but this property is not
necessary. Thus, the weights are only unique up to multiplication by a (non-zero) constant.
To see that a different weights vector would not alter the EMPR, let θ∗ be associated to the
weights (wa)a∈A and consider the new weights (va)a∈A given by va := ϕwa for a ∈ A and a
constant ϕ > 0.14 If we apply these new weights, then we denote the aggregated variables
or processes by carrying superindex v. Thus one can verify that piv = ϕpiw, V vT = ϕV
w
T ,
ζv = ϕζw etc. In the same manner the drivers change: gv(t, z) = ϕgw(t, z
ϕ
) and thus
gvz (t, z) = g
w
z (t,
z
ϕ
). With the new driver and the corresponding g˜v one obtains the new pair
(Y˜ v, Z˜v) with the property Z˜v = ϕZ˜w. Thus
−θ∗ = gwz (t, Z˜w − ζw) = gvz (t, Z˜v − ζv),
which implies the uniqueness of θ∗ with respect to the choice of the weights.
14Negative weights would change the interpretation; therefore, only positive weights should be used.
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Example 2.5.6 (The entropic case). In the entropic case, we have found gw(z) = |z|
2
2γR
, so
we have Zw,1(t,−θSt ) = −γRθSt . The minimized driver is then
G˜w(t, z) = −γR
2
(θSt )
2 − z1θSt +
1
2γR
(z2)2,
as was found in Subsection 2.4.3, Equation (2.4.21). This driver is quadratic and regular,
and the terminal condition −Hw is bounded. From [Kob00], [IDR10] there is a unique
solution (Y˜ w, Z˜w) in S∞ × HBMO and the comparison theorem applies (see e.g. [Kob00,
Theorem 2.6], [MY10, Theorem 3.2]). The optimal strategies are
pi∗,w,1 =
Z˜w,1 + γRθ
S
σSS
and pi∗,w,2 = 0.
With Z˜w ∈ HBMO and θS bounded, pi∗,w,1 is integrable against S. This verifies the first three
assumptions of the theorem. Furthermore, with (2.5.10) and since Z˜w ∈ HBMO and θS is
bounded, we find that
θR = − Z˜
w,2
γR
and θ∗ = (θS, θR) ∈ HBMO. (2.5.11)
Following on Remark 2.4.3, the optimality of pi∗,w and (Y˜ w, Z˜w), for an agent w with
preferences described by gw who trades in S, is obtained exactly in the same way as the
optimality for a single agent a ∈ A in Theorem 2.4.2. So we prove only the claims of
Theorem 2.5.4 related to the EMPR θ∗. First, however, we state a counterpart to Lemma
2.4.4 to the case when no trading in B is possible.
Lemma 2.5.7. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2.5.4, let piw = (piw,1, 0) be an admis-
sible strategy and (Ŷ w, Ẑw) be the associated risk process, i.e., the solution to the BSDE
with driver g˜w(t, piwt , ·) and terminal condition −Hw. Assume that the FOC holds for these
processes, i.e., for t ∈ [0, T ],
gwz1(t, Ẑ
w
t − ζ̂wt ) = −θSt with ζ̂wt := piw,1t σt.
Then (Ŷ w, Ẑw) = (Y˜ w, Z˜w) and piw = pi∗,w.
Proof. Recalling the properties of gw (see Lemma 2.5.1) and the definition of Πw,1, the
condition gwz1(t, Ẑ
w
t − piw,1t σt) = −θSt means that piw,1t = Πw,1(t, Ẑwt ). We have then
g˜w(t, piwt , Ẑ
w
t ) = G˜
w(t, Ẑwt ) (recall (2.5.9)). By the assumed uniqueness of the solu-
tion to the BSDE with driver G˜w(t, ·) and terminal condition −Hw, we have (Ŷ w, Ẑw) =
(Y˜ w, Z˜w). Consequently, by the uniqueness of the FOC’s solution, piw,1t = Πw,1(t, Ẑwt ) =
Πw,1(t, Z˜wt ) = pi
∗,w,1
t . Since both strategies have second component equal to zero, we
have piw = pi∗,w.
The next result, to be used in the proof of Theorem 2.5.4, states that aggregating the
solutions to the individual optimization problems leads to an optimum for the aggre-
gated preference gw and identifies the BSDE of the aggregation with the weighted sum
of the agents’ BSDEs.
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Lemma 2.5.8. Let ϑ ∈ HBMO be a MPR and assume the conditions of Theorem 2.4.5.
Let pi∗ := (pi∗,a)a∈A be the unconstrained NE associated with ϑ, and let (Y˜ a, Z˜a) be the
solution to the minimized-risk BSDE for each agent a ∈ A, i.e., the terminal condition is
−Ha and the driver G˜a is given by (2.4.10). Define (Ŷ w, Ẑw) := ∑a∈Awa(Y˜ a, Z˜a) and
piw :=
∑
a∈A c
api∗,a = c
∑
a∈A pi
∗,a.
Then (Ŷ w, Ẑw) and piw are the minimal risk and optimal strategy, respectively, for a sin-
gle agent whose preferences are given by gw, who can invest in (S,B) (without trading
constraints).
Proof. Firstly, we sum the individual risk BSDEs to obtain (Ŷ w, Ẑw) and its BSDE. We
have Ŷ wT = −
∑
a∈Aw
aHa = −Hw and
−dŶ wt =
[∑
a∈A
waG˜a(t, Z˜at )
]
dt−
∑
a∈A
wa〈Z˜at , dWt〉
=
[∑
a∈A
wa
{
ga
(
t, Z˜at − ζat (pi∗)
)
− 〈ζat (pi∗), ϑt〉
}]
dt− 〈
∑
a∈A
waZ˜at , dWt〉
=
[∑
a∈A
waga
(
t, Z˜at − ζat (pi∗)
)
−
〈
ζ̂wt , ϑt
〉]
dt− 〈Ẑwt , dWt〉,
where ζ̂w :=
∑
a∈Aw
aζa(pi∗) = piw,1σ + piw,2κ. We remark that, on the one hand,∑
a∈A
wa(Z˜at − ζat (pi∗)) = Ẑwt − ζ̂wt , t ∈ [0, T ],
and, on the other hand, from pi∗,a· = Π
a(·, pi∗,−a· , Z˜a· ) (because pi∗ is a NE) we can infer
that, for all a ∈ A,
∇zga
(
t, Z˜at − ζat (pi∗)
)
= −ϑt, t ∈ [0, T ].
Therefore, we know by Lemma 2.5.1 that gw(t, Ẑwt − ζ̂wt ) =
∑
a∈Aw
aga(t, Z˜at − ζat (pi∗)).
This implies that for t ∈ [0, T ]
−dŶ wt =
[
gw(t, Ẑwt − ζ̂wt )− 〈ζ̂wt , ϑt〉
]
dt− 〈Ẑwt , dWt〉
= g˜w(t, piwt , Ẑ
w
t )dt− 〈Ẑwt , dWt〉.
Secondly, by Lemma 2.5.1, we also know that ∇zgw
(
t, Ẑwt − ζ̂wt
)
= −ϑt . Therefore, by
Lemma 2.4.4, we obtain that (Ŷ w, Ẑw) is the solution to the minimized-risk BSDE for
an agent with preferences given by gw, terminal condition −Hw, who trades in S and B
under the given MPR ϑ with piw as the optimal strategy.
Proof of Theorem 2.5.4. The first part of the proof of the theorem, the optimization for
the representative agent, follows through arguments similar to those used in the single
agent case, see Theorem 2.4.2 and Remark 2.4.3. Hence we omit it.
◃ Existence of the EMPR. Here we prove that θ∗ = (θS, θR), defined through (2.5.10),
is indeed an EMPR. Since θ∗ ∈ HBMO and the conditions of Theorem 2.4.5 hold, let
(pi∗,a)a∈A be the unique unconstrained NE under the MPR θ∗, and let (Y˜ a, Z˜a) be the
solution to the minimized-risk BSDE for each agent a ∈ A. Our goal is to prove that∑
a∈A pi
∗,a,2 = 0.
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Let us introduce (Ŷ w, Ẑw) :=
∑
a∈Aw
a(Y˜ a, Z˜a) and piw :=
∑
a∈A c
api∗,a = c
∑
a∈A pi
∗,a.
From Lemma 2.5.8, we know that piw and Ŷ w are the optimal strategy and risk for a
single agent with risk preferences encoded by gw, exposed to terminal risk−Hw, trading
S and B under θ∗ without trading constraints.
Meanwhile, we defined pi∗,w = (pi∗,w,1, 0) as the optimal strategy for an agent w with
preferences encoded by gw and who can only invest in S (with MPR θS). By construction
of θR, we have
∇zgw
(
t, Z˜wt − ζwt
)
= −θ∗t , with ζwt = pi∗,w,1t σt, t ∈ [0, T ].
From Lemma 2.4.4 we infer that pi∗,w is also the optimal strategy for an agent with
preferences gw and who can invest in S and B with given MPR θ∗. By the uniqueness in
Lemma 2.4.4 we therefore have piw = pi∗,w. This implies in particular that
∑
a∈A pi
∗,a,2 =
piw,2 = pi∗,w,2 = 0. We have thus proved that the NE associated with θ∗ satisfies the
zero-net supply condition, hence the constructed θ∗ is an EMPR.
◃ Uniqueness of the EMPR. Assume that ϑ := (θS, ϑR) is also an EMPR and let (pi∗,a,ϑ)a∈A
be the associated NE for which, by definition of EMPR, the zero-net supply condition∑
a∈A pi
∗,a,ϑ,2 = 0 is satisfied. Let also (Y˜ a,ϑ, Z˜a,ϑ) be the solution to the minimized-risk
BSDE for each agent a ∈ A. As above, we define (Ŷ w,ϑ, Ẑw,ϑ) := ∑a∈Awa(Y˜ a,ϑ, Z˜a,ϑ)
and piw,ϑ :=
∑
a∈A c
api∗,a,ϑ = c
∑
a∈A pi
∗,a,ϑ. By Lemma 2.5.8, we obtain that (Ŷ w,ϑ, Ẑw,ϑ)
and piw,ϑ are optimal for an agent w who trades in S and B under the given MPR ϑ for a
single agent economy. Consequently, using the characterization between the optimizer
and the FOC condition, we have
gwz1
(
t, Ẑw,ϑt − piw,ϑ,1t σt
)
= −θSt and gwz2
(
t, Ẑw,ϑt − piw,ϑ,1t σt
)
= −ϑRt ,
where piw,ϑ,2 = 0 as ϑ is an EMPR. By Lemma 2.5.7, the first equation guarantees that
(Ŷ w,ϑ, Ẑw,ϑ) and piw,ϑ are optimal for an agent with preferences gw who trades in S. By
the construction of (Y˜ w, Z˜w) and pi∗,w (for the MPR θ∗), and the uniqueness recalled in
Lemma 2.5.7, we have (Ŷ w,ϑ, Ẑw,ϑ) = (Y˜ w, Z˜w) and piw,ϑ = pi∗,w. As a consequence, we
have from the second FOC equation
−ϑRt = gwz2
(
t, Ẑw,ϑt − piw,ϑ,1t σt
)
= gwz2
(
t, Z˜wt − pi∗,w,1t σt
)
= −θRt .
Hence the uniqueness of the EMPR θ∗.
From Theorem 2.5.4 we point out that θ∗ is only a MPR for the representative agent’s
economy as the representative agent trades in an incomplete market where she is not
able trade the risk from (Rt)t∈[0,T ] — recall (2.3.1). Nonetheless, θ∗ is the only MPR
leading to a complete market such that the NE from the agents’ strategies satisfies the
zero net supply condition.
In order to put the above result into perspective, we remark that in a complete Arrow-
Debreu model of price-taking agents, the representative agent approach is known to
give Walrasian equilibrium prices, which motivated this approach in [HPDR10]. In our
setting with strategic interaction, however, the success of this method was not quite as
predictable.
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Remark 2.5.9. In [Rüs13, Page 271, Equation (11.25)] a “weighted minimal convolu-
tion” of risk measures is introduced via
(∧
ρi
)
γ
(X) := inf
{
N∑
i=1
γiρi(Xi)
∣∣∣∣∣ X1, . . . , XN ∈ Lp,
N∑
i=1
Xi = X
}
for γ = (γi) ∈ RN>0 and for some p ≥ 1.
Observe that aggregation in our context would not work without the dilation weights 1/wa
in the argument of the driver. This can be seen in the proof of Lemma 2.5.8. The reason is
that G˜a is the sum of ga with the strategies plugged in as arguments and of an additional
term containing the strategies multiplied by the weights.
Remark 2.5.10 (No trade-off between risk tolerance and performance concern rate).
Each agent’s individual preferences are specified by the parameters γa and λa, i.e. risk tol-
erance and performance concern, respectively. One may ask whether a parametric relation
between those parameters exists such that an agent with (γa, λa) and another agent with
(γb, λ
b) would exhibit the same behavior and have the same optimal strategies. Indeed, in
most formulas the two parameters appear as coupled. However, one can see that the termi-
nal condition Hw is independent of the risk tolerance parameter γ·, hence by changing λa
and γa of any one fixed agent a ∈ A, one cannot obtain the same outcome.
2.6 Further results on the entropic risk measure case
In this section we investigate further the case of entropic risk, i.e., each agent’s indi-
vidual driver is given by (2.4.15). The advantage of this choice is, beside providing a
simple set of parametrized drivers, that we can refer to [HPDR10] for the analysis of the
model without performance concerns. We refer in particular to Section 4 in [HPDR10].
We introduce a structure that allows to use the theory developed in the previous section
and, moreover, to design HD such that Assumption 2.4.1 holds true. The ultimate goal
of this section is to understand how the concern rates λ· affect prices and risks. The first
two parts of the section verify that Assumption 2.4.1 holds and the third sheds light on
the behavior of the aggregated risk and derivative price as the parameters vary.
We now make further assumptions (commented below) on the structure of the random
variables introduced Section 2.3. Namely, we assume that the endowmentsHa for a ∈ A
and the derivative HD have the form
Ha = ha(ST , RT ) and HD = hD(ST , RT ), (2.6.1)
respectively, for some deterministic functions h·. This structure for the derivative and
endowments is interpreted as each agent receiving a lump sum at maturity time T . To
ease the analysis we will assume throughout a Black-Scholes market (i.e., µS, σS are
constants). Throughout the rest of this section the following assumption holds.
Assumption 2.6.1. Let Assumption 2.3.1 hold. Let σS ∈ (0,∞) and µR, µS ∈ R (and
hence also θS ∈ R). For any a ∈ A the functions hD, ha ∈ C1b (R2;R) are strictly positive,
their derivatives are uniformly Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. the non-financial risk and satisfy
(∂x2h
D)(x1, x2) ̸= 0 for any (x1, x2) ∈ R× R.
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Remark 2.6.2. In particular, as hD ∈ C1b (R2;R), ∂x2hD is continuous in both arguments.
Thus, if it was positive at one and negative at another point, by the intermediate value the-
orem, it would have to be zero somewhere in between these points, which would contradict
the assumption. Therefore, ∂x2hD must be either always positive or always negative.
The assumption concerning the strict positivity of the involved maps or that ∂x2h
D ̸= 0
are the key in proving that Assumption 2.4.1 is indeed verified. The assumption on
the form of Ha and HD reduces the BSDE to the Markovian case, giving us access
to the many existing BSDE regularity results, which we will use below in their full
scope. It would be possible (this is left open to future research) to remain in the non-
Markovian setting of general FT -measurable HD and Ha and use the link between non-
Markovian BSDEs and path-dependent PDEs (see e.g. [EKTZ14]). Indeed, tools on
general Malliavin differentiability of BSDE solutions in the non-Markovian setting can
be found in [AIdR10] or in more generality in [dR11] and [MPR17].
We recall that our goal is to analyze the impact of the parameters λ·, n, γ· on the risk
processes (single and representative agent), derivative price process and EMPeR.
In this section we work mainly with the representative agent BSDE (see Example 2.5.6
or Equation (2.5.2)) and the derivative price BSDE (2.3.6).
To avoid a notation overload when working with the BSDE for the representative agent,
we drop the tilde notation and define (Y w, Zw) as the solution to the mentioned BSDE,
not to be confused with (2.5.5) which plays no role here. The solution to the derivative
price BSDE (2.3.6) is denoted by (B, κ).
2.6.1 The aggregated risk
The BSDE (2.5.2) is not difficult to analyze given the existing literature on BSDEs of
quadratic growth. Recall that θS ∈ S∞ and Y wT ∈ L∞ (since it is a weighted sum
of bounded random variables). We shortly recall that D1,2 is the space of first order
Malliavin differentiable processes and D denotes the Malliavin derivative operator, we
point the reader to Appendix A.2 for further Malliavin calculus references.
Theorem 2.6.3. The BSDE (2.5.2) has a unique solution (Y w, Zw) ∈ (S∞∩D1,2)×(HBMO∩
D1,2). Moreover, there exists a strictly negative function uw ∈ C0,1([0, T ]×R2;R) such that
for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Y wt = u
w(t, St, Rt) and Z
w,2
t = (∂x2u
w)(t, St, Rt)b, P-a.s..
i) For any r, u ∈ [0, t], t ∈ [0, T ] it holds that
DW
R
u Y
w
t = D
WR
r Y
w
t P-a.s. and DW
R
u Z
w
t = D
WR
r Z
w
t P⊗ Leb-a.e.
and in particular DWRt Yt = Z
w
t P-a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ].
ii) There exists a constant C > 0 such that |Zw,2t | ≤ C for any t ∈ [0, T ], i.e. Zw,2 ∈ S∞
and ∂x2uw ∈ Cb([0, T ]× R2;R). Moreover, θR ∈ S∞.
iii) The process DWR· Z
w belongs to HBMO.
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Proof. Let a ∈ A and 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T . Existence and uniqueness of the stochastic
differential equations (SDEs) (2.3.1) and (2.3.2) follow from Proposition A.3.1.
By assumption we have Y wT ∈ L∞ and θS ∈ S∞ which allows to quote Theorem 2.6
in [IDR10], implying (Y w, Zw) ∈ S∞ × HBMO. Moreover, given that Y wT < 0, a strict
comparison principle15 for quadratic BSDEs (e.g. [MY10, Theorem 3.2]16) yields Y wt < 0
for any t ∈ [0, T ] and hence uw < 0.
Proposition A.3.1 ensures that the payoffs HD and Ha, and hence Hw, are Malliavin
differentiable with bounded Malliavin derivatives. Combining this further with θS ∈ R,
the Malliavin differentiability of (2.5.2) follows from Theorem 2.9 in [IDR10]. Under
Assumption 2.6.1 the results in [IDR10] (or [dR11, Chapter 4]) along with [AIdR10,
Theorem 7.6] yield the Markov property for Y w and the parametric differentiability
result for the (quadratic) BSDE.
◃ Proof of i): Since uw ∈ C0,1, by direct application of the Malliavin differential (or by
directly applying (A.3.2)) we have for 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T (using DWRu Rt = b)
DW
R
u Y
w
t = D
WR
u
(
uw(t, St, Rt)
)
= (∂x2u
w)(t, St, Rt)(D
WR
u Rt) = (∂x2u
w)(t, St, Rt)b = D
WR
t Y
w
t .
It now follows that
DW
R
t Y
w
t = D
WR
u Y
w
t = Z
w
t for any 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T P-a.s. . (2.6.2)
◃ Proof of ii): Define now the probability measure Q (equivalent to P) via
dQ
dP
= E
(
−
∫ T
0
〈(
θSs ,−
Zw,2s
γR
)
, dWs
〉)
. (2.6.3)
With this choice,WQ := W +
∫ ·
0
(
θSs ,−Z
w,2
s
γR
)
ds is a Q-Brownian Motion. The measure Q
is well defined since θS ∈ S∞ and Zw,2 ∈ HBMO (see Lemma A.1.1). For 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T
we have ([AIdR10, Theorem 8.4] or [IDR10, Theorem 2.9])
DW
R
u Y
w
t = D
WR
u Y
w
T +
∫ T
t
[
−θSsDW
R
u Z
w,1
s +
1
γR
Zw,2s D
WR
u Z
w,2
s
]
ds−
∫ T
t
〈DWRu Zws , dWs〉,
(2.6.4)
which implies DW
R
u Y
w
t = EQ
[
DW
R
u Y
w
T
∣∣Ft] .
The results in Proposition A.3.1 and the definition of Y wT imply that |DWRu Y wt | < C.
Path regularity results for BSDEs along with their usual representation formulas (see
15The (weak) comparison principle, applied to terminal conditions −Hw < 0 and 0, allows only to
infer that Y wt ≤ 0. If, however we had Y ws = 0 for any time s < T , then the strict version of the theorem
implies that we would have Y wT = 0, hence we have a contradiction, proving that indeed Y
w
t < 0 for all
times t ∈ [0, T ].
16[KTPZ15, Theorem 6.1] goes further than necessary for our purpose by providing a strict comparison
principle for BSDEs with jumps, whereas [Kob00] is not quite sufficient, because the comparison principle
therein (Theorem 2.6) is not strict in the sense of [CEP10]. Theorems 3 and 5 in [CEP10] are strict, but
the setting of [MY10] is closer to ours and thus easier to adapt.
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[IDR10]) yield that (DWRt Yt) = (Z
2
t ) ∈ S∞; the boundedness of ∂x2uw follows easily17.
As a consequence, since Zw,2 ∈ S∞ and (2.5.11) holds, we also have θR ∈ S∞.
◃ Proof of iii): Using now the fact that θS, Zw,2 ∈ S∞, we apply Theorem 2.6 in [IDR10]
to (2.6.4) and obtain that DWR· Z
w ∈ HBMO. The BMO norm of DWRZw depends only
on some real constants and T , γR, supu ‖DWRu Y wT ‖L∞ and ‖(θS, Zw,2)‖S∞×S∞ (see again
[IDR10, Theorem 2.6]).
In the next result we show that the mapping x2 ↦→ (∂x2uw)(t, x1, x2) is Lipschitz contin-
uous.
Proposition 2.6.4. For any (t, x1) ∈ [0, T ] × R, the map R ∋ x2 ↦→ (∂x2uw)(t, x1, x2)
is Lipschitz continuous uniformly in t and x1. In particular, the process DW
R
Zw is P-a.s.
bounded.
Proof. Denote by R and R˜ the solutions to (2.3.1) with R0 = r0 and R˜0 = r˜0 respec-
tively; denote as well by (Y w, Zw) and (Y˜ w, Z˜w) the solutions to BSDE (2.5.2) for the
underlying processes R and R˜, respectively.
Let 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T and define δDY := DWRY w−DWRY˜ w, δDZ i := DWRZw,i−DWRZ˜w,i
for i ∈ {1, 2} and δDZ := (δDZ1, δDZ2). Then, following from (2.6.4) written under Q
from (2.6.3), we have
δDuYt = δDuYT −
∫ T
t
〈δDuZs, dWQs 〉+
∫ T
t
1
γR
(Zw,2s − Z˜w,2s )DW
R
u Z
w,2
s ds.
Define now the process18
et := exp
(∫ t
0
1
γR
DW
R
u Z
w,2
s ds
)
, t ∈ [0, T ] with (et)t∈[0,T ] ∈ Hp, ∀p > 1, (2.6.5)
where the Hp-integrability of (et)t∈[0,T ] follows from Lemma A.1.1. Observe next that
by the results of Theorem 2.6.3 one has δDuYt = δDtYt = Z
w,2
t − Z˜w,2t . Applying Itô’s
formula to (etδD·Yt), using the just mentioned identity and taking Q-conditional expec-
tations it follows at u = t = 0 that
|(∂x2uw)(0, s0, r0)− (∂x2uw)(0, s0, r˜0)| =
1
b
∣∣∣(Zw,20 − Z˜w,20 )∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣1bEQ [eT δD0YT ]
∣∣∣∣
≤ C|r0 − r˜0|.
This is a consequence of Proposition A.3.1 combined with the fact that EQ[epT ] (∀p > 1)
is finite due to the BMO properties of DWRZw,2, see Lemma A.1.1. The constant C is
independent of u, r0, r˜0 and s0.19 Although DW
R
Zw,2 is a BMO martingale under P, the
integrability still carries under Q; this is the same argument as in the final step of the
proof of Lemma 3.1 in [IDR10] (see also Lemma 2.2 and Remark 2.7 of the cited work).
17Recall that ∂x2u
w(t, St, Rt)b = D
WR
t Y
w
t , which we just proved to be bounded.
18We do not add another index u to et, because once we take the expectation, the dependence on u
vanishes by Theorem 2.6.3 i). Any u ∈ [0, s] would give the same expectation.
19u appears only indirectly via eT and the expectation of the latter is independent of u by Theorem
2.6.3 i).
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The extension of the above result to the whole time interval [0, T ] follows via the Markov
property of the BSDE solution. This relates to the close link between BSDEs of the
Markovian type and certain classes of quasi-linear parabolic PDEs (see e.g. [EPQ97,
Section 4]).
Finally, the boundedness of DWRZw follows from the Lipschitz property of the map
x2 ↦→ (∂x2uw)(·, ·, x2) and the boundedness of DWRR, see Proposition A.3.1, ii).
2.6.2 The EMPR and the derivative’s BSDE
The next result shows that Assumption 2.6.1 on Ha and HD implies that Assumption
2.4.1 holds for the model with entropic risk, i.e., that the market is complete.
Theorem 2.6.5 (Market completion). Under the standing assumptions for this chapter,
the derivative HD completes the market, i.e., κR ̸= 0 P-a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]. More
precisely, κR ∈ S∞ and sgn(κRt ) = sgn(b∂x2hD) for any t ∈ [0, T ].
Before proving the above result we need an intermediary one. Recall that BSDE (2.3.6)
describes the dynamics of the price processBθ, thatHD ∈ L∞ and θ ∈ S∞×(HBMO∩D1,2)
(following from Assumption 2.6.1 and Theorem 2.6.3).
Proposition 2.6.6. The pair (B, κ) belongs to (S∞∩D1,2)×(HBMO∩D1,2) and the Malliavin
derivatives satisfy for 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T the dynamics
DW
R
u B
θ
t = D
WR
u H
D −
∫ T
t
κRs D
WR
u θ
R
s +
〈
θs, D
WR
u κ
θ
s
〉
ds−
∫ T
t
〈DWRu κθs, dWs〉. (2.6.6)
The representation DWRt B
θ
t = κ
R
t holds P-a.s. for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof. Let 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T . Observe that (2.3.6) (describing the dynamics of Bθ) is
a BSDE with a linear driver and a bounded terminal condition. The existence and
uniqueness of a solution follows from the results of [EPQ97]. Moreover, the estimation
techniques used in [IDR10] yield that (B, κ) ∈ S∞ ×HBMO (see [IDR10]Theorem 2.6).
The Malliavin differentiability of (B, κ) follows from Proposition 5.3 in [EPQ97] and the
remark following it since (θS, θR) ∈ R×(S∞∩D1,2) (see Theorem 2.6.3). [EPQ97, Propo-
sition 5.3] and Proposition A.3.1 yield Equation (2.6.6) and therefore the dynamics of
the Malliavin derivative w.r.t.WR ofBθ. According to [EPQ97, Proposition 5.3],DWRt B
θ
t
is a version of κθt for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
We now prove a finer result on B and κ, namely that DWRt B
θ
t = κ
R
t holds P-a.s. for any
0 ≤ t ≤ T instead of just P ⊗ Leb-a.e..20 This is done by showing that (u, t) ↦→ DWRu Bθt
is jointly continuous.
Remark that the map t ↦→ DWRu Bθt for u ≤ t is given by (2.6.6) and hence it is continuous
in time (∀t ∈ [u, T ]). Note now that Proposition 2.6.4 and Proposition A.3.1 yield that
DW
R
Zw,2 is bounded and DWRu Z
w,2
t = D
WR
r Z
w,2
t = D
WR
0 Z
w,2
t for any 0 ≤ u, r ≤ t ≤ T .
These properties hold as well for θR via the identity −γRθR = Zw,2.
Using the measure Pθ (introduced in (2.3.3)), thatDWRθS = 0 and the identity−γRθR =
Zw,2, one can rewrite (2.6.6) as
DW
R
u B
θ
t = D
WR
u H
D +
1
γR
∫ T
t
κRs D
WR
u Z
w,2
s ds−
∫ T
t
〈DWRu κθs, dW θs 〉. (2.6.7)
20In other words, instead of a version we want κRt to be a modification of D
WR
t B
θ
t .
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Writing the same BSDE as above, but for a parameter v (instead of u) we have for
0 ≤ v ≤ t ≤ T
DW
R
v B
θ
t = D
WR
v H
D +
1
γR
∫ T
t
κRs D
WR
v Z
w,2
s ds−
∫ T
t
〈DWRv κθs, dW θs 〉
= DW
R
u H
D +
1
γR
∫ T
t
κRs D
WR
u Z
w,2
s ds−
∫ T
t
〈DWRv κθs, dW θs 〉,
where we used the results of Proposition A.3.1 (part (iii)) and the above result that
DW
R
u Z
w,2
t = D
WR
r Z
w,2
t = D
WR
0 Z
w,2
t for any 0 ≤ u, r ≤ t ≤ T . Since the solution to
(2.6.7) is unique and the BSDE just above has exactly the same parameters as (2.6.7),
we must conclude that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and for 0 ≤ u, r ≤ t it holds DWRu Bθt = DWRr Bθt .
From the continuity of t ↦→ DWR· Bθt follows now the joint continuity of (u, t) ↦→ DWRu Bθt
in its time parameters and hence the representation DWRt B
θ
t = κ
R
t holds P-a.s. for any
t ∈ [0, T ].
We can now prove Theorem 2.6.5.
Proof of Theorem 2.6.5. We proceed in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 2.6.4.
The argument goes as follows: define the process (et)t∈[0,T ] just like in (2.6.5); apply Itô’s
formula to (etDW
R
· B
θ
t ) and write the resulting equation under Pθ (just like (2.6.7)); take
Pθ-conditional expectations. At this point a remaining Lebesgue integral is still in the
dynamics:
DW
R
u B
θ
t = (et)
−1Eθ
[
eTD
WR
u H
D +
1
γR
∫ T
t
es(κ
R
s −DW
R
u B
θ
s )D
WR
u Z
w,2
s ds|Ft
]
= (et)
−1Eθ
[
eTD
WR
u H
D|Ft
]
,
where from the first to the second line we used Proposition 2.6.6, i.e. that κRs =
DW
R
s B
θ
s = D
WR
u B
θ
s P-a.s. for any 0 ≤ u ≤ s ≤ T .
Moreover, using Proposition A.3.1, and that the boundedness of DWRZw,2 implies that
of eT and e−1t , we conclude that the boundedness of DW
R
· H
D implies that of (DWR· B
θ
t )
and hence that of (κRt ).
Recalling HD = hD(ST , RT ) and the dynamics of R given by Equation (2.3.1), we see
that (by the chain rule) DWRu H
D = b∂x2h
D. Since b∂x2h
D is either always positive or
always negative and since κRt = D
WR
t B
θ
t P-a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ], it follows that κR ̸= 0
P-a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. More precisely, depending on the sign of b∂x2hD, κR is P-a.s.
either always positive or always negative21, giving sgn(κR· ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D).
Remark 2.6.7 (Comparison with [HPDR10]). There are some differences between this
Section, in particular Subsections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2, and [HPDR10, Section 4] which we
would like to point out. Starting from the setting and assumptions, as we consider entropic
risk, whereas [HPDR10] switch to the problem of maximization of "entropic utilities" (i.e.,
21For any positive random variable X (X > 0 P-a.s.) one has EP[X|F ] > 0 for any sigma-field F . Since
the measure change is done for a strictly positive density function, the inequality for the new conditional
expectation is still strict.
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expected exponential utility), there are some different signs within the BSDEs. Further-
more, θSt is allowed to depend on the risk Rt, whereas we work in a Black-Scholes market,
implying that θS is a constant.
Theorem 2.6.3, Proposition 2.6.4 (on Lipschitz property) and Theorem 2.6.5 (on market
completeness) have a corresponding result in [HPDR10]. However, our proofs of the latter
two use purely probabilistic arguments relying on Malliavin calculus applied to the BSDEs
for Y w and B (in Proposition 2.6.6), whereas both Lipschitz continuity and market com-
pleteness are proven via PDE theory in [HPDR10]. The former approach appears to us a
bit more straightforward than the latter, and it also yields slightly different results. For
instance, with our approach we state the Markov property of Y w and Zw, not only that
of the latter one, but we do not give the characterization as viscosity solution of a PDE.
[HPDR10] show that Zw,2 is a version of the Malliavin derivative of Y w with respect to
WR, whereas our two-dimensional process Zw is shown to be a modification of DWRY .
Furthermore, we give explicitly the regularity of B and κ and the BSDE solved by this
couple of processes (in Proposition 2.6.6) .
2.6.3 Parameter Analysis
It is possible to justify at a theoretical level some of the predictable behavior of the
processes Y w, Bθ and θR with relation to the problem’s parameters n, γR, λa and γa for
a ∈ A. Some statements are only made for t < T , because the process at hand does not
depend on a given parameter at terminal time T .
Theorem 2.6.8. Let θ be the EMPR. The process (Y w, Zw) solving BSDE (2.5.2) is differ-
entiable with relation to λa for any a ∈ A, n and γR (see (2.5.6) and (2.5.8)).
Fix agent a ∈ A. If the differences
γR − γa and Eθ
[(∑
b∈A
wbHb
)
−Ha
]
(2.6.8)
are positive (negative respectively), then ∂λ˜aY
w
t is negative (positive respectively) for any
t ∈ [0, T ]. For any a ∈ A we have P-a.s. that
∂γRY
w
t < 0, ∂γaY
w
t < 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ).
Furthermore, P-a.s.
∂nY
w
t < 0, sgn(∂nθ
R
t ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D), ∀t ∈ [0, T ], and ∂nBθt < 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ).
Part of the results are in some way expected. Introducing more derivatives leads to an
overall risk reduction and as more derivatives are placed in the market, the derivative
is worth less (per unit). If γR is interpreted as the representative agent’s risk tolerance,
then as γR increases we have a decrease in risk (Y w decreases) since it represents an
increase in the single agents’ risk tolerance (i.e., γa increases).
The main message of the above theorem is that the effect of the performance concern of
one agent on the aggregate risk depends essentially on how the agent is positioned with
respect to the others, both in terms of risk tolerance as well as the personal endowments.
If the agent’s risk tolerance γa is higher than the aggregate risk tolerance γR and her
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endowment position dominates the aggregate endowment position, then an increase in
the agent’s concern rate leads to an increase of the aggregate risk.
Before proving the above result we remark that condition (2.6.8) simplifies under cer-
tain conditions; such simplifications are summarized in the below corollary. All results
follow by direct manipulation of the involved quantities.
Corollary 2.6.9. Let the conditions of Theorem 2.6.8 hold.
If γa = γ for all a ∈ A, then γR − γa = γ
(∑
a∈Aw
a − 1) = 0.
If N = 2 s.t. A = {a, b}, then wb = 1− wa and hence(∑
c∈A
wcHc
)−Ha = −wb(Ha −Hb) and (∑
c∈A
wcHc
)−Hb = wa(Ha −Hb).
Similarly, γR − γa = −wb(γa − γb) and γR − γb = wa(γa − γb). Moreover, it holds that
sgn
(
∂λaY
w
t
)
= −sgn
(
∂λbY
w
t
)
P-a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.6.9)
Proof of Theorem 2.6.8. Let a ∈ A and t ∈ [0, T ]. Theorem 3.1.9 in [dR11] (see also
[IDR10, Theorem 2.8]) ensures the differentiability of BSDE (2.5.2) with respect to γR,
γa, λa and n.
◃ The derivative of Y w in γR: Applying ∂γR to BSDE (2.5.2) and writing it under the
probability measure Q defined in (2.6.3) yields the dynamics
∂γRY
w
t = 0 +
∫ T
t
(
−1
2
(θSs )
2 − 1
2γ2R
(
Zw,2s
)2)
ds−
∫ T
t
〈∂γRZws , dWQs 〉.
TakingQ-conditional expectations and noticing that the Lebesgue integral term is strictly
negative for any t ∈ [0, T ), we have then ∂γRY wt < 0 for any t ∈ [0, T ).
◃ The derivative of Y w in γa: This case follows from the previous one as γR is defined by
(2.5.6) and the weights wa (see (2.5.8)) are independent of γa for a ∈ A. By definition
γR =
∑
a∈Aw
aγa, which implies ∂γaγR = wa > 0. Finally, from ∂γaY w = ∂γRY
w · ∂γaγR
the statement follows.
◃ The derivatives of Y w in λ˜a: We compute only the derivatives with respect to λ˜a in
order to present simplified calculations as λ˜a = λa/(N − 1). Calculating the involved
derivatives leads to
∂λ˜a
1
1 + λ˜a
= −(Λwa)2, ∂λ˜a
1
Λ
= (wa)2, ∂λ˜aw
a = (wa)2Λ(wa − 1), ∂λ˜awb = (wa)2Λwb,
∂λ˜aγR = ∂λ˜a
∑
b∈A
wbγb = (w
a)2Λ(γR − γa) and ∂λ˜aHw = (wa)2Λ
((∑
b∈A
wbHb
)−Ha).
Combining the above results with the BSDE for ∂λ˜aY
w under the Q-measure (just as in
the previous two steps) yields
∂λ˜aY
w
t = −(wa)2ΛEQ
[((∑
b∈A
wbHb
)−Ha)+ (γR − γa) ∫ T
t
(1
2
(θSs )
2 +
1
2γ2R
(
Zw,2s
)2 )
ds
∣∣∣Ft] .
Since Q is equivalent to P, the statement follows.
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◃ The derivative of Y w in n: Applying ∂n to BSDE (2.5.2) and writing it under the
probability measure Q defined in (2.6.3) yields the dynamics
∂nY
w
t = ∂nY
w
T −
∫ T
t
〈∂nZws , dWQs 〉 with ∂nY wT = −
HD
N
=⇒ ∂nY wt = EQ[∂nY wT |Ft] = −
1
N
EQ[HD|Ft] < 0,
where the last sign follows from the definition of Y wT and H
D.22
◃ The derivative of θR in n: The analysis of Zw,2 and hence of θR with respect to n and
γR follows from the analysis of (2.6.4). Given representation (2.5.11), applying ∂n to
BSDE (2.6.4) and writing it under the probability measure Q defined in (2.6.3) yields
the dynamics
∂nD
WR
u Y
w
t = ∂nD
WR
u Y
w
T −
∫ T
t
〈∂nDWRu Zws , dWQs 〉+
∫ T
t
(
1
γR
DW
R
u Z
w,2
s ∂nZ
w,2
s
)
ds
⇐⇒ ∂nZw,2t = ∂nDW
R
u Y
w
T −
∫ T
t
〈∂nDWRu Zws , dWQs 〉+
∫ T
t
(
1
γR
DW
R
u Z
w,2
s ∂nZ
w,2
s
)
ds
⇐⇒ ∂nZw,2t = (et)−1EQ
[
eT∂nD
WR
u Y
w
T |Ft
]
for 0 ≤ u ≤ t ≤ T , where (et) is as in (2.6.5) and the argumentation is similar to that
back there. Notice now that with YT = −
∑
a∈Aw
a(Ha + nHD/N) we have
∂nD
WR
t Y
w
T = −
1
N
(∑
a∈A
wa
)
DW
R
t H
D = − 1
N
(∑
a∈A
wa
)
b(∂x2h
D)(ST , RT ).
Although the index t on the LHS suggests otherwise, this expression is independent of
t, which can be justified without appealing to the RHS by recalling (2.6.2).
Given Assumption 2.6.1, we conclude that sgn(Zw,2t ) = −sgn(b∂x2hD), and furthermore,
recalling (2.5.11) and that γR > 0, we find that sgn(∂nθRt ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D).
◃ The derivative of Bθ in n: We use justifications similar to those used in Proposition
2.6.6 and hence we do not give all the details. Recall (2.3.6), apply the ∂n-operator to
the equation and do the usual change of measure (with Pθ) to obtain
∂nB
θ
t = 0−
∫ T
t
κRs ∂nθ
R
s ds−
∫ T
t
〈∂nκθs, dW θs 〉 =⇒ ∂nBθt = −Eθ
[∫ T
t
κRs ∂nθ
R
s ds
]
.
By the previous result we have sgn(∂nθRt ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D) and from Theorem 2.6.5 we
have sgn(κRt ) = sgn(b∂x2h
D). It easily follows that ∂nBθt < 0.
Unfortunately, the conditions used above do not allow for similar results on the behavior
of, say (γR, n, λ·) ↦→ Y˜ a. The conditions required for such results are too restrictive to be
of any usefulness. Nonetheless, we will investigate them in Section 2.7 via numerical
simulation.
22Observe that Q from (2.6.3) depends on n, hence EQ[HD|Ft] depends on n. Its sign, however, stays
the same, as the conditional expectation of a positive random variable is always positive.
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2.7 Study of a particular model with two agents
In this section, we investigate a model economy consisting of two agents using entropic
risk measures and having opposed exposures to the external non-financial risk. We give
particular attention to the impact of the relative performance concern rates on the equi-
librium related processes. The model is simple enough to allow extended tractability,
when compared with Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, and nonetheless still sufficiently gen-
eral as to produce a rich set of results and interpretations. In particular, we explicitly
describe the structure of the equilibrium. Using numerical simulations, we are able
to explore the dependence of individual quantities (such as the optimal portfolios pi∗a
and minimized risks Y a0 ) on the various parameters, thus complementing the results in
Theorem 2.6.8.
2.7.1 The particular model and numerical methodology
We consider a stylized market consisting of two agents. We argue that a larger set of
N agents with certain exposures to the external risk R can be clustered in two groups:
those profiting from the high values of R and those profiting from the low values of
R, and we can apply the weighted aggregation technique used in Section 2.5 to each
group. Our two agents can therefore be thought of as representative agents for each
group. The external risk process is taken to be the temperature affecting the two agents,
who also have access to a stock market.
Temperature and Stock models
We study one period of one month (T = 1). The temperature (in degrees Celsius)
follows a stochastic differential equation (SDE) (2.3.1) with constant coefficients:
Rt = r0 + µ
R t+ bWRt , t ∈ [0, T ],
and for the stock we take a standard Black–Scholes model:
dSt
St
= µSdt+ σSdW St , t ∈ [0, T ],
where the coefficients are R0 = r0 = 18, µR = 2 and b = 4 for the temperature process,
and S0 = 50, µS = −0.2 and σS = 0.25 (so θS = µS/σS = −0.8) for the stock price
process.
The agents’ parameters and endowments and the derivative
Define I(x) := 1
pi
arctan(x) + 1
2
∈ [0, 1]. The agents’ endowments, Ha and Hb, are taken
to be
Ha = 5 + I
(
2
(
RT − 24
)) · 15,
Hb = 5 + I
(
2
(
16−RT
)) · (15 + 5 I(ST − 40)).
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Agent a profits from higher temperatures while agent b profits from lower ones. The
derivative has a payoff HD that does not depend on the stock S, and is given by
HD = I(RT − 20),
so that it allows to transfer the weather risk by trading the derivative. All functions
satisfy Assumptions 2.3.1 and 2.6.1. Given the agents’ opposite exposures to RT and
the design of HD, agent a will act as a seller while agent b will act as a buyer, thus
establishing a viable market for the derivative.
We assume throughout that the total supply of derivative is zero, n = 0; in other words,
every unit of derivative one agent owns is underwritten by the other. The risk tolerance
coefficients of the agents are fixed at γa = γb = 1 unless we are analyzing some behavior
with respect to them. Similarly, unless otherwise specified, the concern rates are fixed
to be λa = λb = 0.25.
The numerical procedure
The simulation of the involved processes entails a time discretization and Monte Carlo
simulations. The forward processes have explicit solutions and we use them directly.
All BSDEs are solved numerically. Regarding their time discretization, we use a stan-
dard backward Euler scheme, see [BT04], and we complement the time-discretization
procedure with the control variate technique stated in [LdRS15, Section 5.4.2]. The
approximation of the conditional expectations in the backward induction steps is done
via projection over basis functions, see the Least-Squares Monte Carlo method used in
[GT16].
We follow Sections 2.4 and 2.5. First, we solve the representative agent’s BSDE (2.5.2).
This yields via (2.5.11) the EMPeR process θR. Once this is obtained, we solve the BSDE
for the price Bθ of the derivative, Equation (2.3.6), obtaining (κS, κR) in the process.
Finally, we solve the BSDE (2.4.25) with driver (2.4.16) for each agent a ∈ A and
compute the optimal strategies pi∗,a = (pi∗,a,1, pi∗,a,2) via (2.4.17) and (2.4.18). We note
that in the case of two agents, the system (2.4.17) is easily inverted.
All plots below are computed using 200.000 simulated paths along a uniform time-
discretization grid of 20 time-steps, except the plot of Figure 2.2 which uses 30 time-
steps.
2.7.2 Analysis of the behavior in the model
Figure 2.2 shows a realization of the behavior of the agents over the trading period.
One can see that the price of the derivative reacts to the temperature’s movements, in
particular towards the end of the time period. This suggests that the derivative does
indeed complete the market by providing the agents full exposure to R, or equivalently
to WR – Assumption 2.4.1 is satisfied. Agent b is always long in the derivative and a
always short (the latter following from the former since her position is the opposite of
that of b). The fact that both agents only go short in the stock is due to its decreasing
trend (θS < 0). Only agent b’s terminal risk exposure depends directly on the terminal
stock price, whereas only agent a has performance concerns23.
23For this plot, λb = 0, hence agent b does not react to the trading performance of agent a.
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Tr a di n g a cti vit y
T h e o pti m al i n v e st m e nt str at e gi e s f or t h e d eri v ati v e w er e s e e n i n R e m ar k 2. 4. 1 0 a n d
ar e gi v e n b y
π ∗ , a,2 = 11 + λ a
Z˜ a, 2 + γ a θ R
κ R a n d π
∗ , b,2 = 11 + λ b
Z˜ b, 2 + γ b θ R
κ R .
T h e o pti m al i n v e st m e nt str at e gi e s i n t h e st o c k f oll o w e a sil y b y i n v erti n g A 2 fr o m E x-
pr e s si o n ( 2. 4. 1 3 ). T hi s yi el d s
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
π ∗ , a,1
π ∗ , b,1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1
1 − λ a λ b
λ a
1 − λ a λ b
λ b
1 − λ a λ b
1
1 − λ a λ b
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
Z˜ a, 1 + γ a θ S
σ S S −
Z˜ a, 2 + γ a θ R
κ R
κ S
σ S S
Z˜ b, 1 + γ b θ S
σ S S −
Z˜ b, 2 + γ b θ R
κ R
κ S
σ S S
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ . ( 2. 7. 1 )
R e m a r k 2. 7. 1 ( O n t h e str u ct ur e of t h e e q uili bri u m ) . L et us c o m m e nt o n t h e st r u ct u r e of
t h e i n v est m e nt st r at e g y i n st o c k.
E a c h a g e nt c o m p ut es h e r st r at e g y as a w ei g ht e d s u m of t h e w a y b ot h w o ul d c o m p ut e t h ei rs
if t h e r e w as n o r el ati v e p e rf o r m a n c e c o n c e r n ( c o m p a r e wit h ( 2. 4. 2 0 ) ), usi n g t h e w ei g hts( 1
1 − λ a λ b , λ a1 − λ a λ b
) f o r a a n d ( λ b1 − λ a λ b , 11 − λ a λ b
) f o r b .
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These weights can be understood from Equation (2.4.17) with A = {a, b}: each agent’s best
response is to invest in the stock according to her natural strategy plus λi times the strategy
played by the other. Assume now that each agent was initially planning to compute her
optimal position using
pi(0),i,1 =
Z˜i,1 + γiθ
S
σSS
− Z˜
i,2 + γiθ
R
κR
κS
σSS
, i ∈ {a, b} ,
and that they are shown, in turn, the strategy that the other is about to play, so that they
can update theirs, yielding a sequence of strategies pi(1),a,1, pi(1),b,1, pi(2),a,1, pi(2),b,1, pi(3),a,1,
. . . for each agent (starting with a’s update). Because they both update their strategy
according to Equation (2.4.17), we observe agent a imitating part of agent b, imitating
part of agent a, imitating part of agent b, etc. Summing the corresponding series, agent a
ends up investing according to
∑∞
n=0(λ
aλb)n pi(0),a,1+ λa
∑∞
n=0(λ
aλb)npi(0),b,1, and similarly
for agent b. This geometric series converges to (2.7.1).
The structure of the optimal investment in the derivative, however, follows from the en-
dogenous trading condition. If an agent is shown the strategy that the other had decided
to follow, she could not unilaterally change her strategy. From this emerges the EMPeR θR
– see below.
We now look at the behavior of the individual portfolios with respect to the rates of
relative performance concern. The intensity of the trading activity at time t = 0 on both
the stock (pi∗,a,10 ) and the derivative (pi
∗,a,2
0 ) as maps of the concern rates λ
a, λb can be
found in Figure 2.3. The positions of agent b are similar in some sense: for the stock,
the surface looks very similar; for the derivative, it is the exact opposite (due to the zero
net supply condition). For readability we plot only the position of agent a.
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Figure 2.3: Initial number pia,10 and pi
a,2
0 of shares of stock (left) and derivative (right)
held by agent a, as a function of (λa, λb). For visualization purposes the axes on the left
picture were inverted.
The observed behavior in Figure 2.3 is in line with the intuitive idea that the more the
agents are concerned (high λi) about their relative performance V iT − V jT , j ̸= i ∈ {a, b}
(recall (0.0.1)), the more they will invest in a way that neutralizes this source of risk.
This is done by adopting a trading strategy that is as close as possible to that of the
other agent.
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For the stock, we see from the formulas in Remark 2.7.1 that when λaλb < 1, the process
of a imitating b imitating a, etc, results in a finite position. But the volume increases
with both λa and λb, and explodes as (λa, λb)→ (1, 1). In our example they would both
(short-)sell infinitely many shares of the stock. Note that this is possible only because
the stock is assumed to be exogenously priced and perfectly liquid. For the derivative,
they cannot imitate each other and position themselves in the same direction, as the
zero net supply condition implies that the agents must hold exactly opposite positions.
Agent b’s gains on trading the derivative will be exactly agent a’s losses. The only way
to reduce the difference in performances for a very concerned agent is to engage less
(in volume) in the trading of the derivative. The market clearing condition then forces
the other agent to also trade less (in volume). This is seen from the factor 1/(1 + λi) in
the formulas in Remark 2.7.1 and is confirmed in Figure 2.3 (on the right) where agent
a, identified as the seller, ends up selling fewer units of the derivative as either concern
rate increases. Due to the market clearing condition between the agents, no explosion
is possible.
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Figure 2.4: Initial price of the derivative, Bθ0 , as map of (λ
a, λb) on the left, and as map
of (γa, γb) on the right.
Figure 2.4 (left) shows an opposite dependence of the derivative’s price Bθ0 on the con-
cern rates λa, λb, a behavior not captured by Theorem 2.6.8. One can make sense of this
effect by having in mind Figure 2.3. A higher λa implies that agent a wants to trade less
and, as she is the seller, this drives the price up. Symmetrically, a higher λb implies that
agent b wants to trade less and, as she is the buyer, this drives the price down. Figure
2.4 (right) shows a negative relation between risk tolerance and the price of the deriva-
tive. As higher risk tolerance requires less risk hedging, the demand for the derivative
decreases, which leads to the observed lower prices for the derivative.
Aggregated risk
Figure 2.5 confirms the analytical results of Theorem 2.6.8 and Corollary 2.6.9. As
predicted, the increase of the risk tolerances leads to a decrease in the aggregated risk
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(see Figure 2.5, right picture). The picture on the left shows clearly the cross behavior
stated in (2.6.9).
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Figure 2.5: Aggregated risk Y w0 as a function of (λ
a, λb) (left) and of (γa, γb) (right).
Risk of each agent
Theorem 2.6.8 does not capture the behavior of each agent’s risk assessment as a func-
tion of the concern rates λ·.
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Figure 2.6 portrays the risk perceptions of each agent as λa, λb change. First, agent
a’s risk Y a0 increases in λ
b. This can be explained as follows: As λb increases, agent b
engages in less trading of the derivative in order to reduce her relative performance
concern, and this affects agents a’s ability to hedge Ha. Second, agent a’s risk Y a0
decreases in λa. A possible explanation for this behavior is, having in mind (0.0.1)
or (2.3.10), that if a gives more importance to her relative performance concern, then
she trades more in a way that mimics what b does. This in turn reduces her ability to
neutralize the endowment risk.
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2.7.3 Effect of introducing the derivative
We now comment on the effects of introducing the derivative in this model market.
Figure 2.7 displays the risks of the representative agent and of agent a with respect to
λa and λb when no derivative is available and when a market for it is available.
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Figure 2.7: Left : risk Y a0 when the derivative is not available (flat surface) and when it
is (tilted surface), as a function of the concern rates (λa, λb). Right: same plot for the
aggregated risk Y w0 (the two surfaces are equal).
We observe in the plot on the right that adding the derivative does not change the
aggregated risk. This is clear if one views it as the risk of the representative agent:
being alone by construction, the zero net supply condition means that she must keep a
zero position in the derivative, and hence does not benefit from its presence (compare
the strategies in (2.4.22) with those in Example 2.5.6).
For an individual agent however (left plot), the availability of the derivative always
leads to a reduction of risk. We observe that in the absence of the derivative, the risk
of agent a does not depend on the concern rates. We can apply the methodology of
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 to find that the optimal porfolios of the agents in this situation are
given by
pi∗,i,1t =
1
1− λaλb
γiθ
S + Z˜i,1t
σSSt
+
λi
1− λaλb
γjθ
S + Z˜j,1t
σSSt
for j ̸= i ∈ {a, b}, t ∈ [0, T ],
while the minimized risk equation is given by the BSDE
dY˜ it = −
[
− 1
2
γi
(
θS
)2 − Z˜i,1t θS + 12γi (Z˜i,2)2
]
dt+ 〈Z˜it , dWt〉, t ∈ [0, T ]
Y˜ iT = −H i(ST , RT ).
This shows analytically that the value of the problem, Y a0 , depends on neither λ
a nor λb
while the optimal strategy does, as was already observed in [FdR11, Proposition 4.1].
Playing the game repeatedly leads to an extreme impact on the stock market
The above study considers a one-period model with (continuous-time) trading until the
horizon T = 1 month. Imagine now the repetition of this trading period over time
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and assume no significant changes to the agents’ endowments or the dynamics of the
financial and external risks.
At the level of the agents’ preferences, with the sole exception of the concern rates,
we assume that they do not change with time. Specifically, we assume that their risk
tolerances, and consequently the entropic risk measures ρ·0 used to assess their risk in
(0.0.1), are fixed throughout; however, their concern rates λ· over their relative perfor-
mance may vary. This might happen in an increasingly competitive segment where the
participants feel an increasing pressure to surpass their competitors in order to survive.
Figure 2.6 sheds some light on the outcome of playing this game repeatedly. Indeed,
each agent benefits from a unilateral increase of their concern rate λ while they are
worse off with an increase of the other’s concern rate. So they have an incentive to
increase λ, as the trading periods are repeated, culminating in Assumption 2.3.3 being
violated as (λa, λb)→ (1, 1).
It is interesting to note that this drifting toward the singularity of the model, (λa, λb) =
(1, 1), is not captured by the risk assessments. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show that Y w0 , Y
a
0
and Y b0 remain bounded. At the level of the investment strategies, the trading activity
in the derivative slows down but persists. The sharing of the external risk becomes less
efficient, because the agents are increasingly concerned about losing out to the other,
but does not disappear. However, the investment in the stock explodes (see Figure 2.3).
We stress that this behavior arises only after the derivative is introduced in the market.
Indeed, as shown by Figure 2.7, when the derivative is not available and the agents
in A are only concerned with the relative performance of their investment strategy on
the stock market, they have no incentive to have increasingly high concern rates. The
particular shape of the surface (λa, λb) ↦→ Y i0 , risk decreasing with λi but increasing with
λj, appears only when the derivative is made available. In this situation, the agents
are placed in direct interaction (by trading) in addition to the indirect one (social):
each agent makes now gains directly over the other. The final result is a potential
destabilization of the stock market.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyzed the effect of a form of social interaction between agents on
an equilibrium pricing mechanism. Specifically, we considered the pricing of a (market-
completing) derivative introduced to allow market participants to share the risk associ-
ated with an external and non-tradable risk factor. The social interaction here takes the
form of concerns over relative performance.
From a theoretical point of view, we have shown how to solve the problem for general
risk measures and a finite number of agents, when assuming that the derivative com-
pletes the market. Due to the heterogeneous rates of concerns of the agents, the risks
of the agents cannot be aggregated by the usual infimal convolution technique, so we
developed it further and introduced the weighted-dilated infimal convolution variant.
We then focused on the particular case of the entropic risk measure and were able to
determine sufficient conditions to design a derivative that completes the market. In a
market model with two agents representing opposite profiles of exposure to the external
risk, we explored the impact of the social interactions on the benefit brought by financial
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innovation.
We found that the introduction of the derivative always reduces the risk, at the level
of individual agents. However, the particular distribution of this risk reduction means
that both agents have an incentive to become more concerned with their relative perfor-
mance, because this reduces their individual risk. At the global level, while the volume
of derivatives traded merely decreases, the volumes traded in the previously-existing
financial asset explode and the equilibrium ceases to exist. This non-trivial, and per-
haps not desirable, behavior of the system after introduction of the derivative bears
resemblance to the findings of [CMV09] and [CML16]. In practice, the assumption that
the agents are small and that the price dynamics of the stock is independent of their
actions fails to hold. Thus, although the stock price is fundamentally independent of
the external risk, introducing the derivative can lead to unintended consequences on
what was a stable stock market. We stress that this phenomenon is not captured by the
risk measures. Therefore, one should not only use the performance of the risk measure
when evaluating the possible benefits of a new policy (the introduction of the deriva-
tive, here). This also stresses the importance of having systemic view: studying the
problem from the point of view of an individual investor shows that the availability of
the derivative is always beneficial, but at the global level the picture has strong nuances.
Strongly undesirable endogenous phenomena can emerge in the dynamics, arising es-
sentially from the interaction between the various agents and their possibility to adapt
to the new policy.
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3 | Pathwise Directional Derivatives
Beyond Cameron-Martin Directions
3.1 Organization of this chapter
First, in Section 3.2, the spaces and necessary notation are introduced. In Section 3.3
variations with Cameron-Martin functions are presented as benchmark for our further
analysis. In Sections 3.4 and 3.5 we extend this to variations from the space of Hölder
continuous and merely continuous functions. Section 3.6 goes another step further to
discontinuous functions and Section 3.7 puts forward a notion of variation of paths with
measures. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes with a table of the relevant results.
3.2 Spaces and Notation
Let I := [0, 1] denote our time interval and Ω := C(I;R) the space of real-valued con-
tinuous paths equipped with the supremum norm ‖f‖∞ := sup {|f(t)| | t ∈ I}, where
|·| shall denote the Euclidean norm on R. By B(I) we denote the Borel σ-algebra on
I, whereas B = B(R) is the Borel σ-algebra on R. Let H denote some Hilbert space
on I, for instance H = L2(I) = L2(I,B(I), λ|I), with a fixed ONB1 (hk)k∈N. Denote by
C∞b (Rn) the space of bounded and infinitely continuously differentiable functions on Rn
with bounded partial derivatives. Let S denote what we will call cylinder functions, i.e.
S := {F : Ω→ R | F (ω) = f(θ1(ω), . . . , θn(ω)), f ∈ C∞b (Rn), n ∈ N} ,
where θk(ω) :=
∫
I
hk(t)dω(t). If we want to emphasize the basis used we also write
θhk(ω).
Remark 3.2.1. If (hk)k∈N is an ONB of L2(I), then in general the integral θhk(ω) =∫
I
hk(t)dω(t) need not exist for all ω ∈ Ω. Instead, F could have the representation in
S only for almost all ω ∈ Ω. As we work pathwise throughout this section, all we require
is that for the fixed ω, θhk(ω) exists. For the specific basis of Haar functions, which we
introduce in Section 3.4.1 and use thereafter, the integrals do exist.
We also work with functions with infinite representations, i.e. functions belonging to
D := {F : Ω→ R ∣∣ F (ω) = f ((θk(ω))k∈N) , f ∈ C∞(RN), (βk(ω))k∈N ∈ ℓ2} ,
1We use the often used wording orthonormal basis, by which we mean a complete orthonormal system.
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where for k ∈ N
θk(ω) :=
∫
I
hk(t)dω(t) and βk(ω) := ∇kf ((θn(ω))n∈N) .
The Cameron-Martin space on I is defined as
H(I) :=
{
f : I → R
∣∣∣∣ ∃g ∈ L2(I) : f(t) = ∫ t
0
g(s)ds, t ∈ I
}
.
The α-Hölder space on I is defined as
Cα(I;Rd) :=
{
f : I ⊂ R→ Rd ∣∣ ∃C > 0: ‖f(t)− f(s)‖ ≤ C|t− s|α, ∀t, s ∈ I}
for some 0 < α ≤ 1, where ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm on Rd. We restrict ourselves
here to d = 1 for better readability, hence we write Cα(I) := Cα(I;R). When we restrict
the analysis to functions from a space vanishing at zero, we denote this by adding
subscript 0, e.g. C0(I) = {f ∈ C(I) | f(0) = 0}. The Hölder coefficient2 of f on I is
|f |α := sup
{ |f(t)− f(s)|
|t− s|α
∣∣∣∣ s, t ∈ I, s ̸= t}
such that Cα0 (I) = {f : I → R | f(0) = 0, |f |α <∞}. A norm on Cα(I) is given by
‖f‖α := ‖f‖∞ + |f |α.
For p ≥ 1 let Vp(f) denote the p-variation of a function f on I and let Vp(I) denote the
space of functions on I with finite p-variation. For the exact definition and properties of
this space, see Appendix B.2.4.
When we work with measures they shall belong to the space of finite measures on
(I,B(I)), which we denote by M(I), and the space of measurable functions will be
denoted by
M(I) := {f : (I,B(I))→ (R,B(R)) | f B(I)−B(R)−measurable} .
The Dirac measure on B(I) at t ∈ I,
δt(A) := 1A(t) =
{
1 , t ∈ A,
0 , t /∈ A for A ∈ B(I),
shall not be confused with the Kronecker delta
δab :=
{
1 , a = b,
0 , a ̸= b for a, b ∈ R,
which always has two subscripts, but no argument. Both are of course linked via the
identity δab = δa({b}) = δb({a}) for a, b ∈ I.
In L2(I) =
{
f : I → Rd
∣∣∣ ‖f‖L2(I) <∞} with ‖f‖L2(I) := (∫I |f(t)|2 dt)1/2 we take the
usual inner product 〈f, g〉L2(I) :=
∫
I
f(t)g(t)dt. If f is integrable w.r.t. g, we write
〈f, dg〉 := ∫
I
f(t)dg(t). Observe that if g ∈ H(I), then 〈f, dg〉 = 〈f, g˙〉L2(I).
2The Hölder coefficient is not a norm on Cα(I) as can be seen when applying it to non-zero constant
functions. On the subspace Cα0 (I), however, it is a true norm.
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We also recall the following sequence spaces:
ℓp :=
x = (xn)n∈N ⊂ R
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ‖x‖ℓp =
(∑
n∈N
|xn|p
)1/p
<∞
 for p ∈ [1,∞),
ℓ∞ :=
{
x = (xn)n∈N ⊂ R
∣∣∣∣ ‖x‖ℓ∞ = sup
n∈N
|xn| <∞
}
.
A collection of results from sequence spaces is presented in Appendix B.2.3.
We use the notation∇kf := ∂f∂xk for the k-th partial derivative of f and let∇f := (∇kf)k
denote the (possibly infinite dimensional) gradient of f .
The spaces of Riemann-, Lebesgue- and generalized Riemann-integrable functions (on
I) will be denoted by R(I), L(I) and G(I), respectively. By f ∈ R(g) (resp. L(g) or
G(g)) we denote that f is RS (resp. LS or generalized RS) integrable w.r.t. g on I. We
write (R) ∫
I
f(t)dg(t) (resp. (L) ∫
I
f(t)dg(t) or (G) ∫
I
f(t)dg(t)) if we want to emphasize
the type of the Stieltjes integral. Further details on the different types of integration can
be found in Appendix B.1.
The space of regulated functions on I (taking values in R) shall be denoted by R(I).
The definition of a regulated function and properties are given in Appendix B.2.2.
3.3 Varying paths with in Cameron-Martin functions
The starting point of our analysis is the directional derivative of cylinder functions F ∈ S
that is obtained by varying paths ω ∈ Ω by functions in H(I), the Cameron-Martin
space.3 This is extended in a straightforward manner to functions F ∈ D, and different
aspects of our setting and the directional derivatives are discussed. This section’s re-
sults serve as a benchmark for the extensions in later sections by providing results and
methodology. Until further notice, all integrals are of Lebesgue- or Lebesgue-Stieltjes
type and they are always integrals over time, namely the fixed interval I = [0, 1].
Throughout this section we also fix an ONB (hk)k∈N of L2(I) such that for a fixed ω ∈ Ω
the integrals θhk(ω) exist.
3.3.1 Cylinder functions
We fix a cylinder function F ∈ S that has the representation F (ω) = f(θ1(ω), . . . , θn(ω))
with θk(ω) :=
∫
I
hk(t)dω(t) (k = 1, . . . , n). Further let γ =
∫
I
γ˙(t)dt ∈ H(I) with
3As a reference for this section on may consult for example [Nua06].
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γ˙ ∈ L2(I). Then4
DγF (ω) : = lim
ε→0
1
ε
[F (ω + εγ)− F (ω)]
= lim
ε→0
1
ε
[
f
(∫
I
h1d(ω + εγ), . . . ,
∫
I
hnd(ω + εγ)
)
− f
(∫
I
h1dω, . . . ,
∫
I
hndω
)]
= lim
ε→0
1
ε
[
f
(∫
I
h1dω + ε
∫
I
h1dγ, . . . ,
∫
I
hndω + ε
∫
I
hndγ
)
− f
(∫
I
h1dω, . . . ,
∫
I
hndω
)]
=
n∑
k=1
∂f
∂xk
(∫
I
h1dω, . . . ,
∫
I
hndω
)∫
I
hkdγ
=
n∑
k=1
∇kf (θ1(ω), . . . , θn(ω)) 〈hk, γ˙〉L2(I).
(3.3.1)
The integral
∫
I
hk(t)dγ(t) =
∫
I
hk(t)γ˙(t)dt exists for hk ∈ H(I) and γ˙ ∈ L2(I), as this is
the usual scalar product in L2(I). If F ∈ S, then f ∈ C∞, hence all partial derivatives
exist. The sum is finite, hence DγF (ω) is well-defined as pathwise limit (in (R, |·|)) for
all γ ∈ H(I).
Remark 3.3.1. An important property that we used here is that for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the
mapping θk : Ω → R, given by θk(ω) =
∫
I
hk(t)dω(t), is linear, i.e., for ω, ω̂ ∈ Ω and
ε ∈ R we have θk(ω + εω̂) = θk(ω) + εθk(ω̂). It is the bilinearity of the Stieltjes integral
(f, g) ↦→ ∫
I
fdg that we use here. See for instance II.11.1 for the bilinearity of the RS
integral and VII.11.11-12 for that of the LS integral (both in [Hil63]). Even the rough
integral is bilinear, see for example Lemma 2.6 in [HW13] or Theorem 1 in [Gub04].
3.3.2 From cylinder functions to infinite representation
Recall the space of functions we want to work with:
D := {F : Ω→ R ∣∣ F (ω) = f ((θk(ω))k∈N) , f ∈ C∞(RN), (βk(ω))k∈N ∈ ℓ2} ,
where for k ∈ N
θk(ω) :=
∫
I
hk(t)dω(t) and βk(ω) := ∇kf ((θn(ω))n∈N) .
The assumption that the partial derivatives form a sequence in ℓ2 is natural in the con-
text of Malliavin calculus, see e.g. Theorem 1.5.2 or the corresponding observation
above Definition 2.2.1 in [Imk08].
4Throughout we use the symbol DγF (ω) to denote limε→0 1ε [F (ω + εγ)− F (ω)] if the latter should
exist.
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If the limit exists, then we can define for F ∈ D and γ ∈ H(I) the directional derivative
of F in ω in direction of γ:
DγF (ω) : = lim
ε→0
1
ε
[F (ω + εγ)− F (ω)]
=
∞∑
k=1
∇kf
((∫
I
hndω
)
n∈N
)∫
I
hkdγ
=
∞∑
k=1
βk(ω)〈hk, γ˙〉L2(I).
(3.3.2)
As (hk)k∈N form an ONB of L2(I), the sequence (〈hk, γ˙〉)k∈N lies in ℓ2. This can be seen
from Parseval’s identity, which states that if (hk)k∈N is an ONB of L2(I), then for all
f ∈ L2(I) one has ∑
k∈N
|〈f, hk〉|2 = ‖f‖2L2(I) .
Furthermore, by assumption βk(ω) = ∇kf ((θn(ω))n∈N)) (k ∈ N) defines a sequence in
ℓ2. This shows (using Lemma B.2.7), that the summands in (3.3.2) form a sequence in
ℓ1, i.e., the series converges (absolutely). We can summarize these thoughts as follows:
Theorem 3.3.2. Let F ∈ D with the above notation, fix ω ∈ Ω.
Then DγF (ω) = limε→0 1ε [F (ω + εγ)− F (ω)] is given by the absolutely convergent series∑∞
k=1 βk(ω)〈hk, γ˙〉L2(I).
3.3.3 Dependence on the ONB chosen
We defined DγF (ω) for a given ω ∈ Ω and a fixed ONB of H = L2(I). One may wonder
whether the object we defined is basis-independent.5
Let (gk)k∈N and (hk)k∈N be two different orthonormal bases of L2(I) such that θ
g
k(ω) and
θhk(ω) exist. With these fixed, assume that F (ω) has the representations
F (ω) = fh
(∫
I
h1(t)dω(t), . . . ,
∫
I
hn(t)dω(t)
)
= f g
(∫
I
g1(t)dω(t), . . . ,
∫
I
gm(t)dω(t)
)
for two possibly different numbers n,m ∈ N and fh ∈ C∞b (Rn;R) and f g ∈ C∞b (Rm;R).
Assume further that the linear hulls of h1, . . . , hn and g1, . . . , gm are identical. Then we
have hi =
∑m
j=1〈hi, gj〉gj for i = 1, . . . , n. Define the matrix
M := (〈hi, gj〉)1≤i≤n,1≤j≤m .
With this we see that fh ◦M = f g, hence with the notation θhk(ω) :=
∫
I
hk(t)dω(t) and
θgk(ω) :=
∫
I
gk(t)dω(t) for k ∈ N we find that
5We give the arguments as they are presented on page 42 in [Imk08] for completeness of the exposi-
tion and add remarks concerning the finiteness of the representation.
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m∑
j=1
∇jf g(θg1(ω), . . . , θgm(ω))gj =
m∑
j=1
∇j(fh ◦M)(θg1(ω), . . . , θgm(ω))gj
=
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
∇ifh(θh1 (ω), . . . , θhn(ω))〈hi, gj〉gj
=
n∑
i=1
∇ifh(θh1 (ω), . . . , θhn(ω))hi.
If we only assume that F has finite representation w.r.t. (hk)k∈N, then there is no reason
to assume that its representation w.r.t. another ONB (gk)k∈N will also be finite. Instead,
we have the following result.
Lemma 3.3.3. Let (gk)k∈N and (hk)k∈N be two different orthonormal bases of L2(I). Let
F ∈ S with representation F (ω) = fh(θh1 (ω), . . . , θhn(ω)) for ω ∈ Ω fixed. Then one can
find f g ∈ C∞b (RN;R) such that F has the representation F (ω) = f g((θgk(ω))k∈N).
Proof. As hi ∈ L2(I) and (gj)j∈N is an ONB of L2(I), we can write hi =
∑
j∈N〈hi, gj〉gj.
Hence
θhi (ω) =
∫
I
hi(s)dω(s) =
∫
I
∑
j∈N
〈hi, gj〉gj(s)dω(s) =
∑
j∈N
〈hi, gj〉θgj (ω),
where we exchange summation and integration, because by Bessel’s inequality we have∑
j∈N |〈hi, gj〉|2 ≤ ‖hi‖2L2(I) = 1, where the last equality is due to (hi)i∈N being an ONB
of L2(I). Thus f g is given by
f g
(
(θgj )j∈N
)
= fh
(∑
j∈N
〈h1, gj〉θgj , . . . ,
∑
j∈N
〈hn, gj〉θgj
)
,
i.e., f g = fh ◦M if we denote byM the n×∞matrix with the entriesMij = 〈hi, gj〉.
3.3.4 Connection to the Malliavin Derivative
Functions F ∈ S with representation F (ω) = f(θ1(ω), . . . , θn(ω)) have the Malliavin
derivative DF (t, ω) =
∑n
k=1∇kf (θ1(ω), . . . , θn(ω))hk(t), see for example Definition 4.9
in [Øk97] or Definition 1.2.1 in [Nua06] or cf. Appendix A.2. From the above we can
see that the directional derivative can be rewritten as
DγF (ω) =
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) = 〈DF (·, ω), γ˙〉L2(I). (3.3.3)
The same representation holds for F ∈ D if and only if the infinite summation and
integration can be exchanged. Øksendal [Øk97] introduces two different spaces of
Malliavin differentiable functions, D1,2 and D1,2, where the latter is defined roughly
as those functions whose directional derivatives have the representation as an integral
(3.3.3) for all directions γ ∈ H(I).
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Theorem 3.3.4. For F ∈ D, DF (·, ω) is LS integrable against γ ∈ H(I) on I if and only
if t ↦→ DF (t, ω)γ˙(t) belongs to L1(I). Sufficient for this is DF (·, ω) ∈ L2(I).
Proof. It suffices to recall that by definition, if γ ∈ H, then γ˙ ∈ L2(I). The claim then
follows with Hölder’s inequality.
Theorem 3.3.5. If F ∈ D such that for a given ω ∈ Ω, DF (·, ω) ∈ L2(I) and ψ(t, ω) :=∑∞
k=1 |∇kf ((θj(ω))j∈N)hk(t)γ˙(t)| ∈ L1(I), then DγF (ω) =
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) for γ ∈ H.
Proof. Fix ω ∈ Ω. From Theorem 3.3.4 we know that under the assumptions made,
DF (t, ω)γ˙(t) ∈ L1(I). For n ∈ N let φn(t, ω) :=
∑n
k=1∇kf ((θj(ω))j∈N)hk(t)γ˙(t). Then
(φn)n∈N is dominated by ψ, which allows us to apply Lebesgue’s theorem of dominated
convergence and thus obtain the desired result.
It is clear that by allowing more general directions than only Cameron-Martin functions,
the space of functions possessing the directional derivatives must become smaller. Our
main focus is therefore not on extending Malliavin differentiability, but on defining the
directional derivative and finding sufficient conditions for the first equality of (3.3.3) to
hold.
3.4 Varying paths with Hölder continuous functions
In this section we extend the previous analysis to directional derivatives for directions
γ that are assumed to be α-Hölder continuous functions (we write γ ∈ Cα(I)) for some
α > 0. This is a true extension of directions in the Cameron-Martin space H(I) because
one has the following result:
Lemma 3.4.1. If f ∈ H(I), then f ∈ C1/2(I).
Proof. Without loss of generality assume x > y for x, y ∈ I. Then
|f(x)− f(y)| =
∣∣∣∣∫ x
0
f˙(t)dt−
∫ y
0
f˙(t)dt
∣∣∣∣
≤
(∫ x
y
|f˙(t)|2dt
)1/2
·
(∫ x
y
1dt
)1/2
(Cauchy-Schwarz inequality)
≤
∥∥∥f˙∥∥∥
L2(I)
· |x− y|1/2
and
∥∥∥f˙∥∥∥
L2(I)
<∞ because f(x) = ∫ x
0
f˙(t)dt with f˙ ∈ L2(I).
We will make extensive use of Ciesielski’s isomorphism [Cie60], which we recall here
for completeness of the exposition.
Remark 3.4.2. In this section we want to work with integrals of the structure
∫
I
f(t)dg(t)
where g ∈ Cα(I). Let g˜ : I → R be defined as g˜(t) := g(t)− g(0). Let
Cα0 (I) := {γ ∈ Cα(I) | γ(0) = 0} .
Then we obviously have g˜ ∈ Cα0 (I) and, more importantly,
∫
I
f(t)dg(t) =
∫
I
f(t)dg˜(t).
Hence in what fallows it is without loss of generality that we restrict our analysis to inte-
grators belonging to Cα0 (I).
98
3.4.1 Haar-Schauder basis and Ciesielski’s isomorphism
As we have seen in Section 3.3.3, up to a certain degree our results do not depend on
the basis chosen for the representation of functions in S resp. D. Henceforth, we will fix
the Haar functions as basis of L2(I), which are defined as follows (originally introduced
by Haar in his dissertation, cf. [Haa10]):
Definition 3.4.3 (Haar functions). Let H00(t) ≡ 1 for t ∈ I and for p ∈ N0 and 1 ≤ m ≤
2p define the points
t0pm :=
m− 1
2p
, t1pm :=
2m− 1
2p+1
, t2pm :=
m
2p
and the functions on I given by
Hpm(t) :=

√
2p : t0pm < t < t
1
pm,
−√2p : t1pm < t < t2pm,√
2p
2
: t = t0pm ̸= 0,
−
√
2p
2
: t = t2pm ̸= 1,√
2p : t = t0pm = 0,
−√2p : t = t2pm = 1,
0 : else.
t0pm
if t0pm = 0
t1pm
t2pm
−√2p
√
2p
if t2pm = 1
Figure 3.1: Haar function for p ∈ N0,m ∈ {1, . . . , 2p}
The shape of the Haar functions with the precise jumps can be seen in Figure 3.1.
As long as one considers them as L2-functions, values at the endpoints of intervals do
not matter, hence one can replace that one by the somewhat handier definition that
appears for instance in [GIP16]:
Definition 3.4.4 (Haar functions – a version). For p ∈ N0 and 1 ≤ m ≤ 2p, t ∈ I define
H˜pm(t) =
√
2p
[
1[t0pm,t
1
pm)
(t)− 1[t1pm,t2pm)(t)
]
, where
t0pm =
m− 1
2p
, t1pm =
2m− 1
2p+1
, t2pm =
m
2p
and further let H˜00(t) ≡ 1 for t ∈ I.
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Notation 3.4.5. Let Λ := {(p,m) | p ∈ N0,m ∈ {1, . . . , 2p}} and Λ0 := {(0, 0)} ∪Λ. With
this we introduce for a sequence (Apm)(p,m)∈Λ0 the series∑
(p,m)∈Λ
Apm :=
∞∑
p=0
2p∑
m=1
Apm and
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
Apm := A00 +
∞∑
p=0
2p∑
m=1
Apm.
Remark 3.4.6 (Different versions of the definition). There exist different versions of def-
initions of Haar functions in the literature, two of which have been presented above. Al-
fred Haar introduced his functions originally in such a way that the Fourier series asso-
ciated to a continuous function converges uniformly to that function6, i.e., for f ∈ C(I)
and coefficients apm :=
∫
I
f(t)Hpm(t)dt for (p,m) ∈ Λ0, one has uniform convergence of∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 apmHpm to f . It was remarked in [Ul’64] that the definition of Haar functions
given in [KS51] results in a loss of this property. [KS51] defined Haar functions as follows:
HKSpm (t) =
√
2p
[
1[t0pm,t
1
pm)
(t)− 1(t1pm,t2pm](t)
]
and HKS00 ≡ 1. (3.4.1)
In [Ul’64, page 3] the following counterexample shows that the slightly changed definition
results in a loss of the uniform convergence property stated by Haar. One may evaluate the
Fourier series of the function
f(t) =
{
1 : 0 ≤ t ≤ 3
4
,
25− 32t : 3
4
< t ≤ 1
at t = 1
2
, which yields 2, while f(1
2
) = 1. The same problem arises with Definition 3.4.4
when evaluating f and its Fourier series at t = 1. In fact, any function f ∈ C(I) with
f(1) ̸= ∫
I
f(t)dt is a valid counterexample for showing that the Haar functions from Def-
inition 3.4.4 don’t have the uniform convergence property. This highlights that whenever
results are based on a pointwise evaluation of Haar functions, endpoints do matter.
The following functions, which go back to Faber [Fab10] and Schauder7 [Sch27], allow
us to write any continuous function as linear combination of basis functions. While
Haar functions are discontinuous and finite linear combinations thereof cannot yield a
continuous function, Faber-Schauder functions are already continuous. The following
definition is independent of the chosen definition of the Haar functions, i.e., the choice
of the values at the endpoints is irrelevant.
Definition 3.4.7 (Faber-Schauder functions on I). For t ∈ I define G00(t) := t and
Gpm(t) :=
∫ t
0
Hpm(s)ds =

√
2p(t− t0pm), t ∈ [t0pm, t1pm)√
2p(t2pm − t), t ∈ [t1pm, t2pm)
0, otherwise
for (p,m) ∈ Λ.
Following [Cie59] and [GIP16] we shall call these functions simply Schauder functions.
For any continuous function f ∈ C(I) write
fpm := 〈Hpm, df〉 :=
√
2p
[
2f(t1pm)− f(t0pm)− f(t2pm)
]
, for (p,m) ∈ Λ
6This result is cited in the Appendix as Theorem B.2.1 for later reference.
7Schauder describes his functions with a different normalization s.t. the functions’ highest value is 1
for any (p,m) ∈ Λ0.
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and additionally f00 := 〈H00, df〉 = f(1) − f(0). For a more convenient presentation of
Ciesielski’s isomorphism, we furthermore introduce the rescaled functions
ξ(α)pm(t) :=
2(p+1)α
2
√
2p
Hpm(t), φ
(α)
pm(t) :=
2
√
2p
2(p+1)α
Gpm(t), for (p,m) ∈ Λ,
and
ξ
(α)
00 (t) ≡ 1 , and φ(α)00 (t) := t
for t ∈ I and α ∈ (0, 1). The sequence (φ(α)pm)(p,m)∈Λ0 is normalized such that
∣∣∣φ(α)pm∣∣∣
α
= 1.
With this we recall from [Cie60]8:
Theorem 3.4.8. For α ∈ (0, 1) the following is an isomorphism:
Tα :
{
(ℓ∞, ‖·‖ℓ∞) −→ (Cα0 (I), |·|α)
(ξpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ↦−→ x :=
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 ξpmφ
(α)
pm,
T−1α :
(C
α
0 (I), |·|α) −→ (ℓ∞, ‖·‖ℓ∞)
x ↦−→
(
ξpm :=
∫ 1
0
ξ
(α)
pm(s)dx(s)
)
(p,m)∈Λ0
.
Moreover, the operator norms satisfy
2
3(2α − 1)(21−α − 1) ≤ ‖Tα‖ ≤
2
(2α − 1)(21−α − 1) ,
∥∥T−1α ∥∥ = 1. (3.4.2)
Note that we can write γ ∈ Cα0 (I) in two ways:
γ =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
γ˜(α)pmφ
(α)
pm =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
γpmGpm, (3.4.3)
where for (p,m) ∈ Λ0
γ˜(α)pm = c
(α)
pm · γpm if we let c(α)pm :=
{
2p(α−
1
2
)+α−1 , (p,m) ∈ Λ,
1 , (p,m) = (0, 0).
(3.4.4)
What exactly do we know about (γpm)(p,m)∈Λ0?
Observe that c(α)pm > 0 for all (p,m) ∈ Λ0 and α ∈ (0, 1) and that ∂c
(α)
pm
∂α
= (p+1) · ln 2 · c(α)pm.
Furthermore, ∂c
(α)
pm
∂p
= (α− 1
2
) · ln 2 · c(α)pm, hence
∂c
(α)
pm
∂p

< 0 if α < 1
2
,
= 0 if α = 1
2
,
> 0 if α > 1
2
.
This observation allows us to formulate the following result.
Lemma 3.4.9. With the above notation, in particular (3.4.3) and (3.4.4), we have
8This result does not require a pointwise evaluation of Haar functions.
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(a) (γ˜(1/2)pm )(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ∞ ⇐⇒ (γpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ∞;
(b) for α ∈ (0, 1
2
)
, (γpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ∞ implies (γ˜
(α)
pm )(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ∞;
(c) for α ∈ (1
2
, 1
)
, (γ˜(α)pm )(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ∞ implies (γpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ∞.
We can also directly state two further results.
Lemma 3.4.10 ([Imk15, Lemma 1.1]). A continuous function f : I → R lies in Cα0 (I) if
and only if sup(p,m)∈Λ0 2
p(α− 1
2
) |fpm| <∞, i.e., if
(
2p(α−
1
2
)fpm
)
(p,m)∈Λ0
∈ ℓ∞.
Lemma 3.4.11. Let α ∈ (0, 1
2
) and γ ∈ Cα0 (I). Let (βpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 be a sequence with values
in R1. Further assume that (
βpm
c
(α)
pm
)
∈ ℓ1.
Then
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpmγpm converges unconditionally
9 (in R1).
Proof. By [Cie60], γ ∈ Cα implies that γ˜(α)pm = c(α)pmγpm is a bounded sequence. Apply
Lemma B.2.6 to attain the result.
We conclude this subsection by presenting an example that demonstrates the applica-
bility of Ciesielski’s isomorphism.
Example 3.4.12. For any α ∈ (0, 1), f(t) := tα is in Cβ(I) for any 0 < β ≤ α, but not for
any β > α. Observe that for α < 1
2
, γ /∈ H, because γ˙ /∈ L2(I):
‖γ˙‖2L2(I) =
∫ 1
0
(γ˙(t))2dt =
∫ 1
0
(
αtα−1
)2
dt =
{
α2
2α−1 , α >
1
2
∞, α ≤ 1
2
.
By Ciesielski, f(t) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 fpmGpm(t) for fpm =
∫ 1
0
Hpm(t)df(t). In this particular
case we calculate that for (p,m) ∈ Λ
fpm =
√
2p
[
2f(t1pm)− f(t0pm)− f(t2pm)
]
= 2p/2−(p+1)α [2(2m− 1)α − (2m− 2)α − (2m)α]
=: 2p/2−(p+1)αM(m,α).
It can be shown that fpm ≥ 0 for (p,m) ∈ Λ0 and that it decreases as p and/or m increase.
For more details, see Lemma B.3.1.
In the notation from Ciesielski’s isomorphism, f =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 ξpmφ
(β)
pm, where the coefficients
(ξpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 are in ℓ
∞ if and only if f ∈ Cβ0 (I). They can then be calculated as
ξpm =
2(p+1)β
2
√
2p
∫ 1
0
Hpm(t)df(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
fpm
=
2(p+1)β
2
√
2p
·
√
2p
2(p+1)α
M(m,α) = 2(p+1)(β−α) · 1
2
M(m,α).
Now 1
2
M(m,α) is bounded from above by e.g. M(1, α) = 2−2α. The factor with p is either
bounded by 1 if β ≤ α or unbounded if β > α, hence indeed the sequence (ξpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 is
in ℓ∞ if and only if β ≤ α, which is exactly the Hölder regularity of f(t) = tα on I = [0, 1].
9See Definition B.2.5 in the Appendix.
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3.4.2 Analysis of the directional derivative in Hölder directions
Throughout the rest of this section we assume that γ ∈ Cα0 (I) with α ∈ (0, 1) with
Schauder expansion γ(t) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 γpmGpm(t) for t ∈ I. Ciesielski’s isomorphism
will help us by providing properties of (γpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 depending on the parameter α. As
in the previous section we start again with cylinder functions for which we define the
derivative in direction γ and then extend this to functions with infinite representation,
i.e. F ∈ D.
Notation 3.4.13. For N ∈ N write ΛN := {(p,m) | p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} ,m ∈ {1, . . . , 2p}}
and ΛN0 := {(0, 0)} ∪ ΛN .
With the above notation and θpm(ω) :=
∫
I
Hpm(t)dω(t) for (p,m) ∈ Λ0, let us consider
F ∈ S with representation F (ω) = f
(
(θpm(ω))(p,m)∈ΛN0
)
.
We want to write, starting with the same arguments as in (3.3.1),
DγF (ω) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
[F (ω + εγ)− F (ω)]
=
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
∇pmf
(
(θpm(ω))(p,m)∈ΛN0
)
〈Hpm, dγ〉
=
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
∇pmf
(
(θpm(ω))(p,m)∈ΛN0
)
γpm,
(3.4.5)
where the first equality holds due to the assumptions on f . To see that the second
equality holds, recall that [Cie59, Theorem 3] yields the following:
Proposition 3.4.14. If γ =
∑
(q,n)∈ΛN0 γqnGqn, then the coefficients γpm are explicitly given
by γpm = 〈Hpm, dγ〉 for (p,m) ∈ ΛN0 .
As before, we can write DγF (ω) = 〈DF (·, ω), dγ〉 with Malliavin derivative
DF (t, ω) =
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
∇pmf
(
(θqn(ω))(q,n)∈ΛN0
)
Hpm(t).
In what follows, the Malliavin derivative of F ∈ D is given by
DF (t, ω) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
∇pmf
(
(θqn(ω))(q,n)∈Λ0
)
Hpm(t),
provided the series converges for fixed ω ∈ Ω for all t ∈ I.
3.4.3 Variation of functions in D in Hölder directions
Fix ω ∈ Ω and let F ∈ D with representation F (ω) = f ((θpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0). For brevity
of notation, let βpm(ω) := ∇pmf
(
(θqn(ω))(q,n)∈Λ0
)
for (p,m) ∈ Λ0. As before, we are
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interested in the directional derivative, which, if it exists, has the structure
DγF (ω) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
[F (ω + εγ)− F (ω)]
= lim
N→∞
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
βpm(ω)
∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t)
= lim
N→∞
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
βpm(ω)γpm, (3.4.6)
and may or may not be equal to the expression
〈DF (·, ω), dγ〉 =
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) =
∫
I
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
βpm(ω)Hpm(t)dγ(t).
Our main goal is to establish the existence of DγF , which requires the existence of∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t) and the convergence of the series (3.4.6), which is the candidate for
DγF . In addition, we also ask whether, provided DF (t, ω) exists for all t ∈ I, the
integral
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) exists and whether it equals DγF (ω). We proceed as follows:
Step 1: Find conditions for the convergence of
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0 βpm(ω)γpm as N →∞.
Step 2: Find conditions such that the integral
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) is well defined provided
DF (t, ω) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)Hpm(t).
Step 3: Find conditions such that∫
I
lim
N→∞
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
βpmHpm(t)dγ(t) = lim
N→∞
∫
I
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
βpmHpm(t)dγ(t).
Step 1 – The directional derivative
Theorem 3.4.15. Fix ω ∈ Ω and let F (ω) = f((θpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0) ∈ D with βpm(ω) :=
∇pmf((θqn(ω))(q,n)∈Λ0) for (p,m) ∈ Λ0. For some α ∈ (0, 1) let γ ∈ Cα0 (I) with Schauder
representation γ(t) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 γpmGpm(t). Assume that(
2p(
1
2
−α)βpm(ω)
)
(p,m)∈Λ0
∈ ℓ1.
Then
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)γpm converges absolutely and its limit is DγF (ω).
Proof. Theorem 3.4.8 tells us that for γ ∈ Cα0 (I)with the given Schauder representation,
γ
(α)
pm := 2
(p+1)α
2
√
2p
γpm ∈ ℓ∞ where γpm =
∫ 1
0
Hpm(t)dγ(t). Thus,
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
βpm(ω)γpm =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
βpm(ω)
21+
p
2
2(p+1)α
γ(α)pm = 2
1−α ∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
2p(
1
2
−α)βpm(ω)γ(α)pm .
With Lemma B.2.7 and the assumptions made, the series converges absolutely.
The second point in the proof allows us to find a condition that guarantees that F
possesses directional derivatives in ω for α-Hölder continuous directions for any α > 0.
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Corollary 3.4.16. Let ω ∈ Ω be such that (2p/2βpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1. Then DγF (ω) exists
for all γ ∈ Cα(I), where α can be arbitrarily chosen in (0, 1).
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 3.4.15, because (2−pα)p∈N is a null sequence
for any α ∈ (0, 1).
Let us briefly explain the difference between the above condition on f and the require-
ments on f for belonging to a Besov space.
Besov spaces appear in the literature with different definitions depending on the con-
text. In [Roy93] one can find the representation for α > 1/p given by
Bαp,q :=
{
f : [0, 1]→ R
∣∣∣ ‖f‖α,p,q <∞} where
‖f‖α,p,q is equivalent to
∑
j
2−jq(1/2−α+1/p)
 2j∑
k=1
|fjk|p
q/p

1/q
if fjk =
∫
I
Hjk(t)df(t) = 2
j/2
[
2f(t1jk)− f(t0jk)− f(t2jk)
]
. One can observe that while
Besov spaces are concerned with the sequence given by the coefficients from the Haar-
Schauder representation (f =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 fpmGpm), we search for properties of the se-
quence given by the (infinitely many) partial derivatives of f .
Step 2 – Integrability of DF
The result we want to show is that if γ ∈ Cα0 (I) and if DF has finite q-variation for
q < 1
1−α , then
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) is a well-defined integral in Young’s setting.10 To make
this rigorous, we first recall details from the Young integral:
In [You36] the conditions for the existence of the RS integral
∫
I
f(t)dg(t) are extended
from g being continuous and f of bounded variation11 to both being of finite p- and
q-variation, respectively, with 1
p
+ 1
q
> 1 and having no common discontinuities. In par-
ticular neither f nor g is required to be continuous. In later works (e.g. [GIP16]) slightly
stricter requirements were made, i.e., f and g are supposed to be α- and β-Hölder con-
tinuous, respectively, for α + β > 1. Our integrand DF (t, ω) =
∑
βpm(ω)Hpm(t) is
by nature not necessarily continuous, but instead for F ∈ S it has a finite and for
F ∈ D at most a countable number of jumps. If DF has finite p-variation and if γ
is α-Hölder-continuous, we can assure that integrand and integrator have no common
discontinuities and that the (Young)-Stieltjes integral exists, provided α + 1
p
> 1.
For a link between the spaces Cα(I) and Vp(I) we refer to Theorem B.2.12 and its
discussion. More results on p-variation and the corresponding spaces can be found in
Appendix B.2.4.
Example 3.4.17. Let α, β > 0 and define functions f(t) = tα and g(t) = tβ for t ∈ I,
which are in Cα0 (I) and C
β
0 (I), respectively. Then
∫
I
f(t)dg(t) =
∫
I
f(t)g˙(t)dt = β
α+β
exists
even if α + β is not strictly bigger than 1. This is not surprising, as f, g ∈ BV (I) ∩ C0(I)
10Under these conditions, α + 1q > 1 and as long as integrand or integrator is continuous, there is no
problem with points of discontinuity.
11We use the terms finite (p-)variation and bounded (p-)variation synonymously.
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and it is known that if one function is continuous and the other of bounded variation, the
corresponding (Riemann-)Stieltjes integral exists. This example illustrates that the Hölder
condition is indeed strictly stronger than p-variation combined with continuity.
Recall that Vq(f) denotes the q-variation of f on our fixed interval I = [0, 1]. Then by
lower semi-continuity of the q-variation (see Lemma B.2.11),
Vq(DF ) ≤ lim inf
N→∞
Vq(DFN) for DFN :=
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
βpmHpm.
First we derive conditions which guarantee that DF has finite q-variation. To this end,
observe that each summand βpmHpm adds at most (2 + 2q) · 2 pq2
∣∣βqpm∣∣ to the q-variation,
hence
Vq(DF ) ≤
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
(2 + 2q) · 2 pq2 ∣∣βqpm∣∣ .
If the above expression is finite, DF has finite q-variation. A sufficient condition is that
the sequence
(
2p/2βpm
)
(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓq, which is a weaker condition than for that sequence
to be in ℓ1.
Theorem 3.4.18. Let α ∈ (0, 1). Fix ω ∈ Ω, take F (ω) = f((θpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0) and
set βpm(ω) := ∇pmf((θqn(ω))(q,n)∈Λ0). Further, let γ ∈ Cα0 (I) with Schauder represen-
tation γ(t) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 γpmGpm(t). Assume that the sequence (2
p/2 |βpm|)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓq
for q < 1
1−α . Then DF (·, ω) has finite q-variation and
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) is well defined,
i.e., DF (·, ω) is Stieltjes integrable on I w.r.t. γ.
Proof. If for given ω ∈ Ω, DF (·, ω) has finite q-variation and γ ∈ Cα(I) for α + 1
q
> 1
(or equivalently q < 1
1−α), then [You36] (Theorem on Stieltjes integrability) states that
the integral
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) is well defined. The calculations preceeding the theorem
show that under the assumptions made, indeed DF (·, ω) ∈ Vq(I), hence the proof is
complete.
Step 3 – Is 〈DF, dγ〉 = DγF?
We work under the assumptions made in the previous steps, i.e., for fixed ω ∈ Ω the
sequence of coefficients (βpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0 associated to F must lie in the set
ℓ∗(α) :=

(βpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ2
∣∣ (2( 12−α)pβpm)
(p,m)∈Λ0
∈ ℓ1 and
∃ q < 1
1− α s.t.
(
2
p
2βpm
)
(p,m)∈Λ0
∈ ℓq
 . (3.4.7)
These conditions guarantee that DγF (ω) exists and that DF (·, ω) is integrable on I
w.r.t. γ. Our task is to find sufficient conditions that allow us to exchange the given
Stieltjes integral with infinite summation.
Application of dominated convergence
Fix γ ∈ Cα0 (I) and ω ∈ Ω and let ϕN(t, ω) :=
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0 βpm(ω)Hpm(t). Clearly ϕN ∈L(γ), because ϕN has only a finite number of jumps and is otherwise constant (w.r.t. t).
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ϕN converges to DF (·, ω) uniformly on I (Corollary B.2.9) and ϕN(·, ω) is uniformly
dominated by ψ(t, ω) :=
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 |βpm(ω)Hpm(t)|. From previous theorems we know
that, provided (βpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 lies in the set ℓ
∗(α) described in (3.4.7), DF ∈ Vq(I), hence
the inequality Vq(ψ(·, ω)) ≤ Vq(DF (·, ω)) tells us that ψ ∈ Vq(I) ⊂ R(γ) ⊂ L(γ).
Theorem 3.4.19. Fix ω ∈ Ω. Let F ∈ D be represented by f as before. For α ∈ (0, 1) let
γ ∈ Cα0 (I). Assume that the sequence (βpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ∗(α). Then DF (·, ω) ∈ R(γ) ⊂
L(γ) and
〈DF, dγ〉 =
∫
I
lim
N→∞
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
βpmHpm(t)dγ(t) = lim
N→∞
∫
I
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
βpmHpm(t)dγ(t) = DγF.
Example 3.4.20. Let γ : I → R be given by γ(t) = tα for α ∈ (0, 1). From Example 3.4.12
we know that γ ∈ Cα0 (I).
Let F (ω) =
∑∞
p=0 apθp1(ω) where the sequence (ap)p∈N0 shall be given by ap =
1
2p
, p ∈ N0.
In our previous notation we have
βpm =
{
1
2p
, p ∈ N0,m = 1,
0 , else.
We want to show that Theorem 3.4.19 can be applied to these data and we explicitly
calculate 〈DF, dγ〉 and DγF .
We clearly have F ∈ D, hence we know that DF (t, ω) = ∑(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)Hpm(t), which
is independent of ω by construction. We further calculate
2
p
2βpm =
{
2−
p
2 , p ∈ N0,m = 1,
0 , else,
thus ∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
∣∣∣2 p2βpm∣∣∣ = ∞∑
p=0
2−
p
2 =
∞∑
p=0
(
1√
2
)p
=
1
1− 1√
2
<∞.
We conclude that (2p/2βpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1 and we recall that γ ∈ Cα0 (I); with these results in
mind we can apply Theorem 3.4.19. Let us quickly verify that indeed 〈DF, dγ〉 = DγF by
calculating both terms. By definition we have
DγF =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
βpm
∫ 1
0
Hpm(t)dγ(t) =
∞∑
p=0
apγp1,
where
γp1 =
∫ 1
0
Hp1(t)dγ(t) =
√
2p
[∫ t1p1
t0p1
dγ(t)−
∫ t2p1
t1p1
dγ(t)
]
=
√
2p
[
2
(
2− 1
2p+1
)α
−
(
2− 2
2p+1
)α
−
(
2− 0
2p+1
)α]
=
√
2p
2α(p+1)
[2 · 1− 0− 2α] = 2−α (2− 2α) · 2( 12−α)p.
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With this we can calculate
DγF =
∞∑
p=0
2−p · 2−α (2− 2α) · 2( 12−α)p = 2−α (2− 2α)
∞∑
p=0
(
1
2α+
1
2
)p
=
2
1
2 (2− 2α)
2α+
1
2 − 1 .
For the scalar product, first observe that DF (1) = −1 and for t ∈ [0, 1),
DF (t) =
∞∑
p=0
2−
p
2
[
1[0, 1
2p+1
)(t)− 1( 1
2p+1
, 2
2p+1
)(t)−
1
2
1{ 2
2p+1
}(t)
]
,
hence by dividing the interval I into dyadic intervals and elementary calculus we obtain
〈DF, dγ〉 =
∫
I
DF (t)dγ(t)
=
∞∑
p=0
∫ 1
2p
1
2p+1
((
p−1∑
q=0
2−
q
2
)
− 2− p2
)
dγ(t)
=
∞∑
p=0
[(
1
2α
)p
−
(
1
2α
)p+1]
·
[
1− 2− p2
1− 2− 12 −
1
2−
p
2
]
= −1 +
∞∑
p=0
(
1
2α
)p+1(
(−1) ·
[
1− 2− p2
1− 2− 12 −
1
2−
p
2
]
+
[
1− 2− p+12
1− 2− 12 −
1
2−
p+1
2
])
= −1 + 4− 2
1
2
2α+1
∞∑
p=0
(
1
2α+
1
2
)p
=
2
3
2 − 2α+ 12
2α+
1
2 − 1 ,
which indeed equals DγF .
Remark 3.4.21. If one replaces ap by a˜p := 2−
p
2 for p ∈ N0, then the theorem cannot
be applied, DF (t) is unbounded as t → 0 and by analogous calculations as in the above
example, one can verify that DγF ̸= 〈DF, dγ〉 even though both terms are finite.
3.4.4 Rough and paracontrolled integrals
Compared to the whole history of integration, there has been a rather recent develop-
ment beyond YS integration, namely rough integration. The motivation (or at least one
out of several) was given by the desire to have integrals of the type
∫
F (W )dW for a
Brownian Motion W , whose paths have only Hölder regularity α < 1
2
. Its applicability
to our setting seems to be limited by the discontinuity of the integrand Hpm. There exist
results12 stating under which conditions on (βpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 the series
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpmHpm(t)
converges to a continuous function, but due to the complexity of both those conditions
and the techniques of rough integration we decided to leave a thorough analysis into
12The survey paper [Gol73] presents an impressive number of results on Haar series of the structure∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 bpmHpm(t) ranging from convergence theorems for Haar series to the question of whether
functions can be approximated by Haar series.
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this direction for future research. Very likely, some kind of control of the (βpm)(p,m)∈Λ0
by the coefficients (γpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 will be required for applicability of results of the type
from [GIP15].
Remark 3.4.22. If we were to define
∫
I
DF (t)dγ(t) analogously to [GIP16] as∫
I
DF (t)dγ(t) :=
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
∑
(q,n)∈Λ0
βpmγqn
∫
I
Hpm(t)dGqn(t) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
βpmγpm,
then by construction we would have DγF =
∫
I
DF (t, ·)dγ(t). Already for γ ∈ H(I) we
have seen that this property does not hold in general, hence such a definition would give
different results than the ones we obtained above. In particular, a restriction to γ ∈ H(I)
would yield, in the notation of [Øk97], D1,2 = D1,2.
3.5 Varying paths with continuous functions
In this Section it is a standing assumption that γ ∈ C0(I), i.e. the space of continuous
functions on I vanishing in zero, with representation γ(t) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 γpmGpm(t), t ∈ I.
3.5.1 Extensibility of Ciesielski’s isomorphism
The proof of Theorem 3.4.8 cannot be directly extended (by letting α→ 0 in the proof)
to establish an isomorphism between ℓ∞ and C0(I), because the bounds for the operator
norm (3.4.2) become infinite as we let α get arbitrarily close to 0.
We recall that, by [Cie59, Theorem 3], any continuous function x ∈ C(I) for I = [0, 1]
has a Schauder representation
x(t) = x(0) +
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
[∫
I
Hpm(s)dx(s)
]
Gpm(t),
but this representation is of little help unless the coefficients (
∫
I
Hpm(s)dx(s))(p,m)∈Λ0
can be shown to belong to a nice sequence space. To illustrate that one can have a nice
representation with bounded coefficients, we give the following example.
Example 3.5.1. The function γ : [0, 1] → R, given by γ(0) := 0 and γ(t) := 1
ln(t/2)
for
t ∈ (0, 1], is (uniformly) continuous, but not Hölder continuous of any order α > 0. We
can verify this by verifying the (un-)boundedness of the sequence
ξ(α)pm :=
∫ 1
0
2(p+1)α
2 · √2pHpm(t)dγ(t), (p,m) ∈ Λ0.
To see that this sequence does not belong to ℓ∞ for any positive α, we consider the subse-
quence with m = 1: ∣∣∣ξ(α)p1 ∣∣∣ = 2(p+1)α2 ∣∣2γ(t1p1)− γ(t0p1)− γ(t2p1)∣∣
=
2(p+1)α
2
∣∣∣∣ 2ln( 1
2p+2
)
− 1
ln( 1
2p+1
)
∣∣∣∣
=
2(p+1)α · p
2 · ln(2) · (p+ 1)(p+ 2) ,
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which is unbounded for α > 0. For α = 0, however, the sequence
(
ξ
(α)
pm
)
(p,m)∈Λ0
is bounded:
∣∣∣ξ(0)00 ∣∣∣ = 12 |γ(1)− γ(0)| = 12 ln 2 ,∣∣ξ(0)pm∣∣ = 12 ∣∣2γ(t1pm)− γ(t0pm)− γ(t2pm)∣∣ ≤ 12 |4 · γ(1)| = 2ln 2 , (p,m) ∈ Λ.
This example motivates an analysis of the maps corresponding to Tα and T−1α from
Theorem 3.4.8 for α = 0. To make this precise, let us first define the functions
ξ(0)pm(t) :=
1
2
√
2p
Hpm(t), φ
(0)
pm(t) := 2
√
2pGpm(t), for (p,m) ∈ Λ, t ∈ I
and
ξ
(0)
00 (t) = ξ00(t) ≡ 1 and φ(0)00 (t) = φ00(t) = t, t ∈ I.
With these we can formulate a proposition.
Proposition 3.5.2. The following mapping defines a bounded linear operator:
T˜ :
(C0(I), ‖·‖∞) −→ (ℓ
∞, ‖·‖ℓ∞)
x ↦−→
(
ξpm :=
∫ 1
0
ξ
(0)
pm(t)dx(t)
)
(p,m)∈Λ0
.
Proof. Linearity of T˜ follows directly from the linearity of the integral with respect to
the integrator. The upper bound is given by
∥∥∥T˜∥∥∥ ≤ 2. To see this, calculate the absolute
values:
• |ξ00| = |
∫ 1
0
1dx(t)| ≤ |x(1)| + |x(0)| ≤ 2 ‖x‖∞;
• |ξpm| = |
∫ 1
0
ξ
(0)
pm(t)dx(t)| ≤ 12
∣∣2x(t1pm)− x(t0pm)− x(t2pm)∣∣ ≤ 12 · 4 · ‖x‖∞ ≤ 2 ‖x‖∞.
Hence
∥∥∥T˜ x∥∥∥
ℓ∞
≤ 2 ‖x‖∞, which proves the claim.
Remark 3.5.3. The proof can also be obtained from Lemma 2 in [Cie59], which states
that if ω2 denotes the second order modulus of continuity13 of x ∈ C0(I), and if bpm =∫
I
Hpm(t)dx(t) for (p,m) ∈ Λ0, then one has the estimate
sup
1≤m≤2p
|bpm| ≤
√
2pω2
(
1
2p
)
,
from which we can infer that
(
2−p/2bpm
)
(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ∞ by dividing by
√
2p and taking the
supremum over p ∈ N0, because for a continuous (and hence bounded) function x on I,
ω2 is bounded. In the above notation, ξpm = 2−(1+p/2)bpm, which proves the claim once the
term ξ00 is added to the analysis.
13For x ∈ C([0, 1]), [Cie59] defines ω2(δ) := sup
{
x(t1) + x(t2)− 2x( t1+t22 )
∣∣ t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1], |t1 − t2| ≤ δ}
for δ ∈ [0, 1].
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The candidate for the inverse of T˜ ,
T :
{
(ℓ∞, ‖·‖ℓ∞) −→ (C0(I), ‖·‖∞)
ξ := (ξpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ↦−→ x :=
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 ξpmφ
(0)
pm,
is not a bounded operator. It would be one, if its domain were ℓ1 instead of ℓ∞. To see
this, let x = Tξ for ξ ∈ ℓ1. Then we have for any t ∈ I
|x(t)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
ξpmφ
(0)
pm(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
∣∣∣2√2pξpmGpm(t1pm)∣∣∣
=
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
∣∣2p+1ξpm (t1pm − t0pm)∣∣ = ∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
|ξpm| = ‖ξ‖ℓ1 .
Thus, T would be bounded if its domain was ℓ1, but that is strictly smaller than ℓ∞. For
instance, the sequence ξ := (1, 1, . . .) ∈ ℓ∞ yields |(Tξ)(t)| = t + 2∑(p,m)∈Λ 2p/2Gpm(t).
Let tN :=
∑N
n=0(−1)n(1/2)n. Then
GN :=
∞∑
n=0
√
2nGn1(tN) =
N∑
n=0
√
2nGn1(tN), N ∈ N,
defines a strictly increasing and unbounded sequence (see Lemma B.3.2); therefore,
supN∈N |(Tξ)(tN)| =∞, which proves the unboundedness of the operator T .
3.5.2 Directional derivative and integrated Malliavin derivative
The candidate forDγF (ω) is
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)
∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t). As before, we have to ver-
ify that the integral is well defined and that the sum converges if F ∈ D\S. Furthermore
we are again interested in the link to the Malliavin derivative.
Thus we ask
1. whether the Stieltjes integral (R) ∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t) ((p,m) ∈ Λ0) is well defined for
a continuous, but not Hölder continuous γ;
2. whether the sum
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)
∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t) converges for fixed ω ∈ Ω — in
this case DγF (ω) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)
∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t);
3. whether DF (t, ω) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)Hpm(t) is Stieltjes integrable w.r.t. γ on I;
4. under which conditions ∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) = DγF (ω).
The first two questions give us the directional derivative; the third question is a non-
trivial extension of the first one asking whether DF is integrable against γ; the last
question discusses again whether DγF (ω) = 〈DF (·, ω), dγ〉.
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Denote by BV (I) the functions of bounded (1-)variation on I = [0, 1].
With Hpm ∈ BV (I) for (p,m) ∈ Λ0 we can immediately answer the first question in
the affirmative (combining Theorems B.1.5 and B.1.6). The other questions can be
answered in one go as follows:
Theorem 3.5.4. Fix ω ∈ Ω. Let F ∈ D be represented by f with ∇pmf ((θk(ω))k) =
βpm(ω). Assume that the sequence (2p/2βpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1. Let γ ∈ C0(I).
Then DγF (ω) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm
∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t) and DF ∈ R(γ) ⊂ L(γ), i.e., DγF and∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) are well defined. Furthermore, one has the equality
〈DF, dγ〉 =
∫
I
lim
N→∞
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
βpmHpm(t)dγ(t) = lim
N→∞
∫
I
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
βpmHpm(t)dγ(t) = DγF.
Proof. For (p,m) ∈ Λ0 let γpm :=
∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t). From Proposition 3.5.2 we know that
(2−p/2γpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ∞, hence, by Lemma B.2.7,
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)γpm converges abso-
lutely to DγF (ω). For proving the integrability of DF (·, ω) w.r.t. γ in Stieltjes sense we
follow our strategy from Section 3.4.3: By lower semi-continuity of the total variation
(see Lemma B.2.11),
V1(DF ) ≤ lim inf
N→∞
V1(DFN) for DFN(·, ω) :=
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
βpm(ω)Hpm(·).
Observe that each summand βpmHpm adds at most 4 · 2p/2 |βpm| to the 1-variation, hence
V1(DF ) ≤ 4
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
2p/2 |βpm| .
If the above expression is finite, DF (·, ω) has finite variation. A sufficient condition is
that the sequence
(
2p/2βpm(ω)
)
(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1, which is precisely what we assumed. With
this we know that 〈DF, dγ〉 = ∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) is also well defined (as RS integral and
hence also as LS integral). For exchanging integral and limit we want to apply the
dominated convergence theorem for LS integrals (see Theorem B.1.12). In this situa-
tion,
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0 βpm(ω)Hpm(·) is dominated by |DF (·, ω)|, which is, as we already saw,
integrable w.r.t. γ. By Corollary B.2.9, the series converges absolutely and uniformly to
DF (·, ω) on I as N →∞. Thus dominated convergence gives the desired result.
3.5.3 The path ahead
Throughout we worked with F : Ω → R where Ω = C(I) and the object of interest
was DγF (ω) := limε→0 1ε [F (ω + εγ)− F (ω)]. As long as γ belongs to some subset of
Ω, that definition makes perfect sense. While our paths ω ∈ Ω are still continuous, we
now want to perturb these paths in a discontinuous manner. Provided that the integrals
θpm(γ) =
∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t) have a meaning for γ /∈ C(I), there is nothing stopping us
from allowing such ω˜ as argument of F . Our ultimate goal will be to give a meaning to
DγF (ω) in such a way that will allow us to recover the vertical derivative from [Dup09]
and [CF13].
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3.6 Varying paths with discontinuous functions
Before we can look at the directional derivative, we first have to extend the domain
of our functional F beyond the continuous functions on I. To see what would be a
suitable domain, we must first state the type of integration we are considering. Only
then will we ask the same questions as before on existence of a well defined directional
derivative, integrability of the Malliavin derivative against the chosen direction and
when the directional derivative DγF has the representation 〈DF, dγ〉. It is clear that RS
integration is not suitable here, because it does not allow integrand and integrator to
have common points of discontinuity. Instead, we will consider the LS integral and the
generalized RS integral.
3.6.1 Generalized Riemann-Stieltjes integral
On page 194 in [McL80] one can find the following statement (adapted to our setting):
Lemma 3.6.1. Suppose f is a function of bounded variation on I. Then (G) ∫
I
f(t)dγ(t)
exists when γ is a regulated function.
The integration by parts formula holds, allowing to also define the integral for regulated
integrand and integrator with bounded variation; see Theorem B.1.7.
Haar functions are clearly functions of bounded variation, hence for any regulated func-
tion γ on I and for any (p,m) ∈ Λ0, the integral (G)
∫
I
Hpmdγ exists. For the directional
derivative DγF , which, if it exists equals
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm
∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t), we still need to
ensure the convergence of that series.
Furthermore, DF (·, ω), being the uniform limit (under conditions given in Corollary
B.2.9) of the step functions
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0 βpm(ω)Hpm(t) as N →∞, is certainly a regulated
function. Thus it is integrable against γ ∈ BV (I). If DF (·, ω) has bounded variation
(for which we have derived criteria in previous sections), then its integrability is given
for any regulated integrator γ.
Thus we can consider directional derivatives DγF (ω) for a fixed ω ∈ Ω and for γ being
a regulated function and the further analysis of the link to the Malliavin derivatives will
require either DF (·, ω) or γ to have bounded variation. In the following subsection we
present the different cases mentioned here in detail.
Varying paths with functions of bounded variation
If we consider functions on the extended domain BV (I) belonging to the space
DBV := {F : BV (I)→ R ∣∣ F (ω) = f ((θk(ω))k∈N) , f ∈ C∞(RN), (βk(ω))k∈N ∈ ℓ2} ,
then we can define the directional derivative for fixed ω ∈ Ω and γ ∈ BV (I),
DγF (ω) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
[F (ω + εγ)− F (ω)] ,
provided the limit exists. From previous calculations we know that if this limit exists, it
must equal
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)γpm where we recall the notation for (p,m) ∈ Λ0 and ω ∈ Ω:
βpm(ω) := ∇pmf
(
(θqn(ω))(q,n)∈Λ0
)
, γpm :=
∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t).
113
The integral defining γpm exists in generalized RS sense, because Haar functions are
step functions and thus regulated.
Theorem 3.6.2. Fix ω ∈ Ω and let F ∈ DBV and γ ∈ BV (I). If (2p/2βpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1,
then DF (t, ω) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)Hpm(t) is RS integrable in the generalized sense w.r.t. γ.
Furthermore, DγF (ω) exists and equals (G)
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t).
Proof. From Corollary B.2.9 we infer that DF (·, ω) is regulated and therefore integrable
against an integrator with bounded variation. Furthermore, DF (·, ω) is the uniform
limit of integrable step functions; therefore, by uniform convergence (Theorem B.1.9),
(G)
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ = lim
N→∞
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
βpm(ω)γpm = DγF (ω),
where the second equality holds by definition of the directional derivative.
Remark 3.6.3 (complementing the proof). One can check directly that the series defining
DγF (ω) converges: Any function of bounded variation on I is trivially bounded, hence
|γpm| ≤
√
2p ‖γ‖∞. Thus (βpm(ω)γpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1 by Lemma B.2.7.
Let us remark that if the integrator γ is a discontinuous function and we consider∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t) for some (p,m) ∈ Λ, then the precise (pointwise) definition of Hpm mat-
ters. To illustrate this, we calculate that for a nondecreasing γ : I → R and m /∈ {1, 2p}
∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t) =
√
2p
[
1
2
(
γ(t0pm+)− γ(t0pm−)
)− 1
2
(
γ(t2pm+)− γ(t2pm−)
)
+ γ(t1pm−)− γ(t0pm+)− γ(t2pm−) + γ(t1pm+)
]
,
(3.6.1)
where γ(t−) and γ(t+) denote left and right limit of γ in t ∈ I. The expression in (3.6.1)
is sensitive to the exact value of the Haar function at t0pm and t
2
pm unless γ is continuous
in those points.14
Example 3.6.4. Let p ∈ N and m ∈ {2, . . . , 2p − 1}. For such values consider the integral∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t) when γ : I → R is the shifted Heaviside function γHx (t) := 1[x,1](t) for x ∈ I.
By applying (3.6.1) one can verify that indeed for any t ∈ I, ∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ
H
x (t) = Hpm(x).
Varying paths with regulated functions
We extend the domain from Ω even further to the regulated functionsR(I) and consider
the space
DR := {F : R(I)→ R ∣∣ F (ω) = f ((θk(ω))k∈N) , f ∈ C∞(RN), (βk(ω))k∈N ∈ ℓ2} .
Analogously to the previous section we observe that for such functionals, the directional
derivative DγF (ω) for fixed ω ∈ Ω and γ ∈ R(I) exists and equals
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)γpm,
provided that this sum converges. For the integrability of DF (·, ω) against γ ∈ R(I), we
require DF (·, ω) ∈ BV (I).
14The restricting choice of values for p and m is such that the interval [t0pm, t
2
pm] lies strictly included
in I. This prevents a tedious distinction of different cases depending on whether the endpoints of the
interval coincide with either 0 or 1. Such a distinction would only complicate the formulas without adding
further insights, hence we omit it here.
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Theorem 3.6.5. Fix ω ∈ Ω and let F ∈ DR and γ ∈ R(I). Assume that
(2p/2βpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1.
Then DγF (ω) exists. Furthermore, DF (·, ω) ∈ BV (I), hence
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) exists.
Proof. γ is regulated on a compact interval, hence it is bounded. This fact, combined
with the condition (2p/2βpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1, allows us to argue as in Remark 3.6.3 that
the series defining DγF (ω) converges (absolutely). As we have seen in Theorem 3.5.4,
the condition also implies that DF (·, ω) ∈ BV (I), hence the generalized RS integral∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) exists (and is finite).
The theorem for uniform convergence of Stieltjes integrals (Theorem B.1.9) cannot be
applied, because the integrator γ is not of bounded variation. This property is essential
for the proof of the theorem. Therefore, equality of
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t) and DγF (ω) does
not follow in this case.
3.6.2 Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral
The LS integral (L) ∫
I
f(t)dg(t) can be introduced either as the abstract Lebesgue inte-
gral (L) ∫
I
f(t)dµg(t) when µg is the LS measure associated to g, or as an extension of
the RS integral. We quickly go over the latter approach before going into details with
the former approach. The LS integral is an interim step towards the generalized RS
integral, which we considered already. Hence, the LS integral will not yield any results
going beyond what we have already seen. The reason is that we integrate w.r.t. functions
of bounded variation, but not w.r.t. the larger class of regulated functions. Therefore,
we will keep the integrability results as short as possible and devote more time to the
discussion of measures.
Varying paths with functions of bounded variation
The LS integral on I, (L) ∫
I
f(t)dg(t), is defined if f is measurable and bounded and g
is of bounded variation and right-continuous.15
Thus we can define γpm := (L)
∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t) for γ being right-continuous and of
bounded variation. This permits us to write down the corresponding directional deriva-
tive DγF (ω) for F ∈ S or D and to analyze the convergence of the series defining
DγF (ω). For the integrability of DF (·, ω) w.r.t. such an integrator γ we have to ensure
thatDF (·, ω) is Borel-measurable and bounded. For F ∈ S both properties are satisfied.
For F ∈ D we have to establish the appropriate conditions.
Theorem 3.6.6. Fix ω ∈ Ω and let F ∈ DBV with (2p/2βpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1. Let γ ∈
BV (I) be right-continuous with γpm := (L)
∫
I
Hpm(t)dγ(t) for (p,m) ∈ Λ0.
Then DγF (ω) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)γpm is an absolutely convergent series, DF (·, ω) is inte-
grable w.r.t. γ and DγF (ω) = (L)
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t).
15See for instance [KK68, Section 4.6-17] for the definition of the LS-integral.
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Proof. We have seen in the proof of Theorem 3.5.4 that under the above conditions,
DF (·, ω) ∈ BV (I), hence it is measurable and bounded and therefore integrable. It is
also the uniform limit of step functions, hence we have once more
(L)
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ = lim
N→∞
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
βpm(ω)γpm = DγF (ω).
The absolute convergence of the series can be checked as follows: γ ∈ BV (I) is in
particular bounded, hence for (p,m) ∈ Λ0 we have
|βpm(ω)γpm| ≤
∣∣2p/2βpm(ω)∣∣ · sup
(p,m)∈Λ0
|γpm| ,
which defines an ℓ1-sequence by Lemma B.2.7.
3.7 Varying paths with measures
3.7.1 Lebesgue-Stieltjes signed measures
To every nondecreasing right-continuous16 function γ on I one can associate the LS
measure µγ such that γ is then the distribution function of µγ.17 Using the (unique18)
Jordan decomposition (Theorem B.2.15) of functions of bounded variation one can ex-
tend this construction. Thus we can define a LS signed measure associated to a function
of bounded variation.
Definition 3.7.1 (Lebesgue-Stieltjes signed measure, cf. [CK04, Definition 7.28]). Let
γ ∈ BV (I) with Jordan decomposition γ = γ1−γ2, where γ1 and γ2 are both nondecreasing
functions on I. Let µ1 and µ2 denote the (finite) LS measures associated to γ1 and γ2,
respectively. Then µγ := µ1 − µ2 defines a σ-additive set function on B(I). We call µγ the
LS signed measure associated to γ.
On the other hand, if µ is a LS measure, then we can associate a function gµ to this
measure. With the terminology of probability theory (though µ need not be a probabil-
ity measure), γµ is the (cumulative) distribution function associated to µ, i.e. γµ(t) :=
µ((−∞, t]). Then we can interpret DµF (ω) as the directional derivative that we obtain
from perturbing ω in direction γµ. This approach can be extended to the LS signed mea-
sure corresponding to functions of bounded variation. This correspondence between
functions and (signed) measures motivates the introduction of a directional derivative
when the direction is a finite measure or signed measure on I.
Definition 3.7.2. Let F ∈ DBV and µ a finite LS measure on I with associated distribution
function γµ. Then we define the directional derivative of F (ω) in direction µ as DµF (ω) :=
DγµF (ω), provided the latter exists.
The existence of DγµF and its link to the Malliavin derivative were discussed in Section
3.6.2 and can be transferred to this setting. In the next section we look at the integral
defined in the abstract Lebesgue sense.
16If γ is not right-continuous, then one defines the LS measure by associating it to the right-continuous
version of γ.
17See e.g. [CK04, Section 7.3.1] for the construction of the LS measure.
18See [CK04, Section 7.3.3] on the construction of the (minimal) Jordan decomposition of a function
of bounded variation.
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3.7.2 The integral defined with respect to a measure
There is no need to always go back to the Stieljes-type integrals. Alternatively one
can work with abstract Lebesgue integrals as they are defined for instance in [Nie97,
Section 13.2]. Haar functions are step functions on dyadic intervals, hence they are
measurable. We can use the dominated convergence theorem (e.g. [Nie97, Theorem
13.15]) to obtain integrability of DF against µ ∈M(I). A link between the LS integral
and the abstract Lebesgue integral can be found in [Nie97, Section 13.4].
A candidate for the directional derivative of F ∈ D with (infinite) representation F (ω) =
f
(
(θpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0
)
in direction of a measure µ, provided the series converges, is
DµF (ω) :=
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
βpm(ω)
∫
I
Hpm(t)dµ(t), (3.7.1)
where βpm(ω) = ∇pmf((θqn(ω))(q,n)∈Λ0). We calculate the integral for (p,m) ∈ Λ:
µpm :=
∫
I
Hpm(t)dµ(t)
=
√
2p
[
µ((t0pm, t
1
pm))− µ((t1pm, t2pm))
]
+
√
2p
[
1
2
µ(
{
t0pm
}
)− 1
2
µ(
{
t2pm
}
) +
1
2
µ({0})δm1 − 1
2
µ({1})δm2p
] (3.7.2)
and put µ00 :=
∫
I
H00(t)dµ(t) = µ(I).
Remark 3.7.3. If we had chosen to work with Definition 3.4.4 of Haar functions, we would
instead have
µ˜pm :=
∫
I
H˜pm(t)dµ(t) =
√
2p
[
µ([t0pm, t
1
pm))− µ([t1pm, t2pm))
]
for (p,m) ∈ Λ.
In the special case of the Lebesgue measure µ = λ|I , one has µ00 = λ(I) = 1 and µpm = 0
for all (p,m) ∈ Λ. In the special case of the Dirac measure µ = δt one has µpm = Hpm(t)
for (p,m) ∈ Λ0.
So far we always let DµF (ω) := limε→0 1ε [F (ω + εµ)− F (ω)]. In the next Section we say
how we can give a meaning to this if F ∈ D, ω ∈ Ω = C(I;R) and µ ∈M(I).
3.7.3 Variation of a path with a measure
Recall that for ω ∈ Ω and a Haar function Hpm ((p,m) ∈ Λ0) we defined
θpm(ω) :=
∫
I
Hpm(t)dω(t).
For a measure µ ∈M(I) we now define analogously19
ϑpm(µ) :=
∫
I
Hpm(t)dµ(t) = µpm.
19We use the notation
∫
I
f(t)dµ(t) instead of
∫
I
f(t)µ(dt) for the integral w.r.t. a measure µ.
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This is well defined because Haar functions are simple functions and trivially belong to
M(I). We had already observed that for functions ω, ν ∈ Ω and indices (p,m) ∈ Λ0 one
has θpm(ω + εν) = θpm(ω) + εθpm(ν), i.e., θpm : Ω→ R is a linear functional. The same is
true for ϑpm : M(I)→ R introduced above. For µ, µ̂ ∈M(I), the integrals
∫
I
Hpmdµ and∫
I
Hpmdµ̂ exist. Furthermore, µ+ εµ̂ ∈M(I) and Hpm is integrable w.r.t. µ+ εµ̂ and we
have ϑpm(µ + εµ̂) = ϑpm(µ) + εϑpm(µ̂). With this notation, the directional derivative in
direction γ ∈ C0(I) could be written as
DγF (ω) = lim
ε→0
1
ε
[
f
(
(θpm(ω) + εθpm(γ))(p,m)∈Λ0
)− F (ω)] .
Analogously we define the directional derivative of F (·) = f((θpm(·))pm) ∈ D in direc-
tion µ ∈M(I) as
DµF (ω) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
[
f
(
(θpm(ω) + εϑpm(µ))(p,m)∈Λ0
)− F (ω)] ,
provided the limit exists. Let us first make clear that this definition is indeed rea-
sonable by considering an LS measure µg associated to a function g ∈ BV (I) such
that
∫
I
Hpm(t)dg(t) =
∫
I
Hpm(t)dµg(t) for any Haar function. Then clearly DgF (ω) =
DµgF (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, hence this definition is equivalent to Definition 3.7.2. If the limit
in the definition exists, then we must have (in analogy with (3.3.1))
DµF (ω) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
βpm(ω)ϑpm(µ).
If F ∈ S, this sum is finite, hence nothing more needs to be done. If F ∈ D, the
convergence of this series is an issue to be addressed.
Conditions for convergence of the series and existence of DµF
As before, for F ∈ D write βpm(ω) := ∇pmf
(
(θqn(ω))(q,n)∈Λ0
)
and µpm := ϑpm(µ)
(see (3.7.2)). For fixed ω ∈ Ω we want to find sufficient conditions for the (point-
wise) convergence of
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)µpm. From the definition of D we have that
(βpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ2. We can either impose further restrictions on F or, as previously
done, require (µpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ2.
• If µ has Lebesgue density fµ ∈ C(I), then we can apply the previously developed
theory to µpm =
∫
I
Hpm(t)dµ(t) =
∫
I
Hpm(t)fµ(t)dt.
• If we let µ := δt the Dirac measure, then we already saw that µpm = Hpm(t), which
defines for (p,m) ∈ Λ0 an unbounded sequence; in particular (µpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 /∈ ℓ2.
If we multiply this sequence by 2−p/2, then the sequence becomes bounded with∥∥(2−p/2µpm)(p,m)∈Λ0∥∥ℓ∞ = 1. Hence if (2p/2βpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1, then (βpmµpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈
ℓ1, i.e., DµF (ω) :=
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)µpm is well defined.
Inspired by the above thoughts, we formulate our result:
Theorem 3.7.4. Let µ ∈ M(I) denote a bounded measure with µ(I) =: M < ∞. If
(2p/2βpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1, then DµF (ω) is given by the value of the absolutely converging
series
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)µpm.
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Proof. From the boundedness we infer that
|µpm| ≤
√
2p
[
µ([t0pm, t
1
pm)) + µ((t
1
pm, t
2
pm])
] ≤ √2p ·M,
hence
∥∥(2−p/2µpm)(p,m)∈Λ0∥∥ℓ∞ ≤ M . Application of Lemma B.2.7 to the bounded se-
quence (2−p/2µpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 and the ℓ
1-sequence (2p/2βpm)(p,m)∈Λ0 yields the desired re-
sult.
Integrability of DF against µ ∈M(I)
Fix ω ∈ Ω. If F ∈ S, then DF (t, ω) = ∑(p,m)∈ΛN0 βpm(ω)Hpm(t) for some N ∈ N. As
Hpm ∈ M(I), so is DF (·, ω), and the integral
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dµ(t) is well defined. For
F ∈ D, we observe that again DF (t, ω) = ∑(p,m)∈Λ0 βpm(ω)Hpm(t) belongs to M(I)20.
For rightfully writing 〈DF, dµ〉 = ∫
I
DF (t, ω)dµ(t) we need to verify the integrability of
DF (·, ω) against the measure µ.
Theorem 3.7.5. Fix ω ∈ Ω. Let µ ∈ M(I) and assume (2p/2βpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1. Then
DF (·, ω) is regulated and integrable against µ, i.e., ∫
I
DF (t, ω)dµ(t) exists and is finite.
Proof. We have already seen that the condition on (βpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0 implies thatDF (·, ω)
is the uniform limit of step functions, hence regulated; therefore, DF (·, ω) is integrable
w.r.t. µ. Both DF (·, ω) and µ are finite, hence the integral is also finite.
Is DµF = 〈DF, dµ〉?
As the convergence to DF is uniform in the previous theorems, we can immediately
infer from the uniform convergence theorem for the abstract Lebesgue integral (w.r.t.
finite (signed) measures21) the following result, which we therefore state without re-
peating the arguments of the proof:
Corollary 3.7.6. Fix ω ∈ Ω. Let µ ∈ M(I) and assume (2p/2βpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0 ∈ ℓ1. Then
DµF (ω) and
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dµ(t) exist and are equal.
Remark 3.7.7. One could also argue via dominated convergence as follows: The finite sum∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0 βpm(ω)Hpm(t) is integrable for any finite measure µ ∈ M(I). It is dominated
by |DF (·, ω)|. Assuming that DF (·, ω) is integrable, this also implies that |DF (·, ω)| is
integrable (per definition of the abstract Lebesgue integral), hence it is a dominating in-
tegrable function; the dominated convergence theorem for the abstract Lebesgue integral
(cf. [Nie97, Theorem 13.15] or Theorem B.1.11 in the Appendix) gives the desired result.
3.7.4 Link to the vertical derivative in Cont & Fournié
Summary of Results by Cont & Fournié
Let us briefly review the definitions from [CF13]:
20See for instance Section 10 in [Nie97], in particular Propositions 10.7 and 10.9 and Corollary 10.11,
for the measurability of a (countably infinite) sum of measurable functions.
21The uniform convergence theorem for finite measures (Theorem B.1.10) can be extended to finite
signed measure by applying the Jordan decomposition theorem (Theorem B.2.15).
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Let X : [0, T ] → Rd be a continuous semimartingale on a filtered probability space
(Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) with paths in C0([0, T ],Rd). Let [X](t) =
∫ t
0
A(u)du and let Y (t) =
Ft(Xt, At) depend on the entire paths of X and A, where Xt = (X(u), u ∈ [0, t]).
Introduce the notations for horizontal extension and vertical perturbation of a process
xt = (x(u), 0 ≤ u ≤ t), which we illustrate in Figure 3.2:
xt,h(u) = x(u), u ∈ [0, t]; xt,h(u) = x(t), u ∈ (t, t+ h];
xht (u) = x(u), u ∈ [0, t); xht (t) = x(t) + h.
xt,h
xht
Figure 3.2: Horizontal extension xt,h and vertical perturbation xht of a path x
With this the horizontal derivative is defined as
DtF (x, v) := lim
h→0+
1
h
(Ft+h(xt,h, vt,h)− Ft(xt, ht))
and the vertical derivative is defined as
∇xF (x, v) := (∂iFt(x, v), i = 1, . . . , d) where ∂iFt(x, v) := lim
h→0
1
h
(
Ft(x
hei
t , v)− Ft(x, v)
)
,
if the limits exist and where (ei, i = 1, . . . , d) is the canonical basis in Rd.
Remark 3.7.8. Horizontal (w.r.t. time) and vertical (w.r.t. the state space) differentiation
were already introduced by Dupire in [Dup09] and also appeared in [CF10].
The following results are obtained in [CF13]: There is a change of variable formula
(using both DtF and ∇xF ). The vertical derivative of Y (t) = Ft(Xt, At), ∇XY (t) :=
∇xFt(Xt, At), is independent of the representation F , it has a strong link to the Malliavin
derivative, and ∇X is the inverse of the Itô integral, i.e., ∇X(
∫
φ · dX) = φ.
Examples of both vertical and horizontal derivatives can be found in [CF13, Section 3.1,
pp. 117-118].
Recently, horizontal and vertical derivatives have been nicely explained in the second
part of [BCC16]. See in particular Table 7.1 therein, where R. Cont compares the
property of the Malliavin derivative and the vertical derivative.
Link to our directional derivative in direction of a measure
For t ∈ I consider the (stopped) trajectory ωt = {ω(s) | s ∈ [0, t]}. Then we have
θpm(ωt) =
∫ t
0
Hpm(s)dω(s). Fix again F ∈ D with F (ω) = f
(
(θpm(ω))(p,m)∈Λ0
)
. For this
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we introduce the notation βpm(ωt) = ∇pmf
(
(θqn(ωt))(q,n)∈Λ0
)
. The directional derivative
of F in direction δt, evaluated in ωt, can be calculated as
DδtF (ωt) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
βpm(ωt)ϑpm(δt) =
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
βpm(ωt)
∫
I
Hpm(s)δt(ds)
=
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0
βpm(ωt)Hpm(t).
On the other hand, if we drop the dependence on the quadratic variation process and
let d = 1 in [CF13], then
∇ωF (ω) = ∂1Ft(ω) = DδtF (ωt),
where Ft shall denote the restriction of F to the stopped path ωt. Thus our direc-
tional derivative in direction of δt for Ft yields exactly the vertical derivative. Instead
of the Dirac measure we could also have chosen the Heaviside function as direction,
which appeared in Example 3.6.4. This is no surprise as we already stated that the
correspondence between finite measures and increasing (right-continuous) functions is
one-to-one.
Remark 3.7.9. One can see clearly that DδtF (ωt) requires a pointwise exact definition of
the Haar function. Definitions 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 yield different results here, which is why we
drew attention to this issue in the first place. If one chose to work with differentiation in a
weak (distributional) sense, then this difference would vanish.
3.8 Conclusion
We have seen that for F ∈ D, the (pathwise) directional derivative
DγF (ω) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
[F (ω + εγ)− F (ω)]
can be defined for directions γ not necessarily being Cameron-Martin functions, but
even Hölder- or merely continuous functions. We furthermore provide sufficient condi-
tions such that DγF (ω) =
∫
I
DF (t, ω)dγ(t), where DF is the Malliavin derivative of F .
We extend this approach to discontinuous functions as far as regulated functions and
define a notion of directional derivative in the direction of a measure. The main results
are summarized in Table 3.1.
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DγF =
∑
βpmγpm
∫
I
DFdγ exists DγF =
∫
I
DFdγ
γ ∈ H
Section 3.3
γpm =
∫
I
Hpm(t)γ˙(t)dt
Theorem 3.3.2
Theorem 3.3.4 Theorem 3.3.5
γ ∈ Cα0 (I)
Section 3.4 Theorem 3.4.15 Theorem 3.4.18
Theorem 3.4.19
with (3.4.7)
γ ∈ C0(I)
Section 3.5
Theorem 3.5.4
γ ∈ BV (I)
Section 3.6 Theorem 3.6.2 and Theorem 3.6.6
γ ∈ R(I)
Section 3.6
Theorem 3.6.5
γ ∈M(I)
Section 3.7
Theorem 3.7.4 Theorem 3.7.5 Corollary 3.7.6
Table 3.1: Overview on main results
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A | Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 The BMO space
For a probability measure Q, recall from Section 2.2 that by HBMO(Q) we denote the
space of processes Z ∈ Hp(Q) for any p ≥ 2 such that for some constant KBMO > 0
sup
τ∈T[0,T ]
EQ
[∫ T
τ
|Zs|2ds
∣∣∣Fτ] ≤ KBMO <∞,
where T[0,T ] is the set of all stopping times τ ∈ [0, T ]. As an easy consequence, if
Z ∈ HBMO(Q), then
∫
HdZ ∈ HBMO(Q) for any bounded adapted process H.
For more information on BMO spaces and their relation with BSDEs see Subsection 2.3
in [IDR10] or Section 10.1 in [Tou13]; for reference’s sake, we state the relevant part
(for our purpose) of [IDR10, Lemma 2.2] in the next result.
Lemma A.1.1. Let Z ∈ HBMO and define Φ· :=
∫ ·
0
ZsdWs. Then we have:
1) The stochastic exponential E(ΦT ) is uniformly integrable.
2) There exists a number r > 1 such that E(ΦT ) ∈ Lr. This property follows from
the Reverse Hölder inequality. The maximal r with this property can be expressed
explicitly in terms of the BMO norm of Φ·. There exists as well an upper bound for
‖E(ΦT )‖rLr depending only on T , r and the BMO norm of Φ.
A.2 Basics of Malliavin’s calculus
We briefly introduce the main notation of the stochastic calculus of variations also
known as Malliavin’s calculus. For more details, we refer the reader to [Nua06], for
its application to BSDEs we refer to [Imk08]. Let S be the space of random variables of
the form
ξ = F
(
(
∫ T
0
h1,is dW
1
s )1≤i≤n, · · · , (
∫ T
0
hd,is dW
d
s )1≤i≤n
)
,
where F ∈ C∞b (Rn×d), h1, · · · , hn ∈ L2([0, T ];Rd), n ∈ N. To simplify notation, assume
that all hj are written as row vectors. For ξ ∈ S, we define D = (D1, · · · , Dd) : S →
L2(Ω× [0, T ])d by
Diθξ =
n∑
j=1
∂F
∂xi,j
(∫ T
0
h1tdWt, . . . ,
∫ T
0
hnt dWt
)
hi,jθ , 0 ≤ θ ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
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and for k ∈ N its k-fold iteration by D(k) = (Di1 · · ·Dik)1≤i1,··· ,ik≤d. For k ∈ N, p ≥ 1 let
Dk,p be the closure of S with respect to the norm
‖ξ‖pk,p= E
[
‖ξ‖pLp +
k∑
i=1
‖|D(k)]ξ|‖p
(Hp)i
]
.
D(k) is a closed linear operator on the space Dk,p. Observe that if ξ ∈ D1,2 is Ft-
measurable, then Dθξ = 0 for θ ∈ (t, T ]. Further denote Dk,∞ = ∩p>1Dk,p. We also need
Malliavin calculus for Rm-valued smooth stochastic processes. For k ∈ N, p ≥ 1, denote
by Lk,p(Rm) the set of Rm-valued progressively measurable processes u = (u1, · · · , um)
on [0, T ]× Ω such that
i) for Lebesgue-a.a. t ∈ [0, T ], u(t, ·) ∈ (Dk,p)m;
ii) [0, T ]×Ω ∋ (t, ω) ↦→ D(k)u(t, ω) ∈ (L2([0, T ]1+k))d×n admits a progressively measur-
able version;
iii) ‖u‖pk,p= ‖u‖pHp +
∑k
i=1 ‖Diu ‖p(Hp)1+i <∞.
Note that Jensen’s inequality gives1 for all p ≥ 2
E
[( ∫ T
0
∫ T
0
|DuXt|2du dt
) p
2
]
≤ T p/2−1
∫ T
0
‖DuX‖pHpdu.
We recall a result from [Imk08] concerning the rule for the Malliavin differentiation of
Itô integrals which is of use in applications of Malliavin’s calculus to stochastic analysis.
Theorem A.2.1 (Theorem 2.3.4 in [Imk08]). Let (Xt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ H2 be an adapted process
and define Mt :=
∫ t
0
XrdWr for t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, X ∈ L1,2 if and only if Mt ∈ D1,2 for any
t ∈ [0, T ].
Moreover, for any 0 ≤ s, t ≤ T we have DsMt = Xs1{s≤t}(s) + 1{s≤t}(s)
∫ t
s
DsXrdWr.
A.3 Basic Malliavin calculus results for SDEs
With relation to the Brownian motionsWR andW S, we denote the Malliavin differential
operators DWR and DWS , see Appendix A.2.
Proposition A.3.1. Let Assumption 2.6.1 hold. Then SDEs (2.3.1) and (2.3.2) have a
unique solution R, S ∈ Sp for any p ≥ 2 and
i) R, S ∈ D1,2. We have DWSu Rt = DWRu St = 0 for any t, u ∈ [0, T ] as well as
DW
R
u Rt = 1{u≤t}b and D
WS
u St = 1{u≤t}σ
SSt, t, u ∈ [0, T ]; (A.3.1)
ii) For any jointly measurable function ψ : [0, T ]×R×R→ R that is Lipschitz continuous
(in the second spatial variable), it holds that
DW
R
u
(
ψ(t, St, Rt)
)
= DW
R
r
(
ψ(t, St, Rt)
) ∀u, r ∈ [0, t], t ∈ [0, T ]. (A.3.2)
Furthermore,
(
DW
R
0
(
ψ(·, S·, R·)
)) ∈ S∞.
1The reason behind this last inequality is that within the BSDE framework the usual tools to obtain a
priori estimates yield with much difficulty the LHS while with relative ease the RHS.
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iii) HD, Ha ∈ L1,2∩S∞ for any a ∈ A (recall (2.6.1)) and there existsM > 0 for any 0 ≤
r, u ≤ T and any ζ ∈ A∪ {D} such that DWRu Hζ = DWRr Hζ and 0 < |DWR· Hζ | ≤M .
iv) Let ζ ∈ A ∪ {D} and let r0 ∈ R. The mapping r0 ↦→ (DWRu Hζ) is Lipschitz continuous
uniformly in u ∈ [0, T ] for any s0 ∈ (0,+∞).
Proof. Throughout let ζ ∈ A ∪ {D}. General results on SDEs follow from e.g. Section
2 in [IDR10]2, standard Malliavin calculus, the fact that S is a Geometric Brownian
motion and µR ∈ C([0, T ];R).
Proof of i) The identity DWSu Rt = D
WR
u St = 0 is trivial.
Proof of ii) We prove (A.3.2): assume ψ to be differentiable, then for u, r ∈ [0, t]
DW
R
u
(
ψ(t, St, Rt)
)
= (∂x2ψ)(t, St, Rt)b = D
WR
r
(
ψ(t, St, Rt)
)
,
where we used (A.3.1). Now a standard approximation by mollification delivers the
two results.
Proof of iii) The form of the FT -measurable payoffs HD, Ha is quite specific and it is
clear that for 0 ≤ u ≤ T and ζ ∈ A ∪ {D}
DW
R
u H
ζ = DW
R
u
(
hζ(ST , RT )
)
=
〈
(∇hζ)(ST , RT ), (0,1{u≤T}b)
〉
= b(∂x2h
ζ)(ST , RT )
(A.3.3)
The boundedness of DWR· H
ζ follows from uniform boundedness of the derivatives of
hζ ∈ C2b . We can then conclude that if ∂x2hζ ̸= 0, then it follows that DWR· Hζ ̸= 0 and,
moreover, the identity DWRu H
ζ = DW
R
r H
ζ follows from (A.3.2).
Proof of iv)We now close with the proof of the last statement. Take s0 ∈ (0,+∞) and let
r0, r˜0 ∈ R be two initial conditions for R (see (2.3.1)) and we denote the corresponding
SDE solutions R and R˜ respectively. We also denote Hζ and H˜ζ the random variables
depending on R and R˜ respectively. Due to the linear form of (2.3.1) it is immediate
that Rt − R˜t = r0 − r˜0 for any t ∈ [0, T ].
The properties of |DWRu Hζ − DWRu H˜ζ | follow from those of ∂x2hζ and (A.3.3). By as-
sumption hζ is twice continuously differentiable (in space) with bounded derivatives,
hence, for some K ≥ 0∣∣(∂x2hζ)(ST , RT )− (∂x2hζ)(ST , R˜T )∣∣ ≤ K|RT − R˜T | = K|r0 − r˜0|.
It follows that for some constant C ≥ 0 independent of the data u, s0, r0 and r˜0 one has,
as required, |DWRu Hζ −DWRu H˜ζ | ≤ C|r0 − r˜0|.
A.4 Minor calculations
Lemma A.4.1. For N ∈ N, N ≥ 2, we have
N∑
k=2
k − 1
(N − 1)k
(
N
k
)
= 1.
2Specifically, Theorem 2.3 in [IDR10] asserts the existence of a unique solution of a sufficiently nice
SDE.
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Proof. With k = N − j, an index change and the binomial theorem one obtains
N∑
k=2
k − 1
(N − 1)k
(
N
k
)
=
N−2∑
j=0
N − 1
(N − 1)N−j
(
N
j
)
= (N − 1)
N−2∑
j=0
(
1
N − 1
)N−j (
N
j
)
−
N−2∑
j=1
j
(N − 1)N−j ·
N
j
(
N − 1
j − 1
)
= (N − 1)
N−2∑
j=0
(
1
N − 1
)N−j (
N
j
)
−N
N−3∑
j=0
(
1
N − 1
)N−1−j (
N − 1
j
)
= (N − 1)
[
N∑
j=0
(
1
N − 1
)N−j (
N
j
)
− N
N − 1 − 1
]
−N
[
N−1∑
j=0
(
1
N − 1
)N−1−j (
N − 1
j
)
− N − 1
N − 1 − 1
]
= (N − 1)
[(
N
N − 1
)N
− N
N − 1 − 1
]
−N
[(
N
N − 1
)N−1
− 2
]
= 1.
B | Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Integration theory
B.1.1 Different types of integration
Even though we are interested in directional derivatives, the main issues arise in the
field of integration theory. There are countless books devoted to this subject, for in-
stance [Bur07], [Gor94], [Hil63], [McL80], [vBC00], [Els11], [Nie97], just to name a
few. We will briefly introduce the integrals that we use and emphasize how the different
types of integrals are related to one another.
For the sake of consistency, we present all integration results on the interval I = [0, 1].
A partition of the interval I = [0, 1] is given by nonoverlapping subintervals [tk−1, tk]
such that 0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tn = 1. The partition is called tagged if there are chosen
distinct numbers zk ∈ [tk−1, tk] for k = 1, 2, . . . , n, called tags. The Riemann integral of
a (sufficiently nice) function f : I → R, denoted by (R) ∫
I
f(t)dt, is given by the real
number A satisfying that for each ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that∣∣∣∣∣A−
n∑
k=1
f(zk)(tk − tx−1)
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε
for any partition of I satisfying tk − tk−1 < δ for k = 1, 2, . . . , n; we call such a partition
δ-fine. That integral, if it exists, is independent of the partition and the chosen tags.
There are various extensions of this elementary Riemann integral, allowing for instance
the integration of unbounded functions and integration on an unbounded domain.
A rather recent extension is known under several names such as generalized Riemann
integral or gauge integral or Henstock-Kurzweil integral, where the latter goes back to
the seminal papers of J. Kurzweil (1957) and R. Henstock (1961). The integrals of A.
Denjoy (1912) and O. Perron (1914) have been shown to be equivalent, see for instance
[Gor94].1 The idea of the generalized Riemann integral is that the partition need not
be equally fine on the entire domain of integration, but instead it needs to be fine
when f is less regular and it can be coarse when f is more regular. We introduce the
notion of a gauge, i.e., an interval-valued function γ on I which assigns to each point
t ∈ I a neighborhood of that point. For a fixed gauge γ, a tagged partition is called
γ-fine if [tk−1, tk] ⊂ γ(zk) for k = 1, . . . , n. A function f is called Riemann integrable
in the generalized sense if there exists a real number A such that for each ϵ > 0 there
1The related integral of McShane is slightly weaker, see for instance [Swa01, Chapter 9] or [Pfe93,
Chapters 2 and 6].
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exists a gauge γ such that |A−∑nk=1 f(zk)(tk − tk−1)| < ε for every tagged partition
such that [tk−1, tk] ⊂ γ(zk) for k = 1, 2, . . . , n. We denote the gauge integral of f by
(G) ∫
I
f(t)dt. The advantage of gauge integrals over Lebesgue and Riemann integrals
is that functions with antiderivatives are integrable, even without the requirement of
boundedness necessary for the Lebesgue fundamental theorem of calculus. For more
details on gauge integrals, see [Swa01] or [KS12].
If a function f belongs to M(I), i.e. it is measurable, then measure-theoretic induc-
tion gives a reasonable definition of an integral, namely what is also called (abstract)
Lebesgue integral (see e.g. [Els11] on measure theory2):
• if f(t) = ∑nk=1 ak1Ak(t) for some sets A1, . . . , An ∈ B(I) (i.e., f is a simple func-
tion), then
∫
I
f(t)dµ(t) =
∑n
k=1 akµ(Ak);
• if f ∈ M(I) is positive, then it can be approximated from below by a sequence
of simple functions (fn)n∈N and, keeping in mind the continuity from below of
measure µ, the integral
∫
I
f(t)dµ(t) is defined as limn→∞
∫
I
fn(t)dµ(t),
• if f ∈M(I), we can consider its positive and negative part, for which we know the
integral already, and define
∫
I
f(t)dµ(t) :=
∫
I
f+(t)dµ(t)− ∫
I
f−(t)dµ(t), provided
at least one of the two integrals on the RHS is finite.
The Lebesgue integral includes the basic Riemann integral, but not the improper Rie-
mann integral. One of its biggest advantages is the availability of powerful convergence
results, which do not hold for the basic Riemann integral. The generalized Riemann
integral, however, includes both the Lebesgue integral and the improper Riemann inte-
gral and it features those convergence results. If we denote by R(I), L(I) and G(I) the
spaces of Riemann-, Lebesgue- and gauge-integrable functions on I, respectively, then
R(I) ⊂ L(I) ⊂ G(I).
Example B.1.1. Let f : I → R be given by
f(t) =
{
t2 cos( 1
t2
) , t ∈ (0, 1],
0 , t = 0.
The improper Riemann integral (and also the generalized Riemann integral)∫
I
f ′(t)dt = lim
a→0
∫ 1
a
f ′(t)dt = f(1) = cos(1)
exists, whereas f ′ /∈ L(I). The reason is that Lebesgue integrable functions are by definition
absolutely integrable and
∫
I
|f ′(t)|dt = ∞, hence f ′ cannot be Lebesgue integrable on this
interval. Another example would be the "sawtooth function" presented in [Bur07, Section
8.7.5] or the piecewise constant function presented in [Bar01, Example 2.8].
Example B.1.2. The indicator function f(t) = 1Q∩I(t) on I is known to be Lebesgue-,
but not Riemann-integrable on I. It is Riemann integrable in the generalized sense with
2Elstrodt [Els11, IV §3 Section 6] mentions that this approach to the Lebesgue integral via monotone
approximating sequences stems originally from W. H. Young and was the key to the LS integral.
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(G) ∫
I
1Q(t)dt = 0 (cf. [McL80, Example 4 in Section 1.2]). To see this, let Q ∩ I =
{qn | n ∈ N}. For a given ε > 0 choose the gauge γ as follows:
γ(t) :=
{
(t− ε
2n+2
, t+ ε
2n+2
) , t = qn ∈ Q,
(t− 1, t+ 1) , t ∈ I \Q,
where γ associates to every point in I an open interval in R, which need not be contained
in I. The worst possible choice of tags would be zn = qn (modulo reordering) and the
corresponding Riemann sum is then
N∑
n=1
f(qn)(tn+1 − tn) =
N∑
n=1
1 · (tn+1 − tn) ≤
N∑
n=1
ε
2n+1
Each rational qn can be at most twice a tag (as left and right endpoint of adjacent intervals),
hence for N → ∞ this sum is still smaller than ε, which proves that the value of the
generalized Riemann integral (G) ∫
I
1Q(t)dt is zero.
The next extension is that towards Stieltjes integrals of the different types. The RS
integral (R) ∫
I
f(t)dg(t) for a non-increasing function g is approximated by Riemann
sums of the structure
∑n
k=1 f(zk) [g(tk)− g(tk−1)] for δ-fine partitions, i.e., for δ > 0,
tk − tk−1 < δ. The generalized RS integral (G)
∫
I
f(t)dg(t) has the same Riemann sums,
but the tagged partition is called γ-fine if for a gauge γ, [tk−1, tk] ⊂ γ(zk). For more
details, see e.g. [McL80].
The LS integral is again defined with the help of the LS measure. For a monotone
function g on I one can define µg((a, b]) := g(b+) − g(a+), µg([a, b]) := g(b+) − g(a−)
and so on for a, b ∈ I with a < b (see [vBC00, Chapter 4]). Thus one obtains a mea-
sure µg on I. The LS integral (L)
∫
I
f(t)dg(t) is then defined as the Lebesgue integral∫
I
f(t)dµg(t). The Stieltjes integrals include the non-Stieltjes integrals of the corre-
sponding types through the choice g(t) = t.
Young’s Stieltjes integral [You36] is of RS type. While the RS integral was known to
exist whenever the integrand is continuous and the integrator of bounded variation or
the other way round, Young used Hölder’s inequality to allow for functions of bounded
p- and q-variation, respectively, provided 1
p
+ 1
q
> 1.
A slightly stricter version, namely Hölder continuous integrand and integrator with
Hölder coefficients α and β, respectively, permits an extension beyond α + β > 1 by
means of paracontrol, see for instance [Gub04] or [GIP16]. It should be mentioned that
while the YS integral permits discontinuities of integrand and integrator, the concept of
paracontrol cannot be applied to discontinuous functions.
We only work on the interval I, hence the notation f ∈ R(g) (or f ∈ L(g) or f ∈ G(g))
signifies that the function f is Riemann- (resp. Lebesgue- resp. generalized Riemann-)
Stieltjes integrable on I with respect to a function g. As is shown in Section 8.5 in
[Nie97], if g ∈ C(I), then R(g) ⊂ L(g). It is also mentioned that this is not true in
general if the continuity is dropped, i.e., there exist functions with a finite improper RS
integral which are not LS integrable. Both LS and improper RS integrals are included
in the Stieltjes version of the gauge integrals or generalized Riemann integrals, providing
maximum liberty.
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Further relations and inclusions between different Stieltjes integrals are presented in
[DN11, Figure 2.1]. While the YS integral can go beyond the LS integral, the relation
between YS and generalized RS integration is not clear. These competing notions of
Stieltjes integral therefore do not appear simultaneously; the former appears only in
Section 3.4 and the latter in Section 3.6.
Example B.1.3. If a setA ⊂ R is not Lebesgue measurable, then 1A cannot be LS integrable
against any function g, even the constant function. However, for g ≡ c for some c ∈ R one
has
(R)
∫
R
1A(t)dg(t) = (G)
∫
R
1A(t)dg(t) = 0.
Along the lines of Example B.1.1 one can construct examples of functions f ∈ G(g) with
f /∈ L(g). Take for instance g(t) = t − a for some a ∈ R and f ′ as in Example B.1.1
and consider the integral
∫
I
f ′(t)dg(t). On an unbounded domain one can alternatively
consider g(t) = t − a and f(t) = sin(t)
t
for t ∈ (0,∞). Recall that (R) ∫∞
0
f(t)dg(t) =
(R) ∫∞
0
sin(t)
t
dt = pi
2
, yet f /∈ L((0,∞)) and it is not LS integrable w.r.t. g.
Remark B.1.4. Any function that is Riemann integrable in the generalized sense, i.e.,
which belongs to G(I), is also measurable. See e.g. [Bar01, Theorem 6.8] or [Swa01,
Theorem 3 in Appendix 3]. Thus a non-measurable function like in the above example
cannot be Riemann integrable in the generalized sense.
B.1.2 Available convergence results
One rather strict, but useful convergence result is that on uniform convergence. A cri-
terion for uniform convergence of a series is the Weierstrass M-test, see Theorem B.2.8.
A convergence theorem for Young’s Stieltjes integrals relying on uniform convergence
is presented in [You36] (called Theorem on term by term integration).
As to the dominated convergence theorem known from Lebesgue integration, there is
a (stricter) version for RS integrals. It is found in the literature under the names of
bounded convergence theorem or Arzelà-Osgood theorem, see for instance [Hil63, Theo-
rem II.15.6 or II.15.9] or [Wes51] for different versions of this theorem.
For LS integration, the situation is much easier and, as long as the integrator γ is at least
continuous, R(γ) ⊂ L(γ), which permits us to apply the Stieltjes versions of the well-
known results of monotone convergence, dominated convergence and Fatou’s Lemma.
They can be found for instance in [Nie97, Section 8.4].
Collection of results
For all of the following results, recall that we fix I = [0, 1].
Theorem B.1.5 ([Bur07, Theorem 4.2.1]). If f ∈ C(I) and g is a step function on I, then
f ∈ R(g).
Theorem B.1.6 ([Bur07, Theorem 4.3.2]). Let J = [a, b] ⊂ I denote a fixed closed
subinterval of I. If f and g are bounded functions on J with no common discontinuities
and if f ∈ R(g), then g ∈ R(f) and we have the integration by parts formula∫ b
a
f(t)dg(t) = f(b)g(b)− f(a)g(a)−
∫ b
a
g(t)df(t).
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Theorem B.1.7 ([McL80, page 199]). Let f, g : I → R with one of them being of bounded
variation and the other regulated. Then both (G) ∫
I
fdg and (G) ∫
I
gdf exist.
Theorem B.1.8 (Uniform convergence of gauge integral, [Bar01, Theorem 8.3]). If fn ∈
G(I) for n ∈ N and if fn converges to f uniformly on I, then f ∈ G(I) and (G)
∫
I
f(t)dt =
limn→∞(G)
∫
I
fn(t)dt.
Theorem B.1.9 (Uniform convergence of the generalized RS integral, [Sch96, Theorem
24.17]). Let fn : I → R (n ∈ N) and f : I → R be such that fn → f uniformly on I
for n → ∞. If g : I → R is increasing and fn ∈ G(g) for n ∈ N, then f ∈ G(g) and
limn→∞
∫
I
fn(t)dg(t) =
∫
I
f(t)dg(t).
This result can be extended without any changes to g ∈ BV (I), see [McL80, page 194].
We also have the corresponding result on finite measure spaces:
Theorem B.1.10 (Uniform convergence in finite measure space). Let µ be a finite mea-
sure on (I,B(I)) and let (fn)n∈N be a sequence of bounded measurable functions on I
converging uniformly to f . Then limn→∞
∫
I
fn(t)dµ(t) =
∫
I
f(t)dµ(t).
This can be easily seen from the inequality
∫
I
|fn(t)− f(t)| dµ(t) ≤ µ(I) ‖fn − f‖∞ for
any n ∈ N.
Theorem B.1.11 (Dominated convergence of the abstract Lebesgue integral, [Bur07,
Theorem 6.3.3] or [Gor94, Theorem 3.25/Corollary 13.5]). For n ∈ N let fn ∈ L(I)
(Lebesgue-integrable on I) converging a.e. to f on I. Let g ∈ L(I) s.t. |fn| ≤ g for all
n ∈ N on I. Then f ∈ L(I) and ∫
I
f(t)dµ(t) = limn→∞
∫
I
fn(t)dµ(t).
Theorem B.1.12 (Dominated convergence of LS integral, [Nie97, Theorem 8.11]). Let
u be nondecreasing on I and fn ∈ L(u) for n ∈ N a sequence converging pointwise to f
such that |fn| ≤ g for all n ∈ N and some g ∈ L(u). Then f ∈ L(u) and (L)
∫
I
f(t)du(t) =
limn→∞(L)
∫
I
fn(t)du(t).
Theorem B.1.13 (Vitali convergence theorem, [Gor94, Theorem 13.3]). For n ∈ N let
fn ∈ L(I) and Fn(t) :=
∫ t
0
fn(s)dµ(s) (t ∈ I). Suppose that fn converges pointwise to f
on I. If {Fn}n∈N is equi-absolutely continuous3 on I, then f ∈ L(I) and
∫
I
f(t)dµ(t) =
limn→∞
∫
I
fn(t)dµ(t).
B.2 Relevant spaces and collection of related results
B.2.1 The space C([0, 1]) as inner product space
Let I = [0, 1]. Obviously C(I) ⊂ L2(I) (as continuous functions on a compact set are
bounded). Therefore, 〈f, g〉 := 〈f, g〉L2(I) =
∫ 1
0
f(t)g(t)dt is an inner product on C(I).
The norm induced by 〈·, ·〉 is ‖f‖L2(I) =
√〈f, f〉 = (∫
I
f 2(t)dt
)1/2.
The supremum norm ‖f‖∞ := sup {|f(t)| | t ∈ I} is not induced by any inner product,
for it does not satisfy the parallelogram identity ‖f + g‖2 + ‖f − g‖2 = 2 (‖f‖2 + ‖g‖2).
This can be easily seen by plugging in f(t) = t and g(t) = 1− t, both defined on I.
The space C(I), equipped with the L2-inner product and norm, is not complete; hence
it is not a Hilbert space.
3
{∫
· fn
}
is equi-absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue-measure µ|I if for each ε > 0 there ex. δ > 0
s.t.
∫
J
|fn| < ε for all n ∈ N whenever J ⊂ I measurable with µ(J) < δ.
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Theorem B.2.1 ([Haa10, Chapter III Section §2]). Let f ∈ C(I) and for (p,m) ∈ Λ0
define apm :=
∫
I
f(t)Hpm(t)dt. Then
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 apmHpm(t) converges to f uniformly on I.
B.2.2 Step functions and regulated functions
We collect here the definitions of step and regulated functions and some essential prop-
erties. The results stem from [Lea01, §4.4].
Definition B.2.2 (Step function). We call f : I → R a step function on I if there exists
a finite number of disjoint (possibly degenerate) intervals Ik ⊂ I, k = 1, . . . , n, such that
I =
⋃n
k=1 Ik and f is constant on each Ik.
According to [Lea01, Theorem 1] this is equivalent to f having only finitely many points
of discontinuity and f(I) being a finite set.
Definition B.2.3 (Regulated function). A function f : I → R is called regulated, if it has
left and right limits everywhere, i.e. f(0+), f(1−) exist and for 0 < t < 1, both f(t−) and
f(t+) exist.
Examples of regulated functions on I are step functions, functions of bounded variation
and continuous functions on I.
Theorem B.2.4 ([Lea01, §4.4 Theorem 3]). A function f : I → R is regulated if and only
if it is a uniform limit of step functions on I.
Every regulated function on I is bounded and the product of two regulated functions is
again regulated. From the Riemann integrability of step functions and the uniform con-
vergence theorem, regulated functions are Riemann integrable and due to boundedness
also Lebesgue integrable.
B.2.3 Collection of necessary results from sequence spaces
Recall the Hölder inequality: ‖xy‖ℓ1 ≤ ‖x‖ℓp · ‖y‖ℓq if 1p + 1p = 1. Furthermore, for
1 < p <∞ and any given sequence x, ‖x‖ℓ∞ ≤ ‖x‖ℓp ≤ ‖x‖ℓ1, hence ℓ1 ⊂ ℓp ⊂ ℓ∞.
Definition B.2.5 (Unconditional convergence). A series
∑∞
n=1 xn in a Banach space X
is called unconditionally convergent if the reordered series
∑
n xpi(n) converges for every
permutation pi of N.
Lemma B.2.6. A series
∑∞
n=1 xn in a Banach space X is unconditionally convergent if and
only if
∑∞
n=1 αnxn converges unconditionally for all bounded sequences (αn)n ∈ ℓ∞.
Lemma B.2.7. Let (αn)n and (βn)n be R-valued sequences.
a) If (αn)n ∈ ℓp and (βn)n ∈ ℓq, then (αnβn)n ∈ ℓ1, whenever 1p + 1p = 1.
b) If (αn)n ∈ ℓ∞ and (βn)n ∈ ℓ1, then
∑∞
n=1 αnβn is an unconditionally convergent series.
c) If (αn)n ∈ ℓ1 and (βn)n ∈ ℓ∞, then
∑∞
n=1 αnβn is an unconditionally convergent series.
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Proof. The first follows from the Hölder inequality, the second and third follow from
Lemma B.2.6. Convergence follows from absolute convergence by completeness of the
underlying space, because in a complete space absolute convergence implies conver-
gence.
Theorem B.2.8 (Weierstrass M-test, [Rud76, Theorem 7.10]). Let {fn}n∈N be a sequence
of functions on I and let (Mn)n∈N be a sequence of real numbers such that |fn(t)| ≤Mn for
all n ∈ N and all t ∈ I. If∑∞n=1Mn <∞, then∑∞n=1 fn(t) converges uniformly on I.
Corollary B.2.9. If the sequence MN :=
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0
√
2p |βpm| (N ∈ N) converges, then∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpmHpm(t) defines a uniformly convergent series and is therefore regulated.
Proof. Recall that |Hpm| ≤
√
2p for all (p,m) ∈ Λ0 and apply the Weierstrass M-test
(Theorem B.2.8) to the sequence of functions (
∑
(p,m)∈ΛN0 βpmHpm(t))N∈N to obtain uni-
form convergence. As the uniform limit of step functions,
∑
(p,m)∈Λ0 βpmHpm(t) is regu-
lated.
B.2.4 p-variation spaces
Let Vp(f ; I) denote the p-variation of a function f on the interval I with values in R,
p ≥ 1. If T = {0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tn = 1 | n ∈ N} denotes all finite partitions of I, then
the p-variation of f on I is
Vp(f ; I) := sup
T
{
n∑
k=1
|f(tk)− f(tk−1)|p
}
.
As we only work on the fixed interval I, we simply write Vp(f). We denote by Vp(I) the
space of functions f : I → R with Vp(f) < ∞. For any p ≥ 1 and f ∈ Vp(I), one has
Vp(f) ≥ Vp(|f |). The following result can be found in [CG98, Remark 2.5]:
Lemma B.2.10. For 1 ≤ p ≤ q, V1(I) ⊂ Vp(I) ⊂ Vq(I).
A useful property of p-variation, to be found for example as Property (P7) in [CG98], is
lower semi-continuity, i.e.:
Lemma B.2.11. If the sequence of maps (fn)n∈N (all mappings from I to R) converges
pointwise to f : I → R as n→∞, then Vp(f, I) ≤ lim infn→∞ Vp(fn, I).
We also recall here [CG98, Theorem 3.1] for the precise link between Hölder continuity
and bounded p-variation.
Theorem B.2.12. f : I → R is of bounded p-variation if and only if there exist functions
φ : I → R and g : φ(I)→ R such that
• φ is bounded and nondecreasing,
• g is Hölder continuous with exponent 1
p
and Hölder constant H(g) ≤ 1,
• f = g ◦ φ on I.
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Remark B.2.13. In rough paths literature (e.g. [FV10]), this result usually does not sur-
face, because the object of interest is an integral of continuous integrand and integrator.
Hence instead of functions of bounded p-variation the focus lies on continuous functions
with bounded p-variation.
One must be careful not to infer from this theorem that continuity and bounded (p)-
variation would already imply (1/p)−Hölder continuity, as is highlighted by the follow-
ing Lemma.
Lemma B.2.14. If for I = [0, 1], BV (I) denotes the set of functions of bounded variation
on I and C(I) the set of continuous functions on I, then
(BV (I) ∩ C(I)) \
( ⋃
0<α<1
Cα(I)
)
̸= ∅.
Proof. Consider f : I → R defined by
f(t) :=
{
1
ln( 2
t
)
for 0 < t ≤ 1,
0 for t = 0.
By L’Hospital’s rule f is continuous at zero and hence on the entire closed interval I.
Being monotonically increasing, we know that f ∈ BV (I). (A function is of bounded
variation if and only if it can be written as difference of two monotone functions.)
Furthermore, for any α > 0
lim
t→0+
|f(t)− f(0)|
tα
= lim
t→0+
1
tα ln 2
t
=∞,
hence f /∈ Cα(I) for any α > 0.
Thus, we see immediately (by letting φ be the identity function) that any α-Hölder
continuous function has finite 1
α
-variation.
Finally, the following result, which is due to Camille Jordan, is very useful:
Theorem B.2.15 ([Nie97, Theorem 5.10] – Jordan Decomposition Theorem). A func-
tion defined on a closed interval is of bounded variation if and only if it is a difference of
two nondecreasing functions.
B.3 Minor calculations
Lemma B.3.1. Form ∈ N and α ∈ (0, 1) letM(m,α) := 2(2m−1)α− (2m−2)α− (2m)α.
We have:
(a) M(m,α) ≥ 0 for all m ∈ N and α ∈ (0, 1).
(b) M(m,α)→ 0 as m→∞ for any α ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. Let’s first look at (a): For any α ∈ (0, 1), the function x ↦→ xα is strictly concave on
R+, i.e. for x, y ∈ R+ and λ ∈ [0, 1] one has (λx+(1−λ)y)α ≥ λxα+(1−λ)yα. Plugging
in x = m − 1 and y = m and λ = 1
2
we get after rearranging terms 21−α(2m − 1)α ≥
(m− 1)α +mα, which is again equivalent toM(m,α) ≥ 0.
For (b), consider hα : [1,∞) → R given by hα(m) := mα − (m − 1)α for fixed α ∈ (0, 1).
It is a concave mapping, hence for any x, y in its domain, hα(y)− hα(x) ≤ h′α(x)(y − x).
Specifically for x = m− 1 and y = m (m ∈ N) we obtain
hα(m)− hα(m− 1) ≤ αmα−1 = α
m1−α
m→∞−→ 0.
Now M(m,α) = [hα(2m− 1)− hα(2m− 2)] − [hα(2m)− hα(2m− 1)], which converges
to zero asm→∞ because it is the difference of two sequences, both of which converge
to zero.
Lemma B.3.2. For N ∈ N0 let
tN :=
N∑
n=0
(−1
2
)n
and GN :=
N∑
p=0
√
2pGp1(tN).
Then
(i) GN =
∑∞
p=0
√
2pGp1(tN);
(ii) (GN)N∈N is strictly increasing;
(iii) (GN)N∈N is unbounded.
Proof. Let us formally introduce t−1 = 0.
(i) It suffices to observe that for p > N , Gp1(tN) = 0.
(ii) We first calculate that for p ∈ N0,
√
2pGp1(tN) = (−1)p 2p (tN − tp−1). With this,
GN+1 − GN =
N+1∑
p=0
(−2)p(tN+1 − tp−1)−
N∑
p=0
(−2)p(tN − tp−1)
= (tN+1 − tN)
N+1∑
p=0
(−1)p 2p
=
[
(−1)N+1
(
1
2
)N+1][N+1∑
p=0
(−1)p 2p
]
,
where both brackets are positive if and only if N is odd and negative if and only if
N is even, hence the whole expression is strictly positive for any N ∈ N.
(iii) From the previous point we easily see that
|GN+1 − GN | =
∣∣∣∣∣
N+1∑
p=0
(−1)p2p−(N+1)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
N+1∑
p=0
(−1)p
(
1
2
)p∣∣∣∣∣ = |tN+1| ,
which converges to 2
3
as N → ∞. If the monotone sequence (GN)N∈N was to be
bounded, its increments would have to be a null sequence, which we have just
proven to not be the case. This completes the proof.
136
List of Abbreviations
BSDE Backward Stochastic Differential Equation
CN Crossing Network
DM Dealer Market
DP Dark Pool
EMPeR Equilibrium Market Price of external Risk
EMPR Equilibrium Market Price of Risk
FOC first order condition
LHS left-hand side
LS Lebesgue-Stieltjes
LOB limit order book
MPR Market Price of Risk
NE Nash Equilibrium
ONB orthonormal basis
PDE partial differential equation
RHS right-hand side
RS Riemann-Stieltjes
SDE stochastic differential equation
w.r.t. with respect to
YS Young-Stieltjes
138
List of Figures
1.1 An example without a CN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.2 An example without exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.3 An example with exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.4 An example with exclusion (magnified) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.5 The indirect–utility functions corresponding to the iteration pii+1 = t(0; pii). 41
2.1 Stepwise Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2 Sample paths of stock price, temperature, investment in S and D . . . . 83
2.3 Trading activity in stock w.r.t. concern rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.4 Price of derivative w.r.t. concern rates and risk tolerance . . . . . . . . . 85
2.5 Aggregated risk w.r.t. concern rates and risk tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.6 Risk Y a0 (left) and Y
b
0 (right) as a function of (λ
a, λb). . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.7 Change of risk through introduction of derivative . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.1 Haar function for p ∈ N0,m ∈ {1, . . . , 2p} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.2 Horizontal extension xt,h and vertical perturbation xht of a path x . . . . 119
140
List of Tables
1.1 The numbers of the feedback loop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1 Overview on results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
142
Bibliography
[Abe90] A. B. Abel, Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching up with the Joneses, The American
Economic Review 80 (1990), no. 2, 38–42.
[Abe99] A. B. Abel, Risk premia and term premia in general equilibrium, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 43 (1999), no. 1, 3–33.
[ADEH99] P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J.-M. Eber, and D. Heath, Coherent measures of risk, Math. Finance 9
(1999), no. 3, 203–228. MR1850791 (2002d:91056)
[AIdR10] S. Ankirchner, P. Imkeller, and G. dos Reis, Pricing and hedging of derivatives based on non-
tradable underlyings, Mathematical Finance 20 (2010April), no. 2, 289–312. MR2354164
(2008h:60220)
[AR08] R. M. Anderson and R. C. Raimondo, Equilibrium in continuous-time financial markets: En-
dogenously dynamically complete markets, Econometrica 76 (2008), no. 4, 841–907.
[Ath13] K. B. Athreya, Big Ideas in Macroeconomics: A Nontechnical View, MIT Press, 2013.
[AV15] N. Apergis and D. Voliotis, Spillover effects between lit and dark stock markets: Evidence from
a panel of London Stock Exchange transactions, International Review of Financial Analysis 41
(2015), 101–106.
[Bar01] R. G. Bartle, A Modern Theory of Integration, Graduate Studies in Mathematics, vol. 32, Amer-
ican Mathematical Society, 2001.
[Bat97] R. H. Battalio, Third Market Broker-Dealers: Cost Competitors or Cream Skimmers?, The Jour-
nal of Finance 52 (1997), no. 1, 341–352.
[BCC16] V. Bally, L. Caramellino, and R. Cont, Stochastic Integration by Parts and Functional Itô Calcu-
lus, Birkhäuser, 2016.
[BE05] P. Barrieu and N. El Karoui, Inf-convolution of risk measures and optimal risk transfer, Finance
Stoch. 9 (2005), no. 2, 269–298. MR2211128 (2006k:60010)
[BE09] P. Barrieu and N. El Karoui, Pricing, Hedging, and Designing Derivatives with Risk Measures, In
R. Carmona (ed.), Indifference Pricing: Theory and Applications., 2009, pp. 77–146.
[Bel06] D. R. Bell, The Malliavin Calculus, Dover Publications, Mineola, New York, 2006.
[BHMB16] J. Bielagk, U. Horst, and S. Moreno-Bromberg, A Principal-Agent Model of Trading Un-
der Market Impact – Crossing networks interacting with dealer markets, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1607.04047 (2016).
[BLDR17] J. Bielagk, A. Lionnet, and G. Dos Reis, Equilibrium pricing under relative performance con-
cerns, arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.04218 (2017). Accepted by SIAM Journal on Financial Math-
ematics.
[BMR00] B. Biais, D. Martimort, and J.-C. Rochet, Competing mechanisms in a common value environ-
ment, Econometrica 68 (2000July), no. 4, 799–837.
[BRW16] S. Buti, B. Rindi, and I. M. Werner, Dark Pool Trading Strategies, Market Quality and Welfare,
Journal of Financial Economics (2016). accepted.
144
[BT04] B. Bouchard and N. Touzi, Discrete-time approximation and Monte-Carlo simulation of back-
ward stochastic differential equations, Stochastic Processes and their Applications 111 (2004),
no. 2, 175–206.
[Bur07] F. Burk, A Garden of Integrals, The Dolciani Mathematical Expositions, vol. 31, MAA, 2007.
[CEP10] S. N. Cohen, R. J. Elliott, and C. E. M. Pearce, A General Comparison Theorem for Backward
Stochastic Differential Equations, Advances in Applied Probability 42 (2010), no. 3, 878–898.
[CF10] R. Cont and D.-A. Fournié, Change of variable formulas for non-anticipative functionals on path
space, Journal of Functional Analysis 259 (2010), no. 4, 1043–1072.
[CF13] R. Cont and D.-A. Fournié, Functional Itô calculus and stochastic integral representation of
martingales, The Annals of Probability 41 (2013), no. 1, 109–133.
[CG98] V. Chistyakov and O. Galkin, On maps of bounded p-variation with p > 1, Positivity 2 (1998),
no. 1, 19–45.
[CHKP16] P. Cheridito, U. Horst, M. Kupper, and T. A. Pirvu, Equilibrium pricing in incomplete markets
under translation invariant preferences, Mathematics of Operations Research 41 (2016), no. 1,
174–195.
[Cie59] Z. Ciesielski, On Haar Functions and on the Schauder Basis of the Space C(0,1), Bull. Acad.
Polon. Sci. Sér. Sci. Math. Astronom. Phys 7 (1959), no. 4, 227–232.
[Cie60] Z. Ciesielski, On the Isomorphisms of the Spaces Hα and m, Bull. Acad. Polon. Sci. Sér. Sci.
Math. Astronom. Phys 8 (1960), no. 4, 217–222.
[CK02] Y. L. Chan and L. Kogan, Catching Up with the Joneses: Heterogeneous Preferences and the
Dynamics of Asset Prices 110 (2002), no. 6, 1255–1285.
[CK04] M. Capin´ski and E. Kopp, Measure, Integral and Probability, 2nd ed., Springer Undergraduate
Mathematics Series, Springer, 2004.
[CLR01] G. Carlier and T. Lachand-Robert, Regularity of Solutions for Some Variational Problems Subject
to a Convexity Constraint, Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 54 (2001),
no. 5, 583–594.
[CML16] F. Corsi, S. Marmi, and F. Lillo, When Micro Prudence Increases Macro Risk: The Destabilizing
Effects of Financial Innovation, Leverage, and Diversification, Operations Research 64 (2016),
no. 5, 1073–1088.
[CMV09] F. Caccioli, M. Marsili, and P. Vivo, Eroding market stability by proliferation of financial instru-
ments, The European Physical Journal B 71 (2009), no. 4, 467–479.
[CN15] P. Cheridito and K. Nam, Multidimensional quadratic and subquadratic BSDEs with special
structure, Stochastics 87 (2015), no. 5, 871–884.
[DDH13] T. R. Daniëls, J. Dönges, and F. Heinemann, Crossing network versus dealer market: Unique
equilibrium in the allocation of order flow, European Economic Review 62 (2013), 41–57.
[DdJK15] H. Degryse, F. de Jong, and V. v. Kervel, The Impact of Dark Trading and Visible Fragmenta-
tion on Market Quality, Review of Finance 19 (2015), no. 4, 1587–1622, available at /oup/
backfile/Content_public/Journal/rof/19/4/10.1093/rof/rfu027/2/rfu027.pdf.
[DN11] R. M Dudley and R. Norvaiša, Concrete Functional Calculus, Springer Monographs in Mathe-
matics, Springer, 2011.
[dR11] G. dos Reis, Some advances on quadratic BSDE: Theory - Numerics - Applications, LAP LAM-
BERT Academic Publishing, 2011.
[Due49] J. S. Duesenberry, Income, saving and the theory of consumer behavior, Harward University
Press, 1949.
[Dup09] B. Dupire, Functional Itô Calculus, Bloomberg Portfolio Research paper 2009-04 (2009).
[DVAW05] H. Degryse, M. Van Achter, and G. Wuyts, Crossing Networks: Theory and Evidence, Tijdschrift
voor Bank-en Financiewezen 69 (2005), 114–118.
145
[DVAW09] H. Degryse, M. Van Achter, and G. Wuyts, Dynamic order submission strategies with compe-
tition between a dealer market and a crossing network, Journal of Financial Economics 91
(2009), no. 3, 319–338.
[EKTZ14] I. Ekren, C. Keller, N. Touzi, and J. Zhang, On viscosity solutions of path dependent PDEs, The
Annals of Probability 42 (2014), no. 1, 204–236. MR3161485
[Els11] J. Elstrodt, Maß- und Integrationstheorie, Springer-Lehrbuch, Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2011.
[EPQ97] N. El Karoui, S. Peng, and M. C. Quenez, Backward stochastic differential equations in finance,
Math. Finance 7 (1997), no. 1, 1–71. MR1434407
[ER09] N. El Karoui and C. Ravanelli, Cash subadditive risk measures and interest rate ambiguity,
Math. Finance 19 (2009), no. 4, 561–590. MR2583520
[Esp10] G.-E. Espinosa, Stochastic control methods for optimal portfolio investment, Ph.D. Thesis, 2010.
[ET15] G.-E. Espinosa and N. Touzi, Optimal Investment under Relative Performance Concerns, Math-
ematical Finance 25 (2015), no. 2, 221–257.
[Fab10] G. Faber, Über die Orthogonalfunktionen des Herrn Haar., Jahresbericht der Deutschen
Mathematiker-Vereinigung 19 (1910), 104–112.
[Fag96] M.-C. Fagart, Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d’information, Annales
d’Économie et de Statistique 43 (1996), 1–27.
[FdR11] C. Frei and G. dos Reis, A financial market with interacting investors: does an equilibrium
exist?, Mathematics and financial economics 4 (2011), no. 3, 161–182. MR2796281
[FH14] P. K. Friz and M. Hairer, A Course on Rough Paths: With an Introduction to Regularity Struc-
tures, Springer, 2014.
[FK08] D. Filipovic´ and M. Kupper, Equilibrium prices for monetary utility functions, International
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 11 (2008), no. 3, 325–343.
[FK11] H. Föllmer and T. Knispel, Entropic risk measures: coherence vs. convexity, model ambiguity,
and robust large deviations, Stoch. Dyn. 11 (2011), no. 2-3, 333–351. MR2836530
[Föl81] H. Föllmer, Calcul d’Ito sans probabilités, Séminaire de Probabilités XV 1979/80, 1981,
pp. 143–150.
[FP16] S. Foley and T. J. Putnin, š, Should we be afraid of the dark? Dark trading and market quality,
Journal of Financial Economics 122 (2016), no. 3, 456–481.
[Fre14] C. Frei, Splitting multidimensional BSDEs and finding local equilibria, Stochastic Processes and
their Applications 124 (2014), no. 8, 2654–2671.
[FRG02] M. Frittelli and E. Rosazza Gianin, Putting order in risk measures, Journal of Banking & Fi-
nance 26 (2002), no. 7, 1473–1486.
[FS02] H. Föllmer and A. Schied, Convex measures of risk and trading constraints, Finance Stoch. 6
(2002), no. 4, 429–447. MR1932379
[FV10] P. K. Friz and N. B. Victoir, Multidimensional Stochastic Processes as Rough Paths: Theory and
Applications, Cambridge studies in advanced mathematics, vol. 120, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2010.
[Góm07] J.-P. Gómez, The impact of keeping up with the Joneses behavior on asset prices and portfolio
choice, Finance Research Letters 4 (2007), no. 2, 95–103.
[Gal94] J. Gali, Keeping up with the Joneses: Consumption Externalities, Portfolio Choice, and Asset
Prices, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26 (1994), no. 1, 1–8.
[Gia06] E. R. Gianin, Risk measures via g-expectations, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 39
(2006), no. 1, 19–34.
146
[GIP15] M. Gubinelli, P. Imkeller, and N. Perkowski, Paracontrolled distributions and singular PDEs,
Forum of Mathematics, Pi 3 (2015), e6 (75 pages).
[GIP16] M. Gubinelli, P. Imkeller, and N. Perkowski, A Fourier analytic approach to pathwise stochastic
integration, Electronic Journal of Probability 21 (2016), no. 2, 1–37.
[Gla04] P. Glasserman, Monte Carlo Methods in Financial Engineering, Stochastic Modelling and Ap-
plied Probability, vol. 53, Springer, 2004.
[Glo94] L. Glosten, Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?, The Journal of Finance 49
(1994), no. 4, 1127–1161.
[Gol73] B. I. Golubov, Series with respect to the Haar system, Journal of Soviet Mathematics 1 (1973),
no. 6, 704–726.
[Gor94] R. A. Gordon, The Integrals of Lebesgue, Denjoy, Perron, and Henstock, Vol. 4, American Math-
ematical Society, 1994.
[Gre06] C. Gresse, The Effect of Crossing-Network Trading on Dealer Market’s Bid-Ask Spreads, European
Financial Management 12 (2006), no. 2, 143–160.
[GST+13] P. Gomber, S. Sagade, E. Theissen, M. C. Weber, and C. Westheide, Competi-
tion/Fragmentation in Equities Markets: A Literature Survey, Technical Report 35, SAFE Work-
ing Paper Series, 2013.
[GT16] E. Gobet and P. Turkedjiev, Linear regression MDP scheme for discrete backward stochastic dif-
ferential equations under general conditions, Mathematics of Computation 85 (2016), no. 299,
1359–1391.
[Gub04] M. Gubinelli, Controlling rough paths, Journal of Functional Analysis 216 (2004), 86–140.
[Haa10] A. Haar, Zur Theorie der orthogonalen Funktionensysteme. (Erste Mitteilung.), Mathematische
Annalen 69 (1910), 331–371.
[Hil63] T. H. Hildebrandt, Introduction to the Theory of Integration, Pure and Applied Mathematics,
vol. 13, Academic Press, 1963.
[HIM05] Y. Hu, P. Imkeller, and M. Müller, Utility maximization in incomplete markets, Ann. Appl.
Probab. 15 (2005), no. 3, 1691–1712. MR2152241
[HM00] T. Hendershott and H. Mendelson, Crossing Networks and Dealer Markets: Competition and
Performance, The Journal of Finance 55 (2000), no. 5, 2071–2115.
[HM07] U. Horst and M. Müller, On the Spanning Property of Risk Bonds Priced by Equilibrium, Math-
ematics of Operations Research 32 (2007), no. 4, 784–807.
[HMB11] U. Horst and S. Moreno-Bromberg, Efficiency and equilibria in games of optimal derivative
design, Mathematics and Financial Economics 5 (2011), no. 4, 269–297.
[HN14] U. Horst and F. Naujokat, When to Cross the Spread? Trading in Two-Sided Limit Order Books,
SIAM J. Financial Math. 5 (2014), no. 1, 278–315.
[HPDR10] U. Horst, T. Pirvu, and G. Dos Reis, On securitization, market completion and equilibrium risk
transfer, Mathematics and Financial Economics 2 (2010), no. 4, 211–252. MR2601853
[HRAY10] R. Hinz, H. P. Rudolph, P. Antolín, and J. Yermo (eds.), Evaluating the Financial Performance
of Pension Funds, The World Bank, 2010.
[HT16] Y. Hu and S. Tang, Multi-dimensional backward stochastic differential equations of diagonally
quadratic generators, Stochastic Processes and their Applications 126 (2016), no. 4, 1066–
1086.
[HW13] M. Hairer and H. Weber, Rough Burgers-like equations with multiplicative noise, Probability
Theory and Related Fields 155 (2013), no. 1-2, 71–126.
[IDR10] P. Imkeller and G. Dos Reis, Path regularity and explicit convergence rate for BSDE with trun-
cated quadratic growth, Stochastic Process. Appl. 120 (2010), no. 3, 348–379. MR2584898
147
[Imk08] P. Imkeller, Malliavin’s calculus and applications in stochastic control and finance, IMPAN Lec-
ture Notes, vol. 1, Institute of Mathematics, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, 2008.
[Imk15] P. Imkeller, A Fourier approach to pathwise stochastic integration. Lectures at the 25th Jyväskylä
Summer School, 2015.
[JKL14] A. Jamneshan, M. Kupper, and P. Luo, Multidimensional quadratic BSDEs with separated gen-
erators, 2014. arXiv:1501.00461.
[JST06] E. Jouini, W. Schachermayer, and N. Touzi, Law invariant risk measures have the Fatou prop-
erty, In: Advances in Mathematical Economics. Vol. 9, 2006, pp. 49–71. MR2277714
[Jul00] B. Jullien, Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models, Journal of Economic Theory
93 (2000), no. 1, 1–47.
[KK68] G. A. Korn and T. M. Korn, Mathematical Handbook for Scientists and Engineers. Definitions,
Theorems, and Formulas for Reference and Review, 2nd enl. and rev., McGraw-Hill, 1968.
[Kob00] M. Kobylanski, Backward stochastic differential equations and partial differential equations with
quadratic growth, Ann. Probab. 28 (2000), no. 2, 558–602. MR1782267
[KP16] D. Kramkov and S. Pulido, A system of quadratic BSDEs arising in a price impact model, The
Annals of Applied Probability 26 (2016), no. 2, 794–817.
[KS12] D. S. Kurtz and C. W. Swartz, Theories of Integration: The Integrals of Riemann, Lebesgue,
Henstock–Kurzweil, and McShane, 2nd ed., Series in Real Analysis, vol. 13, World Scientific,
2012.
[KS15] P. Kratz and T. Schöneborn, Portfolio liquidation in dark pools in continuous time, Math. Fi-
nance 25 (2015), no. 3, 496––544.
[KS51] S. Kaczmarz and H. Steinhaus, Theorie der Orthogonalreihen, 2nd ed., Monografje Matematy-
czne, vol. 6, Chelsea Publishing Company, 1951.
[KTPZ15] N. Kazi-Tani, D. Possamaï, and C. Zhou, Quadratic BSDEs with jumps: a fixed-point approach,
Electron. J. Probab. 20 (2015), no. 66, 1–28. MR3361254
[KXŽ15] C. Kardaras, H. Xing, and G. Žitkovic´, Incomplete stochastic equilibria with exponential utilities
close to Pareto optimality, arXiv preprint arXiv:1505.07224 (2015).
[LCL07] T. J. Lyons, M. J. Caruana, and T. Lévy, Differential Equations Driven by Rough Paths: École
d’été de Probabilités de Saint-Flour XXXIV – 2004, Springer, 2007.
[LdRS15] A. Lionnet, G. dos Reis, and L. Szpruch, Time discretization of FBSDE with polynomial
growth drivers and reaction-diffusion PDEs, Ann. Appl. Probab. 25 (2015), no. 5, 2563–2625.
MR3375884
[Lea01] S. Leader, The Kurzweil-Henstock Integral and Its Differential: A Unified Theory of Integration
on R and Rn, CRC Press, 2001.
[LQ02] T. Lyons and Z. Qian, System Control and Rough Paths, Oxford University Press, 2002.
[McL80] R. M. McLeod, The Generalized Riemann Integral, 1st ed., The Carus Mathematical Mono-
graphs, vol. 20, Mathematical Association of America, 1980.
[MPR17] T. Mastrolia, D. Possamaï, and A. Réveillac, On the Malliavin differentiability of BSDEs, Ann.
Inst. H. Poincaré Probab. Statist. 53 (2017), no. 1, 464–492.
[MR78] M. Mussa and S. Rosen, Monopoly and Product Quality, Journal of Economic Theory 18
(1978), 301–317.
[MY10] J. Ma and S. Yao, On Quadratic g-Evaluations/Expectations and Related Analysis, Stochastic
Analysis and Applications 28 (2010), no. 4, 711–734. MR2739601
[Mye91] R. B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, United States of
America, 1991.
148
[NØ06] R. Næs and B. A. Ødegaard, Equity trading by institutional investors: To cross or not to cross?,
Journal of Financial Markets 9 (2006), no. 2, 79–99.
[Neg60] T. Negishi, Welfare economics and existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy,
Metroeconomica 12 (1960), no. 2-3, 92–97.
[Nie97] O. A. Nielsen, An Introduction to Integration and Measure Theory, Wiley-Interscience, 1997.
[Nou12] I. Nourdin, Selected Aspects of Fractional Brownian Motion, Bocconi & Springer Series,
Springer-Verlag, Mailand, 2012.
[NR14] M. Nimalendran and S. Ray, Informational linkages between dark and lit trading venues, Jour-
nal of Financial Markets 17 (2014), 230–261.
[Nua06] D. Nualart, The Malliavin Calculus and Related Topics, 2nd ed., Probability and its Applications
(New York), Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2006.
[Øk97] B. Øksendal, An Introduction to Malliavin Calculus with Applications to Economics. Lecture
notes, 1997.
[Ori12] N. Oriol, Fragmentation of Order Flows and Revision of MiFID: Lessons from Industrial Eco-
nomics, Revue d’économie industrielle 3 (2012), 49–76.
[Pag92] F. H. Page Jr., Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard, Economic
Theory 2 (1992), no. 2, 265–281.
[Ped15] A. Pedraza, Strategic Interactions and Portfolio Choice in Money Management: Theory and Evi-
dence, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 47 (2015), no. 8, 1531–1569.
[Pen97] S. Peng, Backward SDE and related g-expectation, In: N. El Karoui and L. Mazliak (eds.),
Backward stochastic differential equations, 1997, pp. 141–159. MR1752680
[Pfe93] W. F. Pfeffer, The Riemann approach to integration: Local geometric theory, Vol. 109, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1993.
[PP16] N. Perkowski and D. J. Prömel, Pathwise stochastic integrals for model free finance, Bernoulli
22 (2016), no. 4, 2486–2520.
[PS03] C. A. Parlour and D. J. Seppi, Liquidity-Based Competition for Order Flow, The Review of
Financial Studies 16 (2003), no. 2, 301–343.
[PSS+08] J. Pouyet, B. Salanié, F. Salanié, et al., On competitive equilibria with asymmetric information,
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 8 (2008), no. 1, 1–16.
[Rüs13] L. Rüschendorf,Mathematical Risk analysis. Dependence, Risk Bounds, Optimal Allocations and
Portfolios, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2013.
[REK00] R. Rouge and N. El Karoui, Pricing Via Utility Maximization and Entropy, Mathematical Fi-
nance 10 (2000), no. 2, 259–276.
[RH73] H. E. Ryder Jr. and G. M. Heal, Optimal Growth with Intertemporally Dependent Preferences,
The Review of Economic Studies 40 (1973), no. 1, 1–31.
[Roc85] J.-C. Rochet, The taxation principle and multi–time Hamilton-Jacobi equations, Journal of
Mathematical Economics 14 (1985), 113–128.
[Roy93] B. Roynette, Mouvement brownien et espaces de Besov, Stochastics and Stochastic Reports 43
(1993), no. 3-4, 221–260.
[Rud76] W. Rudin, Principles of Mathematical Analysis, 3rd ed., McGraw-Hill New York, 1976.
[Sch17] D. C. Schwarz, Market completion with derivative securities, Finance and Stochastics 21
(2017), no. 1, 263–284.
[Sch27] J. Schauder, Zur Theorie stetiger Abbildungen in Funktionalräumen, Mathematische Zeitschrift
26 (1927), no. 1, 47–65.
[Sch96] E. Schechter, Handbook of analysis and its foundations, Academic Press, 1996.
149
[SUV07] J. L. Solé, F. Utzet, and J. Vives, Canonical Lévy process and Malliavin calculus, Stochastic
Processes and their Applications 117 (2007), no. 2, 165–187.
[Swa01] C. Swartz, Introduction to gauge integrals, World Scientific, 2001.
[Tar55] A. Tarski, A Lattice-Theoretical Fixpoint Theorem and its Applications, Pacific J. Math. 5 (1955),
no. 2, 285–309.
[Tev08] R. Tevzadze, Solvability of backward stochastic differential equations with quadratic growth,
Stochastic Processes and their Applications 118 (2008), no. 3, 503–515. MR2389055
[Tou13] N. Touzi, Optimal Stochastic Control, Stochastic Target Problems, and Backward SDE, Fields
Institute Monographs, vol. 29, Springer, New York, 2013. With Chapter 13 by Angès Tourin.
MR2976505
[Ul’64] P. L. Ul’yanov, On Haar series, Matematicheskii Sbornik 63(105) (1964), no. 3, 356–391.
[vBC00] M. van Brunt and B. Carter, The Lebesgue-Stieltjes Integral. A Practical Introduction, Springer,
2000.
[Vol16] I. Voloshchenko, On pathwise functional Itô calculus and its applications to mathematical fi-
nance, Ph.D. Thesis, 2016.
[Wes51] J. D. Weston, Inequalities for Riemann-Stieltjes Integrals, Mathematische Zeitschrift 54 (1951),
no. 3, 272–274.
[XZ10] C. Xiouros and F. Zapatero, The Representative Agent of an Economy with External Habit For-
mation and Heterogeneous Risk Aversion, Review of Financial Studies 23 (2010), no. 8, 3017–
3047.
[XŽ16] H. Xing and G. Žitkovic´, A class of globally solvable Markovian quadratic BSDE systems and
applications, arXiv preprint arXiv:1603.00217 (2016).
[Ye16] L. Ye, Understanding the impacts of dark pools on price discovery, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1612.08486 (2016).
[You36] L. C. Young, An inequality of the Hölder type, connected with Stieltjes integration, Acta Mathe-
matica 67 (1936), no. 1, 251–282.
[Zhu14] H. Zhu, Do Dark Pools Harm Price Discovery?, The Review of Financial Studies 27 (2014),
no. 3, 747–789.
150
Acknowledgments
First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Ulrich Horst, for his support and his patience
throughout these past years and also for his honesty and understanding.
I am also very thankful to Peter Imkeller, who did not only give brilliant lectures, but
who also offered me a very interesting topic to work on.
Moreover, I want to thank Gonçalo dos Reis, Arnaud Lionnet and Santiago Moreno-
Bromberg for the fruitful discussions and good advice.
I also thank all my colleagues from Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, in particular Sabine
Bergmann and Andrea Fiebig, whose help with bureaucracy is priceless.
Last but not least I also want to thank my family and friends for their constant support
and encouragement.
152
Selbständigkeitserklärung
Ich erkläre, dass ich die Dissertation selbständig und nur unter Verwendung der von mir
gemäß § 7 Abs. 3 der Promotionsordnung der Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftlichen
Fakultät, veröffentlicht im Amtlichen Mitteilungsblatt der Humboldt-Universität zu Ber-
lin Nr. 126/2014 am 18.11.2014 angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe.
Berlin, 27.03.2017
